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Using Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT, Higgins 1997), I take a broad look at the 
manner in which political behaviors and attitudes are impacted by the promotion and 
prevention motivational systems. I first look at how behavior in life generally and political 
life specifically are similar in terms of regulatory focus. Second, I look at how RFT is related 
to political attitudes. Specifically, I look at whether there is a connection between regulatory 
focus and ideological attitudes, whether there is a relationship between policy context and 
motivational systems, and whether the status quo of a policy leads to a relationship between 
focus and issue attitudes. Finally, I look at how regulatory fit impacts the intention to vote as 
well as attitudes related to casting a ballot. I look at process based regulatory fit by 
interacting a person’s chronic regulatory focus and how they behave in political life.  I also 
analyze outcome based fit by manipulating focus and the content of a Get Out the Vote 
message. I examine these topics by using three separate studies – two surveys and one 
experiment. I show people generally use either eager or vigilant strategies across both every 
day and political life. I also show that people who use eager strategies vote for their preferred 
candidate while those using vigilant strategies are more likely to blackball disliked candidates. 
My findings show a much stronger connection between a general proclivity to use eager 
strategies and holding a promotion orientation than prevention focus and using vigilant 
strategies. In addition, I find that the environment in which people are politically active 
impacts attitudes. For example, the current status quo of a policy impacts how regulatory 
focus is related to issue attitudes. Also, under certain conditions, the combination of focus 
and strategy use can increase external efficacy and positive attitudes related to voting. 
Overall, people’s motivational systems color their view of the political world and how they 
relate to it. 
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! 1 
CHAPTER 1   Introduction 
 
“I just wanted to know why I should remain a loyal fan when the owners and the players have 
personally done nothing for me.” 
     –Jackie, Green Bay Packer fan (NPR Aug. 1, 2011) 
 
 
Jackie perceives that she in fact matters to the Green Bay Packers organization and 
that her refusal to support the team following the NFL lockout will negatively impact the 
team. Her goal is to support the team and she expects the organization to see her 
contribution to this goal as important. Does this same perception of being important and 
influential spill over into the political world? Does the perception of a goal and how it is met 
matter in a citizen’s relationship to the political world? The answer to these questions is, as 
with many questions asked in social science, it depends.  
Goals offer a framework of human behavior by providing motivation to direct, 
engage, and sustain actions and these goals represent the desire to reach a positive state and 
avoid a negative one (Austin & Vancouver 1996; Dweck & Leggett 1998). Within the 
political world government officials have reelection goals, citizens obtain information, 
construct beliefs, and choose to participate or not. However, people perceive these goals 
differently, and in effect, move towards them differently and experience the path from 
current to end state differently. I propose taking a deep dive into how motivational 
orientation affects political behavior – how political goals are seen and acted upon differently 
based on Regulatory Focus Theory. 
1.1 Regulatory Focus 
Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT) states there are two distinct motivation systems – 
promotion and prevention – based on pursuing nurturance or security needs (Higgins 
19997). Needs perceived as related to advancement and ideals are met with a promotion 
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focus, using eager strategies highlighted by a sensitivity to gains. Security related needs, 
oughts, are met with a prevention focus – emphasizing duty and obligation – using vigilant 
strategies emphasizing the avoidance of losses (Higgins 1997). Not only can different goals 
reflect either concern, but people may perceive the same goal with a promotion or a 
prevention lens. In each case, whether regulatory focus is examined as a personality trait or 
induced by the environment, goal pursuit is characterized as approaching a desired end-state 
(Higgins 1997; Higgins & Silberman 1997).  
The overarching research question in this project uses RFT to examine political 
behavior by asking, how does goal perception affect political attitudes and behavior 
differently under a promotion or prevention focus?  If Jackie is prevention focused she is 
more likely to root harder for the defense to stop the opposing team’s drive and a win by the 
Packers equals security in the league’s standing. She is also more likely to use anti-Trump 
bumper stickers to show support for Hillary Clinton. If Jackie is promotion oriented she will 
cheer harder for Rodgers to make a touchdown pass to Jones because a win will get the 
Packers closer to the Super Bowl and cheer harder for Rodgers to make a touchdown pass 
to Jones. She will also show support for the Democrat Party’s advancement to power with a 
pro-Clinton bumper sticker.  
While these behaviors may seem like two sides of the same coin, they are intrinsically 
different. Large differences in goal pursuit, emotions, decision-making, and information 
processing occur across the two (Higgins 1997; for review see, Forster & Werth 2009; 
Molden, Lee, Higgins, Shah, & Gardner 2008).  Promotion focused individuals prefer 
positive information and are attuned to positive reinforcement, have a global processing 
style, and display a risky bias. Prevention dominance is associated with preferences for 
negative information, higher responsiveness to negative stimuli, using a local processing 
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style, and a conservative risk bias (Higgins 1997; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes 1994; 
Crowe & Higgins 1997).  
Regulatory focus can be a valuable lens to view political behavior because of the 
wide ranging effects it has on people’s lives, ranging from optimism (Grant & Higgins 2003) 
to driving behaviors (Hamstra, Bolderdijk, & Veldstra 2011) to in- and out-group relations 
(Shah, Brazy, & Higgins 2004) to self-identity (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner 2000). People with a 
promotion focus hold an entirely different worldview compared to people with a strong 
prevention focus. These differences are reflected in the cognitive style of each, connecting 
the individual to the social world (Higgins 1996; Strauman & Wilson 2013). Seeing the world 
differently and processing what is in it in distinct manners makes it probable that each 
regulatory orientation influences behavior not only a people’s everyday life, but also their 
view and behavior within the political world. I explore regulatory focus as a psychological 
and environmental variable throughout this project to examine motivation and its 
connection to political attitudes and behavior. 
1.2 Regulatory Fit 
People may or may not meet goals using strategies that match their goal orientation, 
such as using strategic eagerness (vigilance) for those that have a stronger promotion 
(prevention) orientation. Individuals may, consciously or not, pursue goals in ways that 
match the current regulatory focus. In other cases, the environment may be conducive to 
using either an eager or vigilant strategy or induce regulatory fit itself (Higgins 2000). When 
there is a match between regulatory orientation and goal pursuit means, a “feeling of right” 
occurs. This misattribution increases motivation towards a goal and the perceived value in 
their performance or a target object, as well as raises their confidence in their choice 
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(Cesario, Grant, & Higgins 2004; Higgins 2000; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden 
2003; Idson and Higgins 2000).  
These postulates regarding regulatory fit leads to my second broad research question, 
how does regulatory fit affect attitudes toward one’s perception of political activity? 
Going back to Jackie, the Green Bay fan, if she is promotion (prevention) oriented and uses 
eager (vigilant) strategies to meet her political goals, regulatory fit is likely to occur and she 
will be more motivated to pursue opportunities to engage in the political world and see more 
value in her participation. Jackie’s strong attitude about her importance as a Packer fan could 
be tied to how she pursues goals as a sports fan. If this is true, does it also work within the 
political world?  
1.3 Outline 
 In the remainder of this dissertation, I provide an answer to these main research 
questions as well as several smaller ones nested within the notion that regulatory focus and 
fit impact political behavior. I do this across four empirical chapters that are bookended by 
one chapter on the theoretical underpinnings of RFT and a concluding chapter on the 
findings and implication of motivational orientation on political attitudes and behavior. I 
offer a broad analysis of how RFT fits into political psychology looking not only at ideology 
and attitudinal direction, but also participation and attitudes towards government pertinent 
to a democratic system.   
 Prior to the empirical investigation, I examine previous literature on regulatory focus 
in Chapter 2, focusing on where RFT and political behavior intersect. The chapter brings in 
much of the research from social psychology, the home of RFT literature, as well as 
business, physiological psychology, and political science. In addition, I give an overview of 
! 5 
the methodology behind the empirical investigation of regulatory focus and political 
behavior use in the subsequent chapters.  
 In the first empirical section, Chapter 3, I examine the connection between behaviors 
both inside and outside of politics in relation to regulatory focus. I answer the question, Do 
people act differently than they do in everyday life when political power is at stake? In 
addition, Chapter 3 examines how regulatory focus directs specific behaviors and 
motivations behind vote choice. Here, I focus on understanding whether vote choice is 
based on the candidate that is the lesser of two evils versus the most preferred nominee. 
 I shift to policy attitudes and ideological differences in Chapter 4. Specifically, I test 
three possibilities in which regulatory focus and attitudes may intersect. First, I test the 
hypothesis that promotion focus individuals are dominantly liberal while prevention focus is 
connected to conservatism. Second, I ask if the association between RFT and attitudes is due 
to the content of the policy under examination. Last, I examine the impact of the policy 
environmental on the association between policy attitudes and RFT. In this case, whether or 
not the status quo matches someone’s policy position may determine if promotion or 
prevention strength is connected to specific attitudes.  
 In the final two empirical chapters, Chapters 5 and 6, I examine how regulatory fit 
correlates and impacts political behavior. Chapter 5 examines the interaction between an 
individual’s chronic regulatory focus and how they strategically meet goals. I test whether the 
experience of having corresponding goal perceptions and strategies to meet them are related 
to stronger external efficacy attitudes and motivation to vote.  
Finally, in Chapter 6, I manipulate regulatory fit, rather than measuring it, to examine 
possible causal mechanisms between motivation and political attitudes and behavior. The 
treatment involves inducing either a promotion or prevention focus and manipulating Get-
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Out-the-Vote (GOTV) messages to be more vigilant or eager. These final two chapters will 
help answer the question posed above about Jackie. When Jackie experiences regulatory fit, 
she ought to feel as though her political participation matters more and motivated to act as a 
political agent than when non-fit is experienced.  
 In the concluding chapter, I provide an overview of the findings and major 
conclusions that can be drawn from this project. In addition, I reflect on potential pragmatic 
actions, in accordance with the implications of regulatory focus on the political world. Last, I 
discuss the limitations and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 Exploring Regulatory Focus as a Holistic View 
 of Political Behavior 
 
Goals are inherently tied to political behavior, ranging from the adoption of policy 
attitudes to political participation and perceptions of political representation. Examination of 
political behavior requires attention to goals because, ultimately, behavior inside and outside 
of the political world is a function of attempts to reach a desired end-state or avoid an 
undesirable one. Goals are considered internal, cognitive representations of desired end 
states that link a person’s needs, motives, and beliefs to the social world (for a review see, 
Austin and Vancouver 1996; Fishbach & Ferguson 2013). Motivation, whether conscious or 
not, is guided by both superordinate goals, such as those involved in ideological beliefs, and 
routine goals, concerning the choice between reading the latest news on an election or a 
blockbuster movie.  
 Motivation and goals are not uncommon in political science literature and, often 
times, they are found at the forefront of research agendas. For example, self-interest 
motivations (Downs 1957; Riker & Ordeshook 1973) and pro-social goals (Gerber, Green, 
& Larimer 2008; Panagopoulos 2010) are thought to drive political behavior. Information 
biases and attitude updating is affected by the motivation to be accurate or hold correct 
beliefs (Taber, Lodge, & Glathar 2001). Psychological needs and universal values motivate 
ideological attitudes (Duckitt 2002; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway 2003; Barnea & 
Schwartz 1998). While the latter research utilizes a more fundamental concept of motivation 
than the previous examples, none of these paradigms examine behavior holistically. 
Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT) provides the structure in which overall political behavior, 
not just one aspect of it, can be viewed as being driven by a person’s motivational 
orientation, the environment, and the interaction of the two. 
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Individuals must meet the basic needs of security and nurturance to survive the 
physical and social world. RFT is premised upon the notion that these needs are met by 
distinct regulatory systems – a prevention system and a promotion system, respectively 
(Higgins, 1987; Higgins et al. 1994; Higgins 1997). These regulatory systems, at the systemic 
level, work with the basic notion of approaching desired states and avoiding undesired ones. 
However, what distinguishes the promotion and prevention system is how goals are 
perceived and pursued at the strategic level – the pattern of approach and avoidance 
motivations that direct specific goal-directed behavior (Cornwell & Higgins 2015; Higgins 
1998; Scholer & Higgins 2008). Consistent use of the promotion or prevention system 
makes the regulatory focus system more accessible, making the motivational orientation a 
piece of a person’s personality. In addition, the environment has the capability to active a 
regulatory state (Higgins 1997). This not only allows for unique predictions in the way 
individuals within the political environment are likely to behave, but also functions as a 
broader theory of personality that takes into account variance in the person and the 
environment (Higgins 2008; Higgins & Scholer 2008). 
 The environment not only acts independently to activate one focus over another, but 
also interacts with an individual’s regulatory focus, impacting motivation and associated 
outcomes. Regulatory fit, an extension of RFT, examines how the combination of an 
individual’s current focus and the situational or structural environment influences attitudes 
and behaviors (Higgins 2000; Freitas & Higgins 2002). Under conditions of regulatory fit, 
where the situation or mode of goal attainment matches an individual’s current or chronic 
focus, a “feeling of right” occurs leading to increased persuasion or use of heuristics, 
additional value placed on a target object or behavior, and motivational strength compared 
to when regulatory unfit is experienced (Cesario et al. 2004; Higgins 2000; Idson, Liberman, 
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& Higgins 2004). Essentially, regulatory fit has the ability to intensify motivation as well as its 
correlates and outcomes. 
 RFT has a strong presence within the psychology literature and use of the theory has 
spilled over into other areas such as advertising and public health research, but has only had 
a limited introduction into political science (e.g, Boldero & Higgins 2011; Jost et al. 2003). I 
begin the chapter with an overview of RFT, emphasizing where motivational orientation is 
expected to drive political behavior. Following this, I review the broad methodological 
strategy used throughout the project. I test the hypotheses using two surveys and an 
experiment. Within the methodological outline, I discuss the common data collection 
procedures and variables across the three studies. 
2.1 Regulatory Focus Theory 
RFT is a socio-cognitive theory of motivation with origins in a self-regulatory 
perspective. People regulate their movement towards meeting basic needs with two distinct 
motivational systems – a promotion focus concerns nurturance needs and a prevention 
focus concerns security needs (Higgins 1997). Based on Higgins early work on self-
discrepancy theory, these needs are associated with distinct, desirable end states: 1) the ideal 
self, encompassing hopes, wishes, and aspirations; and, 2) the ought self, consisting of 
obligations, duties, and responsibilities. Pursuing nurturance needs develops the strength and 
importance of the ideal self and seeking security is associated with the development of the 
ought self, which is associated with security needs (Higgins 1987; 1997). Specifically, goals 
within a promotion focus concern ideals, which emphasize accomplishment, growth and 
nurturance needs, while goals under a prevention focus are represented as oughts, which 
emphasize responsibility, safety, and security needs (Higgins 1996; 1997; 1998).  
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The representation of goals differs significantly within each focus. For instance, 
within a promotion focus, nurturance needs are considered a type of maximal goal, 
indicating an aspiration but not necessarily a requirement. On the other hand, prevention 
focus goals concerning security are considered a type of minimal goal, indicating a 
requirement (Brendl & Higgins 1996). In line with this, pursuing promotion goals involves 
maximizing positive outcomes, or gains, to obtain an accomplishment. Pursuing prevention 
goals involves concentrating on minimizing negative outcomes, or losses, in order to achieve 
safety (Higgins 1997; 1998). Promotion goals are met with an eager strategy, in which case 
the preferred strategy is to approach matches to the end state. Approaching the desired end 
state within a prevention focus involves the adoption of a vigilant strategy – emphasizing the 
avoidance of goal mismatches (Crowe & Higgins 1997; Higgins 1997). It is important to 
emphasize that both regulatory states involve approaching a desired end state with either 
strategy. For example, two citizens may see the goal of voting quite differently based on their 
regulatory orientation; Citizen A perceives voting as meeting a basic civic duty while Citizen 
B views voting as an opportunity to become an ideal citizen.  
The differences that occur in the pursuit of advancement or security are 
fundamental, creating distinct perceptions and experiences. Promotion and prevention 
motivations result in differences in how information is evaluated, decisions and judgments 
are made, goals are perceived and pursued, and affective responses to successes and failures 
(Forster & Werth 2009; Higgins 1997; Molden et al. 2008). These differences can be either a 
state or trait, but in either case, it drives human behavior.  
2.2.1 Chronic Regulatory Focus as a Personality Trait 
Political psychology has embraced the trait approach to personality (e.g. Mondak 
2010) and promotion and prevention focus is related to facets of the Big 5 (Higgins 2008; 
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Manczak, Zapata-Gietl, & McAdams 2014; Vaughn, Baumann, & Klemann 2008). However, 
RFT is a theory of motivation from a social psychology background. It goes beyond 
describing behavior but explains where behavior is derived. Personality can be described as a 
set of “motivated preferences and biases in the ways that people see the world and cope in 
the world” (Higgins & Scholar 2008, 183). This takes a motivated cognition approach to 
personality where each system becomes cognitively accessible, coloring the way someone 
sees the world and preferences for strategies to use within the world they see (Higgins 2008; 
Higgins & Scholer 2008, 2010). 
 Self-regulation is the system used by people to compare current to future states and 
this creates the motivation to behave – motivation explains how and why people take certain 
actions (Carver & Sheier 1998). People strive to meet their ideal or ought self-guide which 
begin to develop in early childhood from parental influence and temperament and form the 
basis for a chronic motivational orientation (Higgins 1997; 1998; 2002; Higgins & Silberman 
1998; Higgins et al. 2004; Keller 2008; Manian, Papadakis, Strauman, & Essex 2006). The 
promotion and prevention system to meet goals becomes cognitively accessible to different 
degrees. However, one is often stronger than the other, a person’s view of the world and 
their response preferences (Higgins 2008; Higgins & Scholer 2008; Scholer & Higgins 2010).  
The accessibility of either the promotion or prevention system is developed early in 
life. Children learn self-regulatory strategies – how goals are perceived and how to meet 
them – through caretaker interactions. These interactions include a combination of positive 
and negative consequences and an emphasis on safety or growth, which molds goal 
perception and behavior. Encouragement and positive reinforcements are related to a 
promotion system and focusing on danger and negative reinforcements develops a stronger 
prevention system. While people hold some degree of promotion and prevention focus, the 
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socialization process often leads to one being stronger and more cognitively accessible 
(Higgins 1997; Higgins & Silberman 1998).  
Empirical work has corroborated the theoretical argument, showing that the 
caretaker-child socialization process creates individual differences in regulatory focus in 
children and adults (Keller 2008; Manian et al. 2006). In addition, there has been some 
evidence of stability in dominant focus over a three-year period in which regulatory focus 
predicts the selection and pursuit strategy of goals (Strauman 1996). Socialization, through 
learning what behaviors obtain the child’s desired result – the presence of rewards and 
positive outcomes for ideals and the absence of punishment and negative outcomes for 
oughts – allows for a strong perception of goals and the associated regulatory focus.  
Physiological differences between regulatory focus systems demonstrate how 
regulatory focus guides behavior at the biological level. Neurological studies show how 
people enter situations in a “pre-goal” state, already primed to bias the perception of a goal 
(Strauman et al. 2013). Chronic promotion focus is associated with an increased left frontal 
cortex, which is also previously been associated with approach and gain motivations, while 
chronic prevention individuals have an increased baseline on the left, which previously has 
been tied to loss and avoidance motivations (Amodio, Shah, Sigelman, Brazy, & Harmon-
Jones 2004; Eddington, Dolcos, Cabeza, R. Krishnan, & Strauman 2007). Other studies have 
shown that neural activation in relation to focal stimuli follows a similar structural pattern to 
those previously seen when someone is thinking about desired self-outcomes and self-
referential thinking (Strauman et al. 2013; Touryan et al. 2007). These neural activation 
patterns correspond with studies that show preconscious goals influence behavior regarding 
strategy choice (Forster, Higgins, & Idson 1998), as well as subsequent preconscious 
attention related to approaching a an incomplete goal (Moskowitz 2002). These findings 
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correspond with Higgins (1996) initial theoretical argument that regulatory focus represents 
different worldviews.  
One example of the distinct worldviews between promotion and prevention oriented 
people is how the environment is perceived. Promotion individuals utilize a more global 
perspective versus a more local perspective used by prevention oriented people (Forster & 
Higgins 2005; Pham & Chang 2010). Considering that an individual’s chronic promotion or 
prevention focus colors goal-directed behavior, both at the conscious and pre-conscious 
levels, strategy use based on one’s chronic regulatory focus in everyday and political life 
should be correlated.  
Regulatory focus is an integral piece of personality, expressing itself traits, goals, and 
life stories (Manczak, et al. 2014). Promotion and prevention focus has also been shown to 
be related to other personality traits and enduring predispositions. For example, facets of the 
Big 5 are correlated with one’s chronic regulatory focus (Higgins 2008; Maczak et al. 2014; 
Vaughn et al. 2008). Basic values, which also provide a dispositional motivation structure to 
guide behavior, are associated with focus (Leikas, Lonnqvist, Verkassalo, & Lindeman 2009). 
While regulatory focus correlates with other personality variables, it is distinct and offers a 
new way of looking at political behavior. 
Motivation, at its core, is about approaching desired end states and avoiding 
undesired ones (Carver & Sheier 1998; Elliot & Thrash 2002; Gray 1970). Regulatory focus 
is associated with the behavioral activation system (BAS) and the behavioral inhibition 
system (BIS) (Higgins et al. 2001). It’s important to note that while RFT is similar to the 
theoretical underpinnings of BIS/BAS, it is theoretically distinct and has been shown to be 
empirically separate (Eddington et al. 2007; Forster et al. 1998; Higgins 1996; Higgins, 
Harlow, Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor 2001; Strauman & Wilson 2010). Neurological activation 
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patterns have shown that regulatory focus is more abstract and connected to the sense of 
self than the BIS/BAS (Stauman et al. 2013). Because people tend to develop a chronic 
motivational style that is either promotion or prevention oriented, political behavior is likely 
shaped by dispositional focus in accordance with tendencies within general life.  
Personality in political science has embraced the trait approach and has found 
connections across a wide variety of political attitudes and behavior (e.g. Mondak 2010). In 
addition, promotion and prevention focus is related to facets of the Big 5 (Higgins 2008; 
Manczak et al. 2014; Vaughn et al. 2008). However, RFT takes a motivated cognition 
approach to personality where the promotion and prevention systems become accessible, 
coloring the way someone sees the world and preferences for strategies to use within the 
world they see (Higgins 2008; Higgins & Scholer 2008; Scholer & Higgins 2010). The trait 
approach, such as the Big 5, is often criticized as being descriptive rather than explanatory 
and atheoretical (Block 1995; Mischel & Shoda 1994; Pervin 1994). On the other hand, many 
social psychologists define personality as an interaction between cognitive and affective inner 
processes and the outside world (Bandura 1991; Dweck & Leggett 1988; Mischel & Shoda 
1995). Fleeson and Jayawickreme (2015) argue that the two should be combined to better 
understand personality; while still using the observed behavior from traits to describe people, 
these traits serve as the need to meet goals. For example, extraversion serves the goal of 
having fun and fostering relationships (McCabe & Fleeson 2012). At the systematic level, 
regulatory focus represents the set of higher order goals held by a person that influences 
behavior through an interaction of the self and social world (Higgins 1996; Strauman 1996; 
Strauman & Wilson 2010). Chapter 3 examines how behaviors within the political arena 
correspond with behavior in other areas of life based on one’s chronic focus. The main 
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question concerns if the concept of regulatory focus as a personality trait translate into 
seeing similar strategic behaviors in general and political life.  
2.1.2 Eager and Vigilant Strategies 
The specific strategy used for each motivation system is derived from the different 
goals being pursued. Both goal types are adaptive and concern a positive end-state and both 
sets of strategies involve effective and purposive action towards that end; one system or 
strategy is not necessarily better than the other (Forster & Werth 2009; Higgins 1996). End 
states under a promotion focus are about achievement and accomplishment versus non-
fulfillment. On the other hand, end states for prevention concerns are about responsibility 
and safety versus threat (Crowe & Higgins 1997; Higgins 1997; 1998; Higgins et al. 1994). 
Success for promotion focus involves the presence of a positive outcome and failure is the 
absence of a positive result, putting the focus of end states as gains or non-gains. On the 
other hand, success under prevention is the absence of a negative outcome and failure is its 
presence, therefore end-states are viewed as non-losses and losses (Crowe & Higgins 1997; 
Higgins et al. 1994). The way goals and their outcomes are perceived leads to differences in 
the choice of behavior used to reach the desired end state. 
Ideal goals met by the promotion system involve eager strategies. The importance of 
reaching an ideal state leads to the attempt to approach matches to the goal in order to get a 
positive outcome. Successfully obtaining security requires the absence of a negative 
outcome, therefore the strategic focus is on avoiding mismatches to the desired goal by the 
prevention system. Attempts to attain ought goals involve the use of a vigilant strategy. By 
approaching matches to the desired state with an eager strategy, gains are maximized and 
non-gains minimized. On the other hand, vigilant strategies are able to maximize non-losses 
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and minimize losses by avoiding mismatches to the desired state (Crowe & Higgins 1997; 
Higgins 1996, 1997; Higgins et al. 1994; Molden et al. 2008).  
Where regulatory focus concerns an overall approach behavior at the systematic 
level, in which goals are approached and undesired states are avoided, strategic eagerness and 
vigilance encompasses a second level of emotion. At this strategic level, approach and 
avoidance motivation are performed within a general, consistent pattern under each 
regulatory orientation (Crowe & Higgins 1997; Higgins 1997). Chapter 3 examines if 
promotion and prevention is associated with a general strategic pattern of behaviors within 
general and political life. In addition, does regulatory focus connect to the general strategic 
pattern used within both the everyday and political world lead to how vote decisions are 
made?  
Beyond the systematic and strategic levels of motivation is the tactical level, which 
direct either an approach or avoidance behavior based on the situation; tactics include the 
specific behavior used to ensure vigilance in meeting obligations and security or eagerness to 
reach an accomplishment or growth (Cornwell & Higgins 2015; Scholer & Higgins 2008; 
Scholer, Stroessner, & Higgins 2008). These three levels of motivation work together during 
goal-pursuit, with the lowest level encompassing aspects of the environment more so than 
the higher ordered motivations. Because of this, under certain conditions a prevention 
dominance may be associated using an approach tactic or promotion dominance with an 
avoidance tactic (Scholer et al. 2008; Scholer, Zou, Fujita, Stroessner, & Higgins 2010). This 
notion becomes important when examining behavior and attitudes within the political arena 
because the environment is different for different people. For example, when President 
Obama was in office, the Democrats would have preferred maintaining the status quo within 
the presidential office while Republicans were likely to prefer a change to the status quo. In 
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this case, a stronger promotion focus may be connected with avoidance or behavioral 
inhibition – which would be contrary to traditionally expected eagerness. This notion is 
further explored in examining efficacious attitudes in Chapter 5 when some people are trying 
to maintain the status quo and others change it. 
 Regulatory focus and subsequent strategy choice, based on whether the absence or 
presence of positive versus negative outcomes is emphasized, leads to a number of 
differences between individuals with a chronic or activated promotion or prevention focus. 
These differences include what information is influential and used, how decisions and 
judgments are made, and goal pursuit behaviors, which are all aspects of behavior pertinent 
to understanding political behavior.  
2.1.3 Regulatory Focus Outcomes 
First, promotion and prevention focus, are sensitive to certain aspects of 
information, including the valence and novelty. For example, promotion is associated with 
using and being more motivated following positive feedback involving previous success 
while prevention is tied to closely attending to negative feedback associated with failures and 
being more motivated from it (Forster, Grant, Idson, & Higgins 2001). This corresponds 
with a general proclivity for prevention focused individuals to seek out and use information 
that is negative or matches their own schema. On the other hand, promotion focused 
individuals rely more so on positive and novel information (Forster, Friedman, & Liberman 
2004; Forster, Higgins, & Bianco 2003; Higgins & Tykocinski 2004; Liberman, Idson, 
Camacho, & Higgins 1999; Seibt & Forster 2004). These asymmetrical information biases 
have been found in memory tasks (Higgins & Tykoncinski 1992), attributions to ambiguous 
social stimuli (Strachman & Gable 2006), and learning about novel attitude targets (Fazio, 
Eiser, & Shook 2004). In addition to novelty and valence, information regarding 
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advancement is more influential with a promotion orientation or security for a prevention 
orientation (Aaker & Lee 2001; Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope 2004). Information asymmetries 
reflect the emphasis of each focus; the eager strategy used to meet ideal goals directs 
attention to positive information and anything that may lead to the pleasurable outcome 
while ought goals require vigilance to negative information and conserving resources to 
ensure a negative outcome does not occur. 
Within the area of decision-making, the distinct strategies used under promotion and 
prevention focus are often exemplified through Signal Detection Theory (SDT) terms. 
Under the SDT framework, in which participants identify whether a target has previously 
been shown within an earlier portion of the task, there are four possible outcomes: 1) a hit 
or “yes” response when the target had been presented; 2) a miss or a “no” response when 
the target had been presented; 3) a false alarm or a “yes” response when the target signal had 
not been presented; and, 4) a correct rejection or a “no” response when the target had not 
been presented. Eager strategies emphasize approaching hits and avoiding errors of omission 
– emphasizing the desire to obtain all positive outcomes without skipping over any – often 
taking a risky bias. A vigilant strategy approaches mismatches to negative targets through 
correct rejections and not making a mistake. By doing so, avoiding errors of commission are 
emphasized, ensuring against negative outcomes without letting one slip in – taking on a 
more conservative bias (Crowe & Higgins 1997; Forster, et al. 2003; Liberman et al. 1999; 
Liberman, Molden, Idson, & Higgins 2001; Liberman, Idson, & Higgins 2005).  
The results of the specific decision strategies include promotion focus individuals 
making quick decisions that may suffer from accuracy problems and prevention focus being 
associated with slower, but more accurate decisions (Crowe & Higgins 1997; Forster, et al. 
2003). The promotion and risky versus prevention and conservative relationships have also 
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been found in real-world behaviors regarding driving and investment choices (Hamstra, et al. 
2011; Zhou & Pham 2004). Also, when thinking about counterfactuals, eager strategies 
include adding actions not previously performed in the attempt to fix an error of omission. 
On the other hand, vigilance requires concentrating on removing actions from the situation 
in the attempt fix any error of commission (Roese, Hur, & Pennington 1999). In addition, 
prevention focused individuals have been found to repeat prior decisions, even if they did 
not provide a positive hedonic experience or were unethical, reflecting the safety in behaving 
consistently and maintaining the status quo (Higgins 2005, 2012; Zhang, Cornwell, & 
Higgins 2014). Overall, the use of an eager strategy often presents a risky bias while vigilant 
strategies reflect a conservative bias.  
Associated with how regulatory focus is distinguished by behaviors based on a SDT 
framework, the eagerness strategic concern with gains and non-gains and losses and non-
losses for vigilance also impacts decisions and behavior (Idson, Liberman, & Higgins 2000; 
Lee & Aaker 2004; for reviews see, see Molden, et al. 2008; Forster & Werth 2009). Under 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Loss Aversion (LA) theory, an “S-shaped” curve represents 
how people perceive a gain, +1, and a loss, -1, from a specific reference point, 0. Within LA, 
the “S-shaped” curve consists of a steeper drop from 0 to -1, representing losses and non-
losses than from 0 to +1, representing gain and non-gains. Therefore, losses and non-losses 
are perceived as greater and more negative than gains and non-gains and their positivity 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1979). However, these postulates may not be as previously universal 
as described because of the different sensitivities between promotion and prevention.  
 Liberman, Idson, & Higgins (2005), find that the first principle of LA, that losses are 
rated as more negatively than non-gains does occur. However, contrary to LA, Liberman and 
colleagues show that gains are perceived as more positive than non-losses. The researchers 
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argue that prevention focus, which is more sensitive to negative outcomes and avoiding 
losses, the area from -1 to 0 in the S-curve, is associated with the traditional LA principles. 
However, the promotion system is sensitive to positive outcomes and attaining gains, the 0 
to +1 area of the S-curve, which leads to an opposing perception than predicted by LA. 
Kluger, Stephan, Ganzach, & Hershkovitz (2004) also find that prospect theory is only 
accurate for prevention focused individuals when making assessments concerning weighted 
probabilities. The connection with between emphasis on gains and losses within LA theory 
demonstrates differences in what success means under each regulatory system. A promotion 
focus desires a movement above the reference point or status quo. However, the prevention 
system perceives success as getting back to or maintaining the status quo or reference point 
(Liberman et al. 1999; Molden & Higgins 2011). 
 Eagerness to obtain hits and gains as well as vigilance in ensuring against losses and 
mistakes is associated with different thresholds people employ in making choices. Because 
vigilance is used to obtain security by attending to what may be threatening or negative 
within the environment, the conservative bias ensures mistakes are not made. On the other 
hand, eagerness works towards advancement by being willing to take a risk so that all 
possible opportunities are attempted. Therefore thresholds as to what can and cannot be 
included within a category, judgment, or decision is different under each orientation.  
 One of the ways in which a different sized threshold includes the range of 
possibilities created when making choices or judgments. For example, when creating 
alternative hypotheses or categorizing objects under a prevention focus a high threshold is 
set for potential considerations, only looking into what is certain to fit within a category or a 
correct accounting of a situation or behavior. On the other hand, under a promotion focus, 
the set threshold is lower, allowing for more possibilities both in potential alternatives to 
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explain behavior or situation given credence and in the ways items could be grouped (Crowe 
& Higgins 1997; Friedman & Forster 2000, 2001; Pham & Chang 2010). Liberman, Molden, 
Idson, and Higgins (2001) find that a stronger promotion focus is positively correlated with 
how many reasons are offered to explain a person’s helpful behavior compared to 
prevention focus.  
Strategic differences and goal representations impact other characteristics of an 
individual that are also associated with how and what criteria are used to make decisions. For 
example, promotion strength is associated with being more cognitively flexible, creative, and 
preferring abstract language where prevention strength is associated with less flexibility, 
creativeness, and preferring concrete language (Baas, de Dreu, & Nijstad 2008; Bittner & 
Heidemeier 2013; Friedman & Forster 2000, 2001; Liberman et al. 1999; Semin, Higgins, de 
Montes, Estourget, & Valencia 2005). However, Baas et al. (2011) did find creativity levels 
were similar across promotion and prevention when ought goals had not been met. What is 
seen as a potential alternative can have wide repercussions within the political world. For 
example, policy preferences may be impacted by the extent an issue is placed within a larger 
context or the range of solutions to a problem considered. In addition, political compromise 
may also be impacted by how alternatives are created, such that an increase in potential 
alternatives are used and discussed or seen as viable leads to a higher likelihood of reaching 
an agreement. 
 The informational sensitivities and decision-making strategy differences between 
promotion and prevention focused individuals reflect the cognitive side of how RFT effects 
behavior within the social world, tied not only to a person’s general life but political also. 
These more cognitive distinctions potentially impact how information and judgments are 
made in the political world, not just within general life activities. However, regulatory focus 
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also has an affective component that is likely to affect goal pursuit in the political world, 
especially when it comes to whether one succeeds or fails at meeting desired outcomes such 
as having a desired candidate win an election. Political behavior has repeatedly been shown 
partially rooted in emotion (Brader 2006; Lodge & Taber 2013; Marcus, Neuman, & 
MacKuen 2000). Looking at emotional outcomes based on regulatory focus adds to the 
value in being able to understand an ongoing range of political behaviors and attitudes. 
2.1.4 Differential Emotions Arising from Promotion and Prevention 
Focus  
 
Not only does RFT posit differences in cognitions and behavior associated with 
goals, but also between the emotions that arise when a person succeeds or fails at meeting a 
goal under a promotion or prevention focus. The specific emotions arise even if the 
outcome is only anticipated (Idson et al. 2000).  Success for promotion focus results in 
happiness, whereas success within the prevention focus is calming.  Failure under a 
promotion focus results in feelings of dejection and with a prevention focus, failure leads to 
agitation-related emotions (Higgins 1987; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman 1997). Therefore, 
either strategy can be associated with positive and negative emotions, but the strength of 
each discreet emotion varies in intensity. 
Liberman, et al. (2005) argue that emotional outcomes are based on the principles of 
loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979).  Findings in three studies show losses 
(prevention focus) were more negatively perceived and resulted in negative feelings that were 
stronger than the perceptions and feelings of non-gains (promotion focus). On the other 
hand, gains (promotion focus) were rated more positively than non-losses (prevention focus) 
and were associated with more positive feelings. While the decision was made within a 
manipulated hypothetical situation in the Liberman et al. (2005) study rather than inducing 
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or measuring regulatory focus, the findings correspond with other research that does look 
specifically at motivational orientation. For example, Idson and colleagues (2000; 2004) find 
that under a promotion focus, gaining points is considered more positive than not losing 
points and anticipating a positive outcome is emotionally more intense while the opposite is 
true for a prevention focus. 
These emotional differences based on outcome are likely to come up in relation to 
political attitudes. When a person’s preferred candidate loses an election, the result is an 
undesired outcome or failure to meet the goal of having one’s preference in office. Losing 
elections has been known for worsening attitudes about government (Anderson & Tverdova 
2001), reducing trust (Anderson & LoTempio 2002), and lowering efficacy (Clarke & Acock 
1989), but the causal mechanism has yet to be established.  Understanding that attitudes are 
summaries of a variety of information (e.g. Fazio 2007) the emotional response of winning 
and losing composes a portion of the affective aspect of efficacious attitudes.  Therefore, the 
differences in emotions that occur, based on the dominant regulatory focus at the time, feeds 
into the evaluation of the attitude.  While the emotions themselves do not create external 
efficacy, a loss resulting in a stronger negative emotion under a dominant prevention focus 
may push the attitude lower and a win resulting in a stronger positive emotion with a 
promotion focus may increase the level of efficacy relative to losing under a promotion 
focus or winning under a prevention focus. This notion will be further discussed and tested 
in Chapter 5. 
Regulatory focus, both momentarily induced or as a personality trait, can have 
profound effects in such things as decision-making, goal representation, and emotional 
reactions. In particular, RFT creates a lens that colors the environment and how actors 
navigate the political world based on whether goals are seen as ideals and eagerly pursued or 
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oughts sought with vigilance. For example, take the two people with the strong desire to be a 
good, democratic citizen described above. Citizen A holds a prevention focus and perceives 
voting as a civic duty and Citizen B, with a promotion focus, sees it as being the ideal 
community member. In both cases, voting is a positive end-state and both are highly 
motivated. However, Citizen A uses a vigilant strategy by checking that her id matches the 
state’s voter identification requirements to make sure the poll workers will not turn her away 
while Citizen B, being eager, looks up her polling location the night before to make sure she 
knows where to go. In this case Citizen A is avoiding a mismatch to the goal of voting and 
Citizen B is approaching a match. Promotion and prevention focus not only affects 
participation, but it also can be associated with political attitudes. 
2.2 Regulatory Focus and Ideological Differences 
The differences between promotion and prevention individuals and corresponding 
behavior reflected through strategy are similar to many ideological-based cognitive and 
psychological differences. Similar behavior across the two concepts includes aspects of 
learning and attitude formation with conservatives behaving similar to prevention orientation 
through participation in the BeanFest game (Fazio et al. 2004; Shook & Fazio 2011).  Also, 
the emphasis conservatives place on negative information (Dodd et al. 2012; Hibbing, Smith, 
& Alford 2014; Oxley et al. 2008; Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella 2011) corresponds with the 
larger emphasis on negative information and reinforcement displayed by the prevention 
focus orientation (Higgins 1997; Higgins & Tykoncinski 1992; Strachman & Gable 2006). 
The negative information asymmetry between conservatives/liberals and 
prevention/promotion focus is evident in the study by Choma, Busseri, and Sadava (2009) 
finding that life satisfaction between liberals and conservatives is not different but what 
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feeds into the self-reported happiness ratings is, with positive affect scores being associated 
with liberalism and negative affect with conservatism.   
Beyond the similarity in information biases among the ideological and regulatory 
focus differences, are the differences between decision making strategies and holding a risky 
or conservative bias. Liberman et al. (1999) find that promotion focus individuals were more 
likely to be open to changing a course of action or trade an object where prevention focus 
was more likely to prefer stability by not wanting to change tasks and a higher willingness to 
keep an object rather than trade it.  These findings match up with conflict response patterns 
of conservatives within the go/no-go task (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee 2007) as well as the 
connection between openness to experience and promotion focus (Vaughn et al. 2008). Last, 
the Amodio study finds a higher likelihood of liberals committing errors of commission, 
which is also more likely to occur for promotion focus individuals (Crowe & Higgins 1997). 
Although many of these studies are not combining regulatory focus and ideology (see 
Liberman et al. 1999 for exception), the liberal-conservative and promotion-prevention 
differences align on similar behavioral patterns, and are suggestive a connection among 
regulatory focus and ideology. The possible congruency between ideology and chronic 
regulatory focus will be examined in Chapter 4.  
2.3 Regulatory Fit 
The emphasis up to this point has been regulatory focus as a stable personality 
characteristic or invoked by the environment, but an interaction between regulatory focus 
and the environment impacts behavior and attitudes as well. An important extension to 
RFT, is the notion of regulatory fit which hypothesizes that when the dominant focus at the 
time matches the goal-meeting behaviors being used or if the focus and the end state have a 
regulatory focal match, a type of misattribution occurs through a feeling that things are 
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“right” (Higgins 2000; Cesario, Higgins, & Scholer 2008). Under a condition of regulatory 
fit, there is an increase in ongoing motivation and prospective motivation (Higgins, et al. 
2003; Idson, et al. 2004). A feeling of “rightness” leads individuals to place higher value in 
what they are doing, towards a target object, or attitude, as well as having heightened 
emotions that occur in relation to the success or failure of goal pursuit (Cesario, et al. 2004; 
Cesario & Higgins 2008; Freitas & Higgins 2002; Higgins 2000, 2005). This same effect that 
has been found within everyday behavior should also translate into the political world. When 
the strategies used in participating in politics match the orientation of an individual’s 
regulatory focus, motivation to and value in participation should increase, specifically 
external efficacy. 
 Regulatory fit occurs through an interaction with a person’s dominant focus at the 
time and how a decision is made – process based fit – or how the outcome is framed – 
outcome based fit (Aaker & Lee 2006). In each case, people are more inclined to pursue 
goals where regulatory fit is more likely to occur (Crowe & Higgins 1997; Higgins et al. 
1994). Because people do not have control over the political environment they find 
themselves regulatory fit can come from the person’s own behaviors – a process based fit. 
Individuals are either likely to make decisions on how they participate in accordance with 
their dominant focus or in contrast with their focus. Therefore, the focus here is on process-
based fit the examination of how regulatory fit affects efficacious attitudes. 
 Misattribution is the culprit in producing the effects of regulatory fit. The emotional 
feeling that something is “right” about an action, judgment, or choice is transferred to the 
target attitude or object without conscious awareness (Higgins 2000; 2002; 2005). When 
made aware of the misattribution the effect dissipates or goes away entirely (Cesario et al. 
2004; Higgins et al. 2003). Therefore, when a promotion focused person makes a voting 
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decision based on candidate preference, the perception that it is a good decision is stronger 
than had it been made based on the least disliked candidate. 
 Regulatory fit influences behavior and attitudes in a number of ways including an 
increase in motivation to move towards a goal and the enjoyment of doing so (Avnet & 
Higgins 2003; Forster, et al. 1998; Freitas & Higgins 2002; Higgins 2002; Shah, Higgins, & 
Friedman 1998). Increased motivation and enjoyment will strengthens the inclination to 
participate in politics and the value in it. In addition, when regulatory fit occurs, the intensity 
of feelings towards the decision and the positive evaluations of it are stronger (Cesario, et al. 
2004; Higgins 2002; Idson, et al. 2004, 2000). Therefore, matching motivational orientation 
to political decision making and activity choices will lead to a higher perception of being 
effective in the political system and stronger emotional reactions towards the importance of 
participation. The sense that the citizen is impacting politics, external efficacy, increases 
under regulatory fit. However, the heightened emotional reaction may backfire. If a citizen 
loses – the goal is not met – the negative emotions are also stronger under regulatory fit 
(Aaker & Lee 2001; Cesario et al. 2004).  
 Most importantly to the issue at hand, the misattribution under regulatory fit leads 
people to assign a higher value to the choice (Avnet & Higgins 2003; Cesario, et al. 2004; 
Higgins 2000; 2002; 2005; Lee & Aaker 2004). For example, in one study by Higgins et al. 
(2003) participants could choose a pen or coffee mug and reported either what would be 
“gained” or “lost”. Participants in the regulatory fit conditions (“gain” and promotion or 
“lose” and prevention) placed a higher value on the object than those in the non-fit 
conditions. In addition, the increased value when experiencing regulatory fit is independent 
of the efficacy of the decision and how it is made. For example, Higgins et al. (2003, Study 4) 
were able to show that under regulatory fit, induced independent of the task, participants 
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rated how good-natured a dog in a picture as more positive than participants in non-fit 
conditions. The transfer of value caused by misattribution when experiencing regulatory fit 
should not only occur in these types of lab tasks but also within the social world, and in 
particular, political participation as well. 
 Three studies indicate the power that regulatory fit can have in the political realm.  
First, Dolinski & Drogosz (2011) show that being able to “blackball” a candidate on a ballot 
increases participation among those who are prevention dominant. Therefore, the imaginary 
context offering a way for a prevention oriented person to participate in a way that matches 
his focus leads to reporting more value in and motivation to vote. Second, Lavine et al. 
(1999) find authoritarians are more likely to be persuaded to vote under frames using threat 
rather than frames depicting voting as rewarding. Third, Mannetti, Brizi, Giacomantonio, & 
Higgins (2013) find that when a message on nuclear power was framed in avoidance terms 
and the person had been primed into a promotion condition – creating regulatory nonfit – 
attitudes towards nuclear power were significantly lowered. Mannetti et al. (2013, Study 2) 
also found that approach frames on immigration increases the positive evaluation of the 
candidate giving the speech and increased voting intentions only for those induced into a 
promotion focus. These studies demonstrate that under regulatory fit, someone can be more 
motivated to vote and have an increased sense of value in participation and their ability to 
influence the political world.  
 The transfer of value in what someone is doing should also occur in the political 
world. Specifically, if the two citizens described above meet the goal of voting using 
strategies that match his or her chronic focus, an increased sense of having influence in the 
process should be felt relative to if strategy choice is counter one or both of their 
motivational orientation. However, the political world itself may create an environment that 
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matches to mismatches a citizen’s regulatory focus, which could lead to an increase in 
efficacious attitudes for some but not for others. These potential effects from regulatory fit 
are further discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. 
2.3.1 Regulatory Fit and Persuasion 
 A large amount of research has gone into how regulatory fit impacts attempts to 
persuade audiences. The “rightness” of regulatory fit or “wrongness” of unfit has been 
found to increase or decrease the effectiveness of a message or advertisement in changing 
attitudes and behavior. Persuasion based on regulatory fit is evident in choices made by 
participants as well as reports of increased fluency, engagement, and effectiveness of a 
message (Lee & Aaker 2004; Cesario et al. 2004; Evans & Petty 2003).   
 Three arguments have been used to explain the relationship between regulatory fit 
and persuasion. First, Evans and Petty (2003) argue that the regulatory fit effect on 
persuasion is most likely due to increased elaboration based on the differences between 
stronger versus weak frames and increased cognitive responses. Second, Lee and Aaker 
(2004) claim the feeling of “rightness” under fit increases the perceived fluency of the 
message. However, Pham and Avnet (2004) argue persuasion is caused by an affective 
response for those in a promotion focus but in a prevention focus it is the content of the 
message. This argument emphasizes the different information that is used between those 
with a promotion or prevention focus as a result of what goal meeting strategies are utilized 
– risk averse prevention oriented people use information that can be proven or justified and 
seen as safe but promotion orientation leads to the use of internal information and 
inferences. While the specific mechanism in which attitudes towards voting change due to 
regulatory fit is not the primary goal of the present study, it is important to keep in mind that 
there may be differential effects based on these because peripheral and heuristic causes of 
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change are supposed to be less stable than changes resulting from the systematic and central 
route (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo 1986). If regulatory fit is induced within the promotion focus, 
the effects may be less substantial or long lasting because it is based on an affective change 
rather than fit within a prevention focus leading to attitude change through cognitive 
processing of the information. 
 Just as regulatory fit has shown to increase persuasion in other areas, political 
messages are likely to benefit from an examination of matching messages to people’s 
psychological orientations.  In essence, political messages mirror advertisements in their goal 
and methods, with the exception being that the attitude target is not a brand or product, but 
a political candidate, election, or policy.  Specifically examined in Chapter 6, motivation to 
vote and participation-related attitudes should increase when Get-Out-the-Vote messages 
match a person’s activated regulatory system.  
2.4 Measuring and Manipulating Regulatory Focus 
 Regulatory focus is both, a chronic, individual difference variable, and an 
environmental variable, allowing it to be measured and manipulated. Manipulations into a 
state of promotion or prevention include subliminal priming (Mannetti et al. 2013), framing 
task instructions or vignettes (Freitas & Higgins 2002; Freitas, Liberman, & Higgins 2000; 
Higgins et al. 2003; Idson et al. 2000; Lee & Aaker 2004; Roese et al. 1999; Vaughn et al. 
2008), having participants list goals or write an essay (Frietas & Higgins 2000; Frietas et al. 
2002; Higgins et al. 1994), or performing a maze prior to a task in which you get the mouse 
to a piece of cheese or save it from a bird (Shah et al. 1998). Measuring regulatory focus has 
been done a variety of ways as well. These include proxies such as the BIS/BAS scale 
(Dholakia, Gopinath, & Bagozzi 2005; Dholakia, Gopinath, Bagozzi, & Nataraajan 2006) 
and the Schwartz Values Survey (Kluger et al. 2004; Lucas & Molden 2011; Van-Dijk & 
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Kluger 2004). There have been a number of instruments created specifically to measure 
regulatory focus. Higgins and his colleagues (1997) introduced the Self-Guide Strength, 
which is a reaction time measure of ideal and ought self-guide accessibility, as well as the 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al. 2001). Other researchers have also 
developed their own surveys including the General Regulatory Focus Measure (Lockwood, 
Jordan, & Kunda 2002), the Regulatory Focus Scale (Fellner, Holler, Krichler, & Schabmann 
2007), and the Composite Regulatory Focus Scale (Haws, Dholakia, & Bearden 2010). The 
way regulatory focus should be measured has been examined several times and each has its 
pros and cons. 
 This project utilizes the RFQ, created by Higgins and colleagues (2001), to measure 
chronic focus. The 11-question RFQ is a measure of a person’s previous experience with 
successfully meeting goals using promotion-eager means (6 items) and prevention-vigilant 
means (5 items). The questions involve experiences from childhood as well as items that tap 
more recent experience. The underlining expectation is that previous success under one set 
of means leads to the inclination to use the same when facing a new task or making a new 
goal (Higgins et al. 2001). Therefore, correlations between the RFQ and different behaviors 
can be expected even if the person has not specifically performed the activity before – it 
builds upon the notion that what type of thing has worked with other tasks should work for 
this one as well. 
There have been questions regarding how well the RFQ and other instruments 
measure the theoretical components of RFT. However, when the RFQ is compared to other 
measures, the results suggest it to be the better option. Often times the RFQ is not 
correlated with the other focus measures, has better re-test reliability, and is correlated with 
theoretically similar psychological measures in a more meaningful pattern than the other 
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measures (Haws et al. 2010; Keller & Bless 2006; Summerville & Roese 2008). The RFQ 
sub-scales are independent and have shown to be a much better measure of trait level 
promotion and prevention (Grant & Higgins 2003; Haws et al. 2010; Keller & Bless 2006). 
While there have been questions on the RFQ, it appears to be the most reliable measure at 
this point. The RFQ is used in Chapter 3 looking at how regulatory focus guides general life 
and political behavior, Chapter 4 in looking at ideological differences based on chronic 
regulatory focus, and Chapter 5 when looking at how regulatory fit can impact efficacious 
attitudes. 
In addition to looking at chronic promotion and prevention, the survey methodology 
also uses a unique way of measuring specific tactical strategies tied to promotion and 
prevention. Scholer et al. (2008; Cornwell & Higgins 2015) delineate a difference between 
the conceptual vigilant and eager strategies and the specific tactics people use, stating that 
the tactics, “actualize a contextualized strategy.” This is seen in various pieces of research. 
For example, Higgins et al. (1994) finds that one of the most common strategies to keep a 
friend is to avoid losing touch among participants with a high prevention focus. However, 
the way in which to do so is to “stay in touch”, demonstrating that the vigilant strategy is 
one of avoidance, but tactic is one of action. One portion of the survey methodology used in 
the current project seeks to examine different strategic tactics related to promotion and 
prevention both inside and outside of the political world. Within this unique survey, 
participants are asked about how they meet ten specific goals within everyday life and ten 
within political life in order to examine the connection between chronic regulatory focus and 
behavior across environments in Chapter 3 and how using goal meeting strategies that 
correspond with one’s chronic focus impacts efficacy in Chapter 5. 
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2.4.1 Regulatory Fit Measurements and Manipulations 
As previously discussed, regulatory fit occurs when the goal meeting strategies match 
the motivational orientation of the person, either because the person is choosing the strategy 
best suited for how the goal is perceived or because the environment fosters the correct 
strategy (Cesario et al. 2008; Higgins 2000). One way to examine regulatory fit within the 
political environment is to determine if the strategies used to meet political goals correspond 
with the individual’s chronic focus. In order to determine whether regulatory fit occurs or 
not in the political world, the RFQ is used to measure people’s chronic promotion and 
prevention focus scores and the extent to which they use vigilant or eager strategies are also 
measured. With both individual dominant focus and strategy use measured, the extent that 
the person experiences regulatory fit within the political world can be determined and the 
impact this has on political attitudes examined. The measure of regulatory fit in this way is 
done in Chapter 5, looking at the impact of regulatory fit and non-fit on external efficacy 
attitudes. 
Another way to examine the role of regulatory fit on political attitudes is to 
experimentally manipulate participants into a state of fit versus non-fit. Integral 
manipulations manipulate fit within the task and incidental manipulations activate fit or non-
fit through a task separate from the target attitude or stimulus (Cesario et al. 2008). Integral 
manipulations include ones that combine a manipulation of regulatory focus and strategy 
within the same task or message (Cesario, et al. 2004; Cesario & Higgins 2008; Lee & Aaker 
2004). These types of manipulations often involve framing a target participant as related to 
promotion or prevention goals and then also have the message focus on gains (non-gains) or 
losses (non-losses). In addition, fit and non-fit can be induced incidentally, with a 
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manipulation not tied to the target attitude or behavior, and indirectly affect the 
persuasiveness of a message (Koenig, Cesario, Molden, Kosloff, & Higgins 2009). 
Another method to induce regulatory fit is to take aspects of integral and incidental 
manipulation. Under this strategy regulatory fit or non-fit is induced by first, incidentally 
manipulating the participant’s regulatory focus, and then, providing an integral manipulation 
with the target message. Mannetti et al. (2013) use this type of methodology by subliminally 
priming participants into a promotion or prevention focus state and then altering a political 
message’s regulatory language, but not substantive content before examining the effect of fit 
on attitudes and evaluation of the speaker. Manipulating regulatory focus and strategy 
independently has two benefits. First, it offers a clear distinction between focus and strategy 
rather than mixing the two so that it is known that the participant engaged in both. And, 
second, all four combinations that can exist across the two manipulations may be examined 
to understand any differences that may occur between motivational orientation and strategy. 
This strategy, incidentally manipulating focus and then using promotion-eager versus 
prevention-vigilant wording in a target message, is used in Chapter 6 to examine regulatory 
fit in connection with Get-Out-the-Vote arguments. 
2.5 Overview of Methodology 
 I examine three broad questions within the next four substantive chapters. First, how 
does regulatory focus connect behavior between everyday and political life? Second, how is 
ideology and political attitudes affected by regulatory focus? Third, how does the experience 
of regulatory fit impact attitudes towards political participation? I examine these three 
questions within three separate studies, each with their own set of participants – two surveys 
and one experiment. The first survey, referred to as the “Regulatory Focus, General, and 
Political Life Survey”, is used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 to answer the first and third 
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questions above. The separate survey, using a different sample, referred to as the 
“Regulatory Focus and Ideology Survey” is used in Chapter 4 to answer the second question. 
I examine the third question using an experiment, referred to as “Regulatory Fit and 
GOTV”, in Chapter 6. Table 2.1 provides a brief overview of the three studies, including 
what chapter they will be used and what specific measures are used for each. I go into the 
methodology of each in more detail below and in the following chapters. 
 
2.5.1 Procedure and Participants  
 All of the data collection utilized participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform (AMT), where people, known as Workers, sign up through Amazon and receive 
compensation for performing Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) placed on the platform by 
Requestors. A unique number created by Amazon identifies workers so researchers have no 
access to participants’ identifying information. While there have been questions regarding 
AMT’s external validity, several studies have shown that in many cases, samples are 
representative of the general population and other samples used in research (Berinsky, 
Huber, and Lenz, 2012; Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema, 2013; Paolacci, Chandler, and 
Ipeirotis, 2010). 
Regulatory Focus 
and Ideology Survey
Regulatory Fit and 
GOTV Study
Where Used in Current Project Chapter 3 Chapter 5 Chapter 4 Chapter 6
Regulatory Focus RFQ (Higgins 2001)
Manipulated (Freitas 
and Higgins 2005)
Political Life Strategies yes yes no no
General Life Strategies yes no no no
External Efficacy no yes no yes
Political Activity Efficacy no yes no no
Ideology and Partisanship yes yes yes no
Vote Choice yes yes no no
Demographics yes yes yes no
Table 2.1. Overview of Studies Used throughout Project and Variables within Each
Regulatory Focus, General, and 
Political Life Survey
RFQ (Higgins 2001)
Variables used within Chapters
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 For each study, participants were recruited by placing a HIT on the AMT platform 
under the UNL Political Behavior Lab Requestor Account. Each HIT briefly described the 
project, the amount paid for participation ($1.00 for each survey and $0.50 for the 
experiment), and the length of time it would take (about 20 minutes for the surveys and 15 
minutes for the experiment). The HIT was limited to Workers located in the United States 
that had previously completed more than 1,000 other HITs with a success rate of 95 percent 
or more. The HIT directed participants to Qualtrics, where the surveys and experiments 
were programmed. Within the Qualtrics platform, the first screen for each study was the 
Informed Consent form with the options: agree to participate and decline to continue. After 
agreeing to participate, participants moved on to the study. The final Qulatrics screen gave 
the Worker a randomized number that the participant typed into the original AMT HIT to 
record completion of the survey. 
2.5.2 Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life Survey Procedure 
The Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life Survey consists of a number of 
different item sets. The first set of questions asks participants about ten activities that reflect 
general experiences in everyday life and ten common political activities. Four questions are 
asked for each activity. First, participants are asked if they had ever participated in the 
particular activity or experienced the situation using a dichotomous yes or no response. For 
example, “Have you ever placed a political bumper sticker on your car?” Next, two sets of 
questions ask how likely participants are to use a particular strategy when making a decision 
regarding the target behavior or when engaged in the activity – one framed as strategic 
vigilance and another as eagerness. The two bumper sticker follow-up questions are: 1) 
“When you put a political bumper sticker on your car, how likely are you to have one that is 
positive about a candidate or issue you support?” representing a promotion related, eager 
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strategy; and, 2) “When you put a political bumper sticker on your car, how likely are you to 
have one that is negative about a candidate or issue you do not support?” representing a 
prevention related, vigilant strategy. The final question for each activity and situation 
concerns the perception that the behavior impacted or influenced others. This question is 
used to tap external efficacy specific to each activity. All three follow-up questions are asked 
whether or not the person indicated previously engaging in the targeted behavior. 
 Following these questions, participants completed the 11-item RFQ, to measure their 
strength of promotion and prevention foci. This was followed by questions on participation 
within the 2012 Presidential election and other political attitudes, including interest in 
politics, partisanship, and ideology. In addition, the survey includes five items commonly 
used to measure internal political efficacy and five used to measure external political efficacy. 
The final set of questions includes basic demographic items including their gender, age, race, 
income, and education. An attention item designed to gauge the participant’s investment in 
their responses is the final item of the survey. All survey items are in Appendix A.  
Participants. A total of 681 individuals self-selected to participate in the Regulatory Focus, 
General, and Political Life survey. The average time for completing the survey was 20 
minutes and 44 seconds, leading to an average hourly rate of $2.89, which is in the standard 
range, if not higher, for AMT workers (Paolacci et al. 2010). Forty-three, of the 681 
participants that began the survey, failed to finish, leaving a majority of the necessary items 
for analysis unanswered, and were therefore dropped. In addition, ten failed to correctly 
answer the attention question at the end of the survey. Therefore, a total of 628 participants 
(357 males, 57%) comprise the final sample used in the analyses. The mean age was just 
under 35 years (M = 34.73, SD = 11.24), a majority of participants were white, not Hispanic 
(493; 78%), the modal income level was $20,000 to $40,000, and modal education level was 
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college graduate. The sample was more liberal (M = 3.17, SD = 1.63) than the U.S. 
population with just under 60 percent identifying as leaning or being liberal and half 
identified with or leaned towards the Democrat Party (M = 3.48, SD = 1.66). The heavy tilt 
towards being liberal and a Democrat is not uncommon in AMT samples (Berinsky et al. 
2012). 
2.5.3 Regulatory Focus and Ideology Survey Procedure 
The second survey I use includes several sets of questions focusing on regulatory 
focus, ideology, and political attitudes. A different set of AMT workers were recruited for 
this, second survey. Participants first completed the RFQ (Higgins et al. 2001) to measure 
promotion and prevention focus.  Following this, participants self-reported their ideology on 
a left-right continuum, partisan identification, and interest in politics.  Following these basic 
political questions, participants report a variety of political issue positions using the 
American National Election Study (ANES) format. Participants then reported attitudes 
toward four policy issues – gun rights, abortion, border security, and business regulation – in 
which information on the current state of the issue was given. Last each participant answers 
questions about their political participation, political knowledge, and demographics. 
Appendix A lists the specific wording for each question in the survey.  
Participants. A total of 873 participants were recruited through the HIT.  Of these, 699 
participants (39.3% female) completed the survey.  A majority of the participants were white 
(78.8%) and the mean age was 33.7 (SD = 33.47). The modal level of education was college 
graduate (37.2%) and modal income level was between $20,000 and $40,000 a year. AMT 
workers tend to be more liberal and identify with the Democratic Party (Berinsky, et al. 
2012). The sample is consistent with the trend with 53.4 percent of the participants reporting 
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being a strong Democrat, Democrat, or lean Democrat while 19.1 percent report being a 
strong Republican, Republican, or lean Republican (M = 3.32, SD = 1.45).  
2.5.4 Regulatory Fit and GOTV Study 
The experiment for the Regulatory Fit and GOTV Study utilizes a 2 (prime: 
promotion or prevention) by 2 (message frame: eager or vigilant) design, with the focus of 
the analysis being participants in the regulatory fit conditions (promotion prime with eager 
frame/prevention prime with vigilant frame) versus those in the non-fit conditions 
(promotion prime with vigilant frame/prevention prime with eager frame). 
The study involves three parts. First, participants are randomly assigned to either 
complete the prime to activate a promotion or prevention focus. The task is a widely used 
regulatory focus manipulation where participants list three goals framed as either “hopes and 
aspirations” – to activate promotion – or “duties and obligations” – to activate prevention 
(Freitas & Higgins 2002). Immediately following the regulatory focus manipulation, a second 
random assignment exposes participants to a GOTV message written with either promotion-
eager or prevention-vigilant related language. Following the message, each participant 
responded to a number of items gauging how likely they are to vote in an upcoming election, 
how valuable voting is seen as a participatory act, external efficacy, and the persuasiveness of 
the message. 
Participants. A total of 715 participants were recruited through MTurk over two days in 
March 2014. One hundred and four participants were dropped for not completing the 
protocol, did not perform the regulatory focus manipulation, or participated multiple times. 
In addition, 3 other participants were removed for spending over 791 seconds on the GOTV 
message screen. This left a total of 611 participants.  After random assignment, 312 
participants were primed into a promotion focus and 299 into a prevention focus. In 
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addition, the second random assignment resulted in 302 participants being exposed to the 
promotion-eager GOTV message and 308 participants were assigned to the prevention-
vigilant GOTV message. 
2.5.5 Measures Used Across the Studies 
 The main independent variables across the studies are regulatory focus and 
regulatory fit. In the surveys, regulatory focus is measured using the RFQ (Higgins et al. 
2001), measuring previous use and experience of a promotion and prevention focus. In 
addition to regulatory focus and fit, each survey provides unique measures for answering the 
specific questions within the project. The Regulatory Focus, General Life, and Political Life 
study involves items tapping into specific strategies used throughout life, political 
orientations, and efficacious attitudes. The Regulatory Focus and Ideology study includes 
sets of items to get a broad sense of each participant’s ideological leanings and political 
attitudes. The Regulatory Fit and GOTV study includes items tapping attitudes towards 
voting and external efficacy. Also, each study includes a set of common demographic 
questions. Following is a brief discussion and study-specific statistics for the measures used 
within various portions of the project. 
Regulatory Focus 
 The Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life survey used the RFQ, consisting of 
six promotion and five prevention focus items. These items were subjected to a factor 
analysis with Varimax rotation, resulting in the two expected subscales. The items for each 
were averaged together to obtain a promotion score (M= 3.47, SD = .65) and a prevention score 
(M = 3.54, SD = .78). Examination of the scale scores shows 268 (43.5%) participants 
reported higher promotion scores compared to their prevention scores, 329 (53.3%) 
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reported higher prevention scores, and 20 (3.2%) reported equal scores across both sub-
scales. Promotion and prevention scores are positively correlated (r = .16, p < .001). 
 The RFQ was also used in the Regulatory Focus and Ideology Survey. Factor 
analysis, again using Varimax rotation, produced two orthogonal dimensions with the 
prevention focus items loading on the first (α = .86) and promotion items loading on the 
second dimension (α = .76), explaining 55.56% of the variance. The items for each 
dimension were averaged to obtain an individual’s promotion (M = 3.37, SD =.64) and 
prevention (M = 3.50, SD = .75) score, which were positively correlated (r = .10, p = .004). 
A slight majority of the participants reported higher prevention focus scores than promotion 
scores (55.4%).  
Comparing the RFQ to other studies utilizing the measure brings up two potential 
problems. Higgins et al. (2001), reporting the first use of the RFQ, find a much higher 
proportion of their participants being more chronic promotion dominant, with as much as 
90 percent of the sample being so. However, more participants in both of my samples have a 
higher prevention score, which is opposite of what Higgins and his colleagues report. In 
addition, promotion and prevention are positively correlated in both studies, which has been 
reported in other studies, but is not common (Haaga, Friedman-Wheeler, McIntosh, & 
Ahrens 2008; Haws et al. 2010; Higgins 2001; Grant & Higgins 2003).  
Neither of these may be a problem as the sample was more closely split among those 
with a stronger chronic regulatory focus than previously described and the correlation 
between the two foci is small. However, one thing to note is that prevention concerns are 
regarded as minimal goals where the value by expectancy relationship does not work as 
theory would predict. Rather than motivation increasing with an increase in the extent to 
which a goal matters or the ability to meet it (which is observed for promotion related goals), 
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goals under a prevention focus – obligations that must be met – do not show an increase in 
motivation with higher expectancy perceptions (Brendl & Higgins 1996; Freitas & Higgins 
2002; Idson et al. 2000). Therefore, the momentary focus of the environment or chronic 
focus of the individual may impact findings based on motivation. If political participation is 
seen as an obligation, motivation should not increase or decrease based upon prevention 
scores but could based on promotion scores. On the other hand, the political environment 
may induce the view that participation is necessary, also dampening the impact of a 
motivation effect.  
Regulatory Focus as a Categorical Variable 
Regulatory focus research often categorizes participants as promotion or prevention 
using a dummy code created by subtracting the individual’s prevention score from the 
promotion score and performing a median split. This would indicate that participants above 
the mean are relatively more promotion and below the mean are relatively more prevention 
oriented. However, theoretically this poses a problem because the two measures are 
orthogonal, not one-dimensional (Higgins 2002). In addition, it does not take into account 
nuances that may be hidden within different configurations of RFQ scores. For example, 
someone may have higher mean RFQ scores for both promotion and prevention or lower 
than mean scores on both dimensions. Rather than coding promotion and prevention in 
this, dichotomous way, throughout the dissertation I categorize participants into four 
groups. To create the RFQ category variable, participants were divided based on whether or 
not their subscale scores were higher or lower than the overall mean for the sample on each 
foci. The RFQ category differentiates participants with promotion scores above the sample 
mean (and prevention scores below the mean), those with prevention scores above the 
sample mean (and promotion scores below the mean), those with scores above the sample 
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mean on both promotion and prevention, and those with scores below the sample mean on 
both dimensions. 
 
Table 2.2 displays the number of participants categorized as promotion and 
prevention dominant using the traditional, dichotomous variable and the four categories 
based on a combination of both scores relative to the sample mean for both surveys used in 
the following chapters. The table shows dichotomizing regulatory focus may be mis-
categorizing people. More than half of the participants were neither truly dominant 
promotion nor prevention focused – both of their RFQ subscale scores were higher or 
lower than the sample mean for each. In addition, the distribution is not even with 39 
percent of participants categorized as prevention under the two-category method having 
high promotion scores too but only 18 percent of promotion categorized participants also 
having high prevention scores. In addition, 26 percent of the sample has lower mean 
prevention and promotion scores. If participants are not oriented to meet goals with either 
particular focus – or feels successful in previously goal directed behavior through either – 
there should be differences between these people and the remaining sample that reports 
motivation and success from one or both methods. I use this category variable throughout 
chapters 3 and 5 to examine any effects that occur within different combinations of 
promotion and prevention strength. 
Promotion Prevention Total
High Promotion 140 0 140
High Prevention 0 121 121
High on Both 54 126 180
Low on Both 74 82 156
Total 268 329
RFT Dummy Coding
Category 
Based on 
Both RFQ 
Subscales
Table 2.2. Number of Participants Categorized as Promotion or 
Prevention Across Two Different RFT Dummy Codes
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Regulatory Strategy 
The Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life survey includes a unique battery of 
questions that tap into goal-directed behavior in general and political life. As previously 
discussed, these items are designed to gauge the extent that people use tactics related to an 
eager strategy and vigilant strategy across real-world life. Ten of the activities ask about goals 
common to the political world and ten refer to common day-to-day activities. 
Political Life Strategies. I Examine behavior in the political world using two questions 
related to ten common political activities and situations. These items include: being a 
member of a political party, voting in a primary election, voting in a general election, placing 
a bumper sticker on your car, volunteering for a campaign, donating money to a campaign, 
attending a rally or other political event, contacting a government official, following a 
campaign through the media, and discussing political candidates. Out of the ten possible 
actions, participants reported being engaged in less than half of them (M = 4.10, SD = 2.28), 
with 39 participants reporting having done zero of the political activities before and seven 
reporting having performed all ten. Engagement in each activity ranged from 82 percent 
having previously voted in a general election to only 11 percent reporting placing a bumper 
sticker on their car. 
 I created two indices using the strategy items, which asked how they met each goal 
using eager and vigilant behaviors. The first averaged participant’s responses to the vigilant 
tactic questions across all activities, creating the vigilant political strategy scale (M = 3.90, SD = 
.89). The second averaged responses to the promotion related, eager tactical questions, 
creating the eager political strategy scale (M = 5.05, SD = 1.00). The vigilant political strategy 
scale results in a fairly low reliability coefficient (α = .69), but the political eager strategy scale 
shows much higher consistency (α = .83). Higher consistency with the promotion related 
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political strategies might be reflective of the main activity within the U.S. political system, 
voting – requiring a choice of support for a candidate – which is more consistent with eager 
strategies. Previous research has documented strong goal-means connections within a 
cognitive framework (Sengupta & Zhou 2007; Shah 2003; Shah & Kruglanski 2003). 
Therefore, thinking about the political system potentially activates a promotion orientation 
and/or eager means related to voting, and if this is the case, a consistent pattern of 
promotion related, eager strategies would be expected. 
General Life Strategies. I also asked participants to respond to ten sets of questions related 
to common activities and situations within every day life. These items mirrored the political 
life strategy ones and included: being a fan of a professional sports team, performing a ritual 
to help your team win (strategy questions did not follow this item), pray or talking to a 
higher power, having a skill or hobby, leaving comments for a business, being employed, 
voting for reality show contestants, leaving online reviews, playing video games, participating 
in group projects, and trying new recipes. Participants reported having engaged in roughly 
half of the activities (M = 5.62, SD = 1.92), with two participants reporting “no” to all the 
activities and one reporting “yes” to all. Percentages of participants engaged with the 
situations ranged from 85 percent having participated in a group project to 13 percent 
previously voting in a reality television show competition. 
 Again, I created two indices with these items, mirroring the political strategies. I 
averaged the participants’ responses to the prevention related, vigilant tactic questions across 
the situations, creating the vigilant general life strategy scale (M = 4.52, SD = .77). The second 
averaged all responses to the eager tactical questions, creating the eager general life strategy scale 
(M = 5.37, SD = .76). Neither general life strategy scales have a high level of reliability 
(eager, α = .65; vigilant, α = .53). This is likely due to the relative breadth of different 
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activities participants responded to across everyday life, from playing video games to 
participation in group projects. 
External Efficacy 
I use external efficacy as the main dependent variable in Chapters 5 and 6 to test 
how regulatory fit impacts a person’s perception that his or her political activity means 
something. Chapter 5 examines external efficacy in two ways – using traditional external 
efficacy measures and using activity-specific questions regarding the same goals found in the 
strategy scales. I included these two measures in the Regulatory Focus, General, and Political 
Life survey. Chapter 6 also examines external efficacy, but within an experimental procedure 
in the Regulatory Fit and GOTV study. I only use the traditional external efficacy measure in 
the experiment.  
Traditional Efficacy Measure. I used four questions to measure external efficacy that are 
often found in research and national surveys. These include items include thoughts 
concerning the ideas that Congressmen “lose touch” with the electorate pretty quickly, 
similar people “don’t have any say” in what happens in government, that parties “are only 
interested in people’s votes”, and officials don’t “care much what people like me think”. 
Participants responded to each item on a scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to 
“strongly agree” (7). I recoded each so that higher scores indicate a stronger sense of 
external efficacy and averaged them to create one external efficacy scale. Participants within the 
Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life study (M = 2.24, SD = .86) and the Regulatory 
Focus and GOTV study (M = 2.87, SD = 1.23) have quite low but similar external efficacy 
scores. 
Political Activity Efficacy. In addition to the traditional efficacy items described above, I 
included activity-specific efficacy items in the Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life 
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survey. For nine of the ten sets of political behavior question sets described above, I also 
included an efficacy question. The efficacy questions are designed to tap into the external, 
rather than internal efficacy, component of behavior by emphasizing the participant’s 
perception on how influential their actions are on others. For example, the question 
regarding monetary contributions to a political campaign asks, “Thinking about when you 
have given money to a political campaign, how likely was your contribution influential?” 
Response options range from “very unlikely” (1) to “very likely” (7). I averaged the nine 
items together to create the political activity efficacy scale (M = 3.13, SD = 1.09). The activity 
specific scale is slightly higher than the traditional efficacy scale, but still well below the 
possible mean. 
Political Orientation Items 
 I include several items related to political attitudes and participation in both surveys. 
The Regulatory Focus and Ideology Survey used for Chapter 4, which looks specifically at 
the connection between ideology and regulatory focus, contains more items regarding 
political attitudes and will be more fully discussed within the chapter.  
Ideology and Partisanship. In addition to partisanship, I asked participants to self-report 
their ideological orientation on a 7-point scale, ranging from “Strong Liberal” (1) to “Strong 
Conservative” (7). In addition, partisan identification was measured on a scale ranging from 
“Strong Democrat” (1) to “Strong Republican” (7) with an option for “other”, which 
included the option to name a different political party. The means and standard deviations 
for these variables are above in the participant section above. 
Vote Choice. Two questions in the Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life Survey 
concerned participation in the 2012 election. I first asked, “Did you vote in the presidential 
election of 2012?” was asked with, “yes”, “no”, or “Not applicable/Don’t know”, as 
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response options. Participants reporting having voted were then asked, “Who did you vote 
for: President Barack Obama (the Democrat candidate), Mitt Romney (the Republican 
candidate), or somebody else?” with an option to type in the candidate or party. A total of 
450 participants (71.7%) reported voting in the 2012 election, while 167 (26.6%) reported 
not voting, and 11 (1.8%) reported “not knowing/not applicable”. Of the participants 
reporting participation in the 2012 election, 69.9 percent voted for Barack Obama (n = 314), 
16.1 percent voted for Mitt Romney (n = 101), and 5.4 percent voted for a third-party 
candidate (n = 34).  
Control Variables 
Last, I collected basic demographic information for each participant. I had 
participants report their age in years and gender (male = 1 and female = 0). I measured 
education using a categorical variable ranging from having less than a high school degree to 
professional degree. In addition, I use a categorical variable to measure income with six, 
$20,000 increments starting at less than $20,000 and ending with over $100,000. The final 
demographic variable asked was race, where participants reporting having Hispanic origins 
or not and a follow-up question asking for the specific race(s) s/he identifies. I combine 
these two items to create the variable, race, is dichotomized for the analyses with white, non-
Hispanic participants coded as 1 and all others coded as 0. The means and standard 
deviations of the demographic variables are also within the participant section above. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I introduced the theory of regulatory focus, including how regulatory 
focus develops, the consequences of chronic and momentary promotion and prevention 
focus, as well as connections to political attitudes and behavior. From here, I build upon the 
basic understanding of regulatory focus and go deeper into how the theory informs specific 
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political attitudes and behavior. Overall, the premise of regulatory focus theory includes the 
notion that there are distinct differences in how people meet the hedonic principle, 
approaching pleasure and avoiding pain, based on the perception of goals and the needs they 
meet.  
It is this focus on goals that distinguishes explanations of political behavior based on 
regulatory focus versus personality-based approaches, such as the five-factor model. Studies 
of personality correlates are able to pick out under what circumstances a person may vote, 
but they do not get at what the vote means. Is a vote for a Democrat always a vote for a 
Democrat? Or is it sometimes a vote against a Republican? Regulatory focus puts the goal at 
the forefront of the research, not the behavior or person, allowing a deeper understanding of 
political behavior. 
In addition, motivational orientation is about individual differences that lead to 
alternative perceptions of the current and desired states, but regulatory focus also explains 
how environments shape those perceptions too. For example, voting behavior can be 
affected by the extent a person is promotion focused and the extent that the electoral 
context operates within a realm of promotion. By emphasizing goals, regulatory focus offers 
an understanding of not just the presence or absence of certain behaviors but also a deeper 
understanding of them that is driven by both individual perceptions and the environment. 
Other research looking into motivations and goals of citizens within the political 
process is often focused on narrow, less fundamental motivations and goals. As Simon 
(1985) stated in his address to the discipline regarding rational choice within political science, 
there needs to be an emphasis on the perception of the actor with a deep understanding of 
the situation and goals of him/her. While rational choice embeds self-interest as the 
motivation behind political decisions, it does not offer a broad understanding of the 
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relationship between goals and political behavior. The narrow motivational basis of self-
interest is more about making one choice with the goal of maximizing utility (Downs 1957). 
The empirical findings have shown the lack in this lower-level motivation to be helpful in 
understanding political behavior (Bartels 2006; Sears & Funk 1991).  
A promotion and prevention focus represents superordinate goals based on 
surviving the social world, coloring perceptions of the environment and the interaction 
within it, ultimately making regulatory focus a component of self-identity (Higgins 1997; 
Manczak et al. 2014; Manian, Strauman, & Denney 1998; Strauman et al. 2013). Goals 
pursued within the promotion and prevention systems create distinct views of the world 
through the connection between cognitive, emotional, and social processes.
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CHAPTER 3   Regulatory Focus as the Common Denominator  
     of General and Political Life 
 
Personality traits, cognitive style, and motivational orientation lead to stable patterns 
of behavior, but different circumstances and environments can lead people to act outside of 
their usual characteristics. Aunt Mary Belle might be a very sweet woman, often described as 
warm and caring by others until her favorite baseball team, the Astros, starts losing or a 
commercial for a Republican candidate comes on air. In these instances, she converts into a 
more hostile and cold person. Overall, behavior often fluctuates, revolving around a set of 
central dispositions. Differences arising within the political environment from regular social 
situations may or may not lead to distinct variations in people’s behavior.  
 Much of political science research states or implies that citizens approach political 
goals with complete rationality, or as rationally as possible given inherent individual and 
systemic limitations (Aldrich 1993, 1995; Downs 1957; Fiorina 1976; Poole & Rosenthal 
1984; Popkin 1994; Riker & Ordeshook 1968; Simon 1955). However, research 
demonstrating the impact emotions, personality, biology, and slight environmental cues have 
on political behavior and attitudes suggests that citizens are not rational when it comes to 
politics (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing 2005; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt 2012; Inbar, Pizarro, 
Knobe, & Bloom 2009; Lodge and Taber 2005, 2013; Marcus, et al. 2000; Mondak 2010; 
Oxley et al. 2008). The former implies the same aspects of a person that guides behavior 
within the general, social world drive behavior in the political arena. Specifically, promotion 
and prevention strength leads to particular patterns of behavior in a person’s everyday life, 
which is mirrored by political activity. In turn, strategic eagerness and vigilance imposes a 
certain structure on making the decision to support a particular candidate – by picking the 
most desired candidate or choosing the better of two evils. 
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3.1 Regulatory Focus, General Life, and Political Behavior 
Motivational orientation is one source of behavioral consistency across different 
environments. As previously discussed, chronic regulatory focus leads to differences in 
cognitive style reflective of superordinate goals (Higgins 2006; Strauman 1996; Strauman et 
al. 2013). The postulates and empirical findings regarding RFT suggest that motivations to 
meet political goals and make political decisions differ depending on whether a citizen has 
developed a stronger promotion or prevention focus. In addition, goal related behaviors 
should show consistency across everyday and political situations. While certain environments 
can activate a momentary promotion or prevention focus, people tend to initially approach 
goals with their chronic focus activated, leading to consistent patterns of strategic behavior 
(Strauman et al. 2013). 
  My first set of hypotheses tests the extent to which regulatory focus explains 
behavior inside and outside of politics. My general expectation is that an individual will meet 
goals across the two domains in a consistent manner, characteristic of their dominant focus. 
An individual with a stronger chronic prevention focus will be more likely to root harder 
when their favorite sports team is on defense and make sure that previous mistakes are 
avoided, as well as choose to support candidates, both in terms of money and time, that 
appears the least disagreeable. On the other hand, a person holding a stronger chronic 
promotion focus will rely on previous successes when making decisions, prefer to cheer on 
their team’s offense, as well as give money and time to politicians found to be the most 
desirable.  
H3.1: Promotion focus scores on the RFQ will be positively associated with being 
more likely to use strategic eagerness in general and political life. 
 
H3.2: Prevention focus scores on the RFQ will be positively associated with being 
more likely to use strategic vigilance in general and political life. 
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H3.3:  The likelihood of using eager strategies in general and political life will be 
positively correlated and the likelihood of using vigilant strategies in general and 
political life will be positively correlated.  
 
3.2 Regulatory Focus and Motivations Behind Vote Choices 
 Motivational orientation, based on regulatory focus, is associated with distinct goal 
representations. For example, choosing to support a candidate within a promotion focus can 
be viewed as a way to endorse democratic values and advancing social ideals. Or, under a 
prevention focus, the same goal is thought of as an obligation and a necessity to maintain 
democratic values. The variation in goal perception is then associated with distinct means 
used during goal pursuit. Promotion concerns are pursued with strategic eagerness by 
focusing on maximizing gain-related opportunities, which signify goal success when met. On 
the other hand, strategic vigilance is used for prevention concerns, where success equates to 
a non-loss through avoidance of obstacles that may impede goal completion (Crowe & 
Higgins 1997; Higgins 1997, 1998; Shah, et al. 1998). Variation in goal perception strongly 
impacts information processing and decision-making.  
Decisions regarding vote choice within a promotion focus should emphasize gains 
and positive information and reflect the extent to which the chosen candidate is preferred 
over other candidates. On the other hand, within a prevention focus, the sensitivity to losses 
and emphasis on negative information in judgments should be reflected in a vote choice 
underscored by a dislike of the opposing candidate. While voting against a candidate is not 
an institutionalized option, vote choice decisions are still capable of encompassing a 
blackball strategy. Previous work by Dolinski and Drogosz (2010) shows interest in black-
ball strategies, with prevention focused individuals reporting a higher likelihood of voting if 
they could vote against a party, rather than only being able to support a party for office. The 
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Dolinski and Drogosz study looked at the prospect of being able to blackball a candidate or 
party, but not the informal use of this tactic by voters when choosing to support a candidate 
or party. The second set of hypotheses tests whether people with a stronger prevention 
focus or those more likely to use vigilant strategies use a blackball-type tactic when deciding 
for whom to vote. 
H3.4: Higher promotion scores are associated with a higher likelihood of voting for a 
candidate based on preference for him and his policies, mediated by use of eager 
strategies in general and political life. 
 
H3.5: Higher prevention scores are associated with a higher likelihood of voting for a 
candidate based on disliking the opposing candidate and his policies, mediated by use 
of vigilant strategies in general and political life. 
  
 The first set of hypotheses concern the extent promotion and prevention 
dispositions guide goal pursuit within general and political life as well as the correlation of 
behavior across social domains. My general focus is to examine the extent motivational 
orientation results in similar behavior across general and political activities or if the political 
environment creates variation in behavior different from what occurs throughout daily life. 
The second set of hypotheses are an extension of the first, examining how behavior within 
general and political life, guided by chronic regulatory focus, affects a specific decision 
commonly confronted within the political sphere – the act of choosing a candidate.  
3.3 Examining the Connection between Everyday and Political  
      Behavior through a Regulatory Focus Lens 
 
Data from the Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life Survey, discussed in the 
previous chapter, is used to test the connection between chronic motivational orientation, 
goal-directed strategies, and political behavior. This survey includes the items concerning 
how people go about meeting a variety of goals within their everyday and political world – 
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the strategy scales –  as well as the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire, measuring chronic 
promotion and prevention (RFQ; Higgins et al. 2001). These scales are used to examine the 
connection between motivational orientation and behavior as a test the first set of 
hypotheses.  
I extend the examination between regulatory focus and strategic behavior in a more 
holistic fashion along with looking at how the two affect the process of making a vote choice 
in the second set of hypotheses. Vote motivation is measured using one item concerning the 
2012 presidential election asked in the Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life Survey. 
Participants indicated whether or not they voted in the 2012 election and which candidate 
they supported. Participants were then asked, “Using the following scale, which of the 
following better describes your reasoning for your vote choice: because you like President 
Barack Obama [Mitt Romney/your party’s candidate] and his policies or because you dislike 
Mitt Romney [President Obama/President Obama and Mitt Romney] and his policies?” The 
question was specific to the vote choice indicated by the participant and response options 
were anchored by “I like President Obama [Mitt Romney/my party’s candidate] and his 
policies” (1) and “I dislike….Mitt Romney [President Obama/the other party’s candidate]” 
(10). Therefore, higher scores on the vote motivation variable represent a more vigilant tactic 
and lower scores an eager one in the process of making a vote choice. 
Participants who voted for Obama based their choice on a more eager reasoning 
process (M = 3.52, SD = 2.48). As for Romney voters, their reports place them just slightly 
on the eager side of the median of the scale, which is 5.5 (M = 5.39; SD = 3.42). Third party 
voters were also more likely to have eager/promotion reasons for their vote choice (M = 
4.18, SD = 3.45). Response options across the three types of voters were combined into one 
measure, vote motivation (M = 3.99, SD = 2.89).  
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3.3.1 Initial Look at the RFQ and Strategy Scales 
 The two subscales of the RFQ (Higgins et al. 2001) were used to measure promotion 
(M= 3.47, SD = .65) and prevention (M = 3.54, SD = .78), which are positively correlated (r 
= .16, p < .001). Figure 3.1 displays the means and standard deviations of promotion and 
prevention scores broken down based on which regulatory focus group the participants were 
categorized based the combination of promotion and prevention strength held by each. 
While it is obvious that the group categorized as High Promotion or High Prevention would 
have stronger scores within their respective category, the figure is used more to differentiate 
the scores for the two groups not commonly differentiated – the Overall Low and High 
groups. Mean promotion (M = 2.90, SD = .64) and prevention scores (M = 2.88, SD = .48) 
are equal for participants in the Low Overall group. Participants in the High Overall group 
have a slightly higher mean prevention (M = 4.18, SD = .45) than promotion score (M = 
3.94, SD = .37). 
        Note. N = 620. 
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Participants reported the likelihood of pursuing ten general and political life activities 
using strategic eagerness and vigilance, independently. Figure 3.2 displays the means and 
standard deviations of the scales created from the strategy items. Overall, the mean use of 
eager strategies was higher than the mean likelihood of using strategic vigilance in the 
political arena (t (627) = 27.31, p < .001) and in general life (t (627) = 25.39, p < .001). In 
addition, the two types of strategies are positively correlated within the political (r = .27, p < 
.001) and general life domains (r = .38, p < .001). 
Note. N = 628. 
The distribution of regulatory focus strength and the correlation among the 
likelihood of using eager and vigilant strategies between and across both domains 
demonstrate three emerging trends. First, strategic eagerness is used more frequently than 
vigilance in both domains. However, more participants have higher prevention subscale 
scores compared to their promotion scores. This lack of correspondence may reflect an issue 
involving social desirability, with a hesitation in not wanting to report using minimal effort at 
work or report enjoying the negative side of politics.  
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The second trend includes the positive correlation between pursuing goals using 
opposing strategies within each domain – increased use of eager strategies is associated with 
an increase in strategic vigilance and vice versa. This could pose a problem further in the 
analysis if variance in goal pursuit behaviors is based on having a general degree of 
motivation rather than the specific regulatory focus.  
Third, strategy use, overall, is higher within general life compared to political life, 
indicating political goals are less likely to be pursued either due to less interest or exposure to 
the specific environment. The general question of whether or not the specificity of the 
political environment leads to differences in behavior is only observed, at this point, with the 
finding that strategic vigilance is least likely used in the political domain. This may be due to 
the structural elements of a political environment that, in general, encourages strategic 
eagerness through electoral rules and level of abstractness. Prior to looking in more detail at 
the different social domains, I evaluate the connections across individual attributes and 
regulatory focus and goal pursuit strategies. 
3.3.2 Regulatory Focus and Strategy Use: Demographic and Political 
Profiles 
 
Previous research has not focused on the relationship between promotion and 
prevention focus strength and demographic variables. However, demographic variables have 
a long-standing position of being connected to political behavior. Therefore, examining how 
demographic and basic political tendencies are connected to regulatory focus and the related 
strategies could help in understanding the connection among goal perceptions, pursuit, and 
political behavior. Table 3.1 displays partial correlations between regulatory focus or strategy 
use and the profile items, controlling for the opposing focus or strategy within each 
environment.  
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Promotion and Prevention Profiles 
The left hand columns in Table 3.1 look at the relationship between basic 
demographic variables and RFQ scores. An increased orientation to promotion, controlling 
for prevention scores, is associated with being older, having a higher socioeconomic status, 
and performing a larger variety of the general activities asked within the survey. Prevention 
orientation, controlling for promotion scores, shows a similar pattern regarding age and 
education, but is only marginally significant. Prevention is not associated with previous 
performance across the general life activities.  
 As for the political profile variables, there is no connection to basic tendencies and 
chronic prevention scores, controlling for promotion. However, a stronger promotion focus, 
while controlling for prevention strength, is associated with increased political activity, 
overall. Increasingly higher promotion scores are associated with being more interested in 
politics, previously performing more political activities, being a registered voter, and having 
Demographic Profile
Promotion Prevention Eager Vigilant Eager Vigilant
Age .15*** .07^ .21*** -.16*** .24*** -.03
Education .10* .08^ .04 .01 .04 -.05
Income .23*** .01 .14*** -.03 .08* -.05
White -.01 -.08^ .01 -.07 .09* -.01
Male -.02 -.07^ -.13** .03 -.07^ .02
Gen. Activity .28*** -.03 .32*** .02 .18*** .06
Political Profile
Promotion Prevention Eager Vigilant Eager Vigilant
Pol. Interest .19*** -.04 .22*** -.06 .32*** .19***
Partisanship .03 -.03 -.05 .03 -.10* -.09*
Ideology .06 -.03 -.02 .10* -.06 -.05
Register .11** .02 .18*** -.05 .17*** .002
Vote .13*** .05 .22*** -.08^ .26*** -.03
Pol. Activity .16*** .01 .24*** -.05 .38*** .14***
General Life Strategies Political Life StrategiesRegulatory Focus
Table 3.1. Partial correlations between RFQ scores and Strategy Scales with Demographic and Political 
Profile Variables
Notes. Register is coded so that 1 indicates subject is a registered voter and 0 indicates lack of registration. 
Vote is coded so that 1 indicates having voted in the 2012 election and 0 as abstaining.                                
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001
General Life StrategiesRegulatory Focus Political Life Strategies
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voted in the 2012 election. RFQ scores are not associated with ideological attitudes and 
partisanship, but this relationship will be further explored in Chapter 4.  
Strategy Scale Profiles 
 The relationship between strategic eagerness in goal pursuit and the political and 
demographic profile items follow the pattern witnessed for promotion focus. Strategic 
eagerness is positively related with variables indicating a higher socioeconomic status and a 
higher frequency of participation. On the other hand, strategic vigilance is not associated 
with a clear demographic profile, similar to the weak relationship with prevention focus and 
the same variables.  
Two different explanations exist for the connection between higher participation 
rates and chronic promotion and eager strategy scores. The first is the connection of both to 
higher socioeconomic status, which has historically been tied to higher political participation 
(Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, & Weisberg 2008; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady 1995; 
Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). The second explanation is based on personality 
characteristics associated with a stronger promotion focus, specifically relationship between 
promotion focus and increased levels of optimism and generalized trust (Grant & Higgins 
2003; Keller, Mayo, Greifeneder, & Pfattheicher 2015). The political world requires future 
thinking, resilience, and optimism given the low likelihood of having one’s vote matter and 
delayed gratification of seeing desired policies take action. 
 As for strategic vigilance, increasingly higher use of this tactic within political 
behavior, but not in general life, is associated with an increased interest in politics and a 
wider degree of participation. Political information often has a negativity bias, campaigns use 
us-versus-them rhetoric, and there is an emphasis on where candidates stand in opinion 
polls, which are more likely to align with strategic vigilance in creating a negative reference 
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point and a need to obtain a previous status quo (Cappella & Jamieson 1997; Druckman, 
Kifer, & Parkin 2009; Geer 2006; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1995; Jerit 2004; Patterson 1994). 
In addition, high dissatisfaction with the current political situation may be associated with 
the perception that there are only bad options to choose from or a feeling that the political 
environment needs to return to a previous status quo, presumably one with preferred 
policies, government officials, or economic situation. The environment itself, or the 
perception of the current state, may induce participation that aligns with vigilant strategies 
even if a person does not hold a strong prevention orientation. 
3.3.3 Connections Within and Across General and Political Life 
 With an initial understanding of regulatory focus and behavior, as well as a partial 
look into broad demographic connections with both, my next step is to test the first three 
hypotheses in a more rigorous fashion. The first two hypotheses concern the connection 
between regulatory focus and corresponding strategies – promotion strength should be 
positively associated with the use of eager strategies in everyday and political life (H3.1) and 
prevention focus is expected to be positively correlated with the use of strategic vigilance in 
political and general life (H3.2). Last, H3.3 only concerns strategies – individuals more likely to 
use eager (vigilant) strategies in general life will rely on the same goal-directed behaviors in 
political life. 
Regulatory Focus and Strategy Relationships 
Prior to looking at the full OLS models, coefficients for partial correlations between 
regulatory focus and strategy within each domain are displayed in the top of Table 3.2. The 
middle section of Table 3.2 contains the partial correlations between general life strategies, 
controlling for the opposing strategy, and each political strategy scale. The bottom section 
! 62 
correlates each political strategy, controlling for the opposing tactical scale, with the general 
life strategy scales.  
 
Table 3.2 shows support for the first hypothesis, but not the second. Increases in 
promotion scores are related to an increase in eager strategies in both general and political 
life, as well as a decrease in strategic vigilance in general life. However, increases in 
prevention scores correlate with an increase of using eager strategies in general life and a 
marginally significant decrease in vigilance. In addition, chronic prevention is not associated 
with either life strategy scale. These initial correlations continue to show a strong connection 
between promotion and pursuing goals with strategic eagerness that is lacking with the 
prevention-strategic vigilance connection.  
 The third hypothesis, behavior is similar across the domains, is supported. When 
people increasingly use strategic eagerness or vigilance in one domain, they are also more 
likely to use the same goal pursuit method in the other domain. In addition, the use of 
strategic vigilance decreases with an increased use of strategic eagerness, however the 
opposite is not seen. Overall, participants report behavioral patterns that transcend 
environments based on relied upon goal-directed actions.  
Eager Vigilant Eager Vigilant
.27*** -.15*** .23*** .03
.15*** -.07^ .05 -.04
----- ----- .63*** .09*
----- ----- .02 .33***
.64*** .14*** ----- -----
-.04 .31*** ----- -----
General Life Strategies Political Life Strategies
Table 3.2. Partial correlations between Strategy Scales and Regulatory Focus
Pol. Eager Strategies
Pol. Vigilant Strategies
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001
Partial Correlations Controlling for Opposing General Life Strategy
Partial Correlations Controlling for Opposing Political Life Strategy
Partial Correlations Controlling for Opposing Regulatory Focus
Promotion
Prevention
 Gen. Eager Strategies
Gen. Vigilant Strategies
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 The above partial correlations show that increasingly strong promotion scores are 
associated with an increase in using strategic vigilance in general life but not in political life. 
However, a subset of the sample has high prevention and promotion scores. This subset of 
participants may have high prevention scores, but still use strategic eagerness more often 
because of their high promotion scores, dampening the prevention-strategic vigilance 
relationship. In order to examine this possibility, Figure 3.3 displays the likelihood of using 
both strategies within each domain broken down by the regulatory focus categories.  
Note. N = 620. 
The mean likelihood of using eager strategies in political (F(3, 626) = 12.11, MSE = 
.89, p < .001) and general life (F(3, 626) = 20.51, MSE = .52, p < .001) differs depending on 
the combination of a participant’s RFQ scores. People with higher promotion scores are 
more likely to use eager strategies than those with lower promotion scores, however post 
hoc tests show the differences are based on having a strong motivational orientation rather 
than specifically having a stronger promotion focus. Participants in the High Promotion 
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Figure 3.3. Regulatory Focus Group Strategy Scale Means (SD) 
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group are equally likely to use strategic eagerness in general life as those in the High 
Prevention (p = .211) and High Overall group (p = .178) and participants in the Low Overall 
group use strategic eagerness less than all other groups. People with a promotion or 
prevention orientation pursue goals using strategic eagerness, and participants with both 
orientations are slightly more likely to use this strategy.  
In a similar fashion to general life, mean strategic eagerness in political life is 
distinguished between participants with one or both motivational orientations versus those 
that lack one. People in the High Promotion group are just as likely to use strategic eagerness 
as those in the High Overall (p = .981) and High Prevention groups (p = .116). In addition, 
the High Overall group is more likely than the High Prevention and Low Overall groups (p 
< .001) to eagerly meet political goals. Whereas people who lack a strong motivation 
orientation were less likely to use eagerness in general life compared to people in the High 
Prevention group, these two groups are equally likely to use strategic eagerness in the 
political world (p = .206). As before, holding one type of motivational orientation is 
associated with using eager strategies more often, but people who only hold a strong 
prevention focus are more similar than participants who lack a strong regulatory focus in the 
political world.  
Mean strategic vigilance across each regulatory group is only marginally significant 
within general life activities (F(3, 616) = 2.32, MSE = .58, p = .075) and there is no variation 
across the groups within political activity (F(3, 616) = .06, MSE = .79, p = .980). The only 
distinction across both domains is that the Low Overall group is more likely to use strategic 
vigilance to pursue general life goals compared to people in the High Overall group (p = 
.048). The slight differentiation in strategic vigilance is due to differences between people 
who lean towards one or both motivational systems versus those that do not. This again 
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points towards a distinction in methods of meeting goals based on having a motivational 
orientation versus not having a strong goal-mean structure. 
At his point, goal pursuit methods appear to be based on the extent that a 
motivational system is actively engaged, which indicates that the political environment only 
needs to motivate people in one way or another to create active participants – the message 
content in terms of relaying a promotion or prevention goal may not matter. If either 
promotion or prevention is activated, people are more likely to pursue goals with strategic 
eagerness rather than vigilance. Strategic vigilance appears have less variability based on 
regulatory focus strength, especially within the political world. 
The data also suggests that the promotion-eagerness connection is stronger in terms 
of a coherent goal-strategy relationship as well as to other personal aspects. Promotion 
strength and higher use of eager strategies is related to variables that suggest a more active 
and motivated person, such as higher socioeconomic status and more involvement in a 
variety of daily life activities, whereas prevention strength is not. Both, civic activity and 
socioeconomic status have a strong, positive connection to political participation (Lewis-
Beck et al. 2008; Putnam 1993, 2000; Verba et al. 1995). Therefore, highlighting eagerness 
within political activity, which in turn activates a promotion focus, may increase participation 
rates more than emphasizing vigilance.  
One caveat of emphasizing promotion and/or strategic eagerness is the role of 
prevention and vigilance. Prevention concerns are viewed as obligations that can be 
perceived as necessary goals. Therefore, these goals can lack the choice of whether or not 
they should be pursued and, subsequently, met. On the other hand, promotion concerns are 
ideals, or notions of what state a person would like to reach – these goals represent a choice 
as to whether or not energy and time should be directed towards them (Freitas & Higgins 
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2002; Shah & Higgins 1997). Because voting in the U.S. context is an opt-in system, 
prevention-focused people are less likely to participate unless political activity is perceived as 
necessary. Associated with this notion, increasing the use of vigilance in political activities 
was positively correlated with interest and participatory variety in the political world. This 
indicates a possible connection between vigilance and perceiving political participation as an 
obligation. Therefore, emphasizing prevention and vigilance in messages, especially 
highlighting the responsibility associated with being a democratic citizen could increase 
participation for prevention oriented individuals. 
Regulatory Focus and Eager Strategies 
 I continue to expand the analysis with OLS models beginning with Table 3.3, which 
displays the coefficients for the models that include eager strategies as the dependent 
variable. Table 3.4 holds the model results for strategic vigilance. I examine the frequency of 
using strategic eagerness in general life in Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.3 and Models 3 and 4 
contain the findings regarding political life. Models 1 and 3 include promotion and 
prevention scores and within-domain vigilant strategy scores (strategic vigilance in general 
life is used in Model 1 and political life in Model 3) as the main independent variables. The 
second and fourth models include the addition of the eager and vigilant scores from the 
opposing domain – both political strategy use scores are added in Model 2 and general life 
strategies in Model 4. The same model structure is used for strategic vigilance in the next 
section. 
Models 1 and 3 show support for H3.1, an increase in promotion strength is associated 
with an increase in using strategic eagerness. An increase in promotion strength is positively 
related to a higher frequency in the use of strategic eagerness in general life, Model 1, and 
political life, Model 3, while controlling for vigilance scores in each domain. However, 
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prevention scores are also positively associated with increased levels of strategic eagerness in 
everyday activities and marginally, positively related within the political domain. When 
strategy scores within the opposing domain are added, Models 2 and 4, promotion strength 
continues to be positively associated with using eager strategies more often in general life, 
but the relationship is lost in the political realm. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 displays the estimated means across the different classifications of 
regulatory focus based on Generalized Linear Models (GLM). These models reflect the same 
ones from Table 3.3 swapping out the continuous RFQ scores for the categorical regulatory 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Focus
Promotion .34 (.04)*** .20 (.04)*** .28 (.06)*** .07 (.05)
Prevention .16 (.03)*** .12 (.03)*** .08 (.05)^ -.03 (.04)
Strategies
Gen. Life Eager ----- ----- ----- .76 (.05)***
Gen. Life Vigilant .43 (.03)*** .30 (.03)*** ----- -.03 (.05)
Pol. Life Eager ----- .42 (.03)*** ----- -----
Pol. Life Vigilant ----- -.09 (.03)*** .37 (.04)*** .26 (.03)***
Controls
Age .01 (.002)*** .001 (.002) .02 (.003)*** .01 (.003)***
Education -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.003 (.03) -.002 (.02)
Income .03 (.02) .02 (.02) .02 (.02) -.01 (.02)
White .02 (.06) -.06 (.05) .15 (.08)^ .17 (.07)*
Male -.13 (.05)** -.10 (.04)* -.09 (.07) .03 (.06)
Constant
1.49 (.27)*** 1.20 (.23)*** 1.77 (.32)*** -.47 (.31)
F 34.68*** 67.88*** 22.37*** 59.34***
N 620 620 620 620
R 2 .315 .530 .229 .497
General Life Political Life 
Table 3.3. General and Political Life Eager Strategy Scores as a Function of 
Regulatory Focus and Goal Pursuit Means Within and Across Domains
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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focus group variable previously used. Looking at variation in strategy use based regulatory 
focus categories adds insight into how different combination of promotion and prevention 
strength affects goal pursuit. 
 
Models 1 and 3 examine the relationship between regulatory focus and strategic 
eagerness controlling for the use of vigilant strategies within the same domain (general life 
for Model 1 and political for Model 3). Participants in the High Overall group (represented 
by the white bars) are more likely to use eager strategies in general life than all other groups 
in Model 1. In addition, this same group uses eager strategies in political life more than the 
High Prevention and the Low Overall groups in Model 3. On the other hand, the Low 
Overall group (the polka-dotted bar) is less likely to use eager strategies in both domains.  
There are slight changes in mean strategic eagerness scores when tactics used in the 
opposing domain are added in Model 2 for general life and Model 4 for political life. 
Participants in the High Overall group are more likely to use eager strategies in everyday life 
and the Low Overall group is the less likely to use this strategy compared to all other groups. 
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The distinction in how often people use strategic eagerness is based on having strong 
promotion scores and prevention scores versus having low scores on both.  
In regard to the political environment, once general life strategies are added in Model 
4, the differences in how likely people use eager strategies disappears. The relationship 
between regulatory focus and political behavior appears to be fragile. This may indicate that 
people’s pattern of behavior in daily life mediates the relationship between regulatory focus 
and political behavior, which is less often experienced.  
My hypothesis that behavior will be consistent across domains (H3.3), can also be 
examined in Models 2 and 4. The data supports the hypothesis; as the frequency of eager 
strategies in general life increases, people also increase the same goal pursuit method in their 
political activities, and vice versa. In addition, the connections across domains and strategies 
provide further support that participants continuously use the same strategy in different 
social domains. As strategic vigilance in political life is used more frequently, the use of 
strategic eagerness in general life decreases. In addition, variation in general life vigilance 
does not affect the frequency of political eagerness when the latter is the dependent variable. 
Overall, goal-pursuit strategy transcends domains – differences between daily and political 
life do not lead to variation in the frequency of using strategic eagerness. 
Regulatory Focus and Vigilant Strategies 
 I examine the relationship between vigilant strategy scores and regulatory focus in 
the same way as I examined eager strategies to test H3.2 and H3.3. I expect increased 
prevention strength is associated with using vigilant strategies more often in general and 
political life and that people are consistent in goal pursuit across general life and political life. 
Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.4 look at strategic vigilance in general life while Models 3 and 4 
examine political vigilant strategies.  
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 As Table 3.4 shows, the hypothesis for prevention scores is not supported. An 
increase in prevention strength is associated with a decrease in the frequency people use 
vigilant strategies in daily activities within both, Model 1, which controls for strategic 
eagerness in general life, and Model 2, which adds political eager and vigilant strategies to the 
first model. Buttressing the previous findings regarding promotion and strategy choice, as 
promotion strength increases, people are also less likely to use vigilant strategies in everyday 
life. In addition, there is no association between RFQ scores and strategic vigilance in the 
political arena. The pattern between regulatory focus and goal pursuit strategies continues to 
show the eager-promotion connection but not the vigilant-prevention connection.  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Focus
Promotion -.31 (.05)*** -.30 (.04)*** -.08 (.06) .06 (.06)
Prevention -.14 (.04)*** -.12 (.03)*** -.07 (.04) -.01 (.04)
Strategies
Gen. Life Eager .49 (.04)*** .44 (.05)*** ----- -.21 (.06)***
Gen. Life Vigilant ----- ----- ----- .44 (.05)***
Pol. Life Eager ----- -.03 (.04) .36 (.04)*** .33 (.04)***
Pol. Life Vigilant ----- .28 (.03)*** ----- -----
Controls
Age -.01 (.002)** -.01 (.002)*** -.001 (.003) .002 (.003)
Education .03 (.02) .03 (.02)^ -.02 (.03) -.03 (.02)
Income .01 (.02) .01 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.01 (.02)
White -.09 (.07) -.09 (.06) -.03 (.08) .01 (.08)
Male .02 (.06) .02 (.05) .01 (.07) -.001 (.07)
Constant
3.59 (.26)*** 2.79 (.26)*** 2.82 (.30)*** 1.30 (.35)***
F 24.39*** 30.94*** 12.26*** 19.36***
N 620 620 620 620
R 2 .244 .340 .140 .244
Table 3.4. General and Political Life Vigilant Strategy Scores as a Function of 
Regulatory Focus and Goal Pursuit Means Within and Across Domains
General Life Political Life 
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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 Figure 3.5 displays the estimated means from GLMs using the regulatory focus 
group variable. Participants with low promotion and prevention scores, the Low Overall 
group (polka-dotted bar), have a higher mean likelihood of using vigilant strategies in general 
life when controlling for eager strategies, Model 1, and when political strategies are added, 
Model 2. Political vigilance, Models 3 and 4, does not vary based on which regulatory group 
people are categorized. These results do not reflect a relationship between being either 
promotion or prevention oriented and strategy selection; rather, the models demonstrate that 
distinctions in strategy use is based on participants having a regulatory focus orientation or 
not having one. Holding a strong leaning towards one or both regulatory foci is associated 
with using eagerness more frequently and having weak orientations towards both foci is 
associated with using vigilance more often, at least within the general life domain. Less 
motivated people may be more likely to use vigilant strategies because many of the items, 
using prevention related framing, emphasize minimal effort or a more negative approach to 
life, which may appeal more to these types of people. 
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Moving to the second half of connecting strategy use across domains, the third 
hypothesis is again supported by the data. Increased use of vigilant strategies in everyday life 
corresponds with an increase in vigilance for political activities. In addition, political 
vigilance but not eagerness is associated with an increase in using strategic vigilance in 
everyday life activities. While the RFQ scales are not related to political behavior, the types 
of actions performed in general life are correlated with political goal pursuit. Given the 
notion that there is much more experience in daily activities compared to the more novel, or 
at the least, infrequent exposure to the political environment, general life goal pursuit 
methods may mediate the relationship between regulatory focus and political activity. 
Previous experience under one regulatory focus and using the related strategy, especially 
having successful outcomes, leads people to repeat past behaviors (Higgins 1997, 1998; 
Higgins et al. 2001). Therefore, the increased opportunity to pursue daily goals provides a 
guide to navigating less frequently activated political goals. Although the data does not show 
a prevention focus-vigilant strategy connection, people who rely on strategic vigilance tend 
to stick with it across social environments. 
3.3.4 Discussion 
Several trends have emerged in looking at the connection between regulatory focus 
and the associated strategies based on the hypotheses. First, the frequency strategies are used 
to meet goals appears to be based on the extent a person has some sort of motivational 
orientation, not based on a specific regulatory focus. Strategic eagerness in general life is 
used less frequently by people with weak regulatory focus orientations, but strategic vigilance 
is more likely to be used by the same group of people. When looking at promotion and 
prevention scores independently rather than within the categorical groups, both strong 
promotion and strong prevention is associated with increasing use of strategic eagerness. 
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Activating either or, even better, both motivation systems – representing goals as ideals and 
oughts – within the political system should spur participation by increasing eager goal pursuit 
strategies. However, it may also be that people are inherently motivated or not and players 
within the political arena have little to no ability to persuade people with weak motivation 
systems to participate.  
The second trend suggests the focus should be on relating political participation to 
promotion goals and strategic eagerness. Even though the relationship is fragile within the 
political environment, there is much more consistency in the promotion-eager relationship 
compared to the connection between prevention strength and vigilant strategies. Maintaining 
a consistent goal-strategy message is important because regulatory fit can be induced, leading 
to increased motivation and positive attitudes towards the goal (Freitas & Higgins 2002; 
Higgins 2000, 2002; Idson et al. 2000). In this case, it may be fruitful for campaigns to focus 
on participation as an ideal goal of citizens and how to eagerly meet democratic goals to 
increase participation through regulatory fit. 
However, this strategy would be less successful for people with a strong prevention 
focus or without a strong regulatory orientation overall. Theoretically, prevention orientated 
individuals are less likely to be motivated by ideal-framed goal messages or use strategic 
eagerness. In addition, the models show increased strategic eagerness is associated with using 
vigilance less often and a positive relationship between vigilance and a lack of motivational 
orientation. Together, these findings suggest that targeting political activity in strategic 
avoidance of an undesirable outcome can increase participation for less motivated citizens, 
those least likely to get involved without an intervention.   
The third trend is that increased use of one strategy, either eager or vigilant, in 
general life is associated with an increased likelihood of using the same when confronted 
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with a political situation. The evidence suggests that perceiving the political world as a 
distinct environment, where individuals become more rationalistic or alter their normal 
patterns of behavior, may be erroneous – decisions and actions regarding politics do not 
substantially vary from behavior found in normal routines. In addition, the weakening of 
relationships between regulatory focus scores and strategy use when examining the political 
environment, especially when controlling for everyday behavior in the models, suggests that 
goal pursuit in general life mediates the relationship between motivational orientation and 
how political goals are pursued. 
3.4 Examining Motivations Behind Vote Choice 
The next step in examining how regulatory focus, strategy use, and the combination 
of the two plays out is to examine their relation to what motivates a person’s vote choice, 
which is the most salient political activity within the United States. General goal pursuit is 
expected to create differences in why specific candidates are supported – whether a citizen 
bases the decision on the extent the candidate is liked or the opposition is disliked. 
Specifically, increased promotion strength leads to a higher likelihood of using eager 
strategies in everyday and political life, resulting in voting for the 2012 presidential candidate 
who is most desired. On the other hand, stronger prevention focused individuals, 
increasingly use vigilant strategies across the two domains, and couch their 2012 vote choice 
in terms of oppositional distaste. 
3.4.1 Focus, Strategy, and Vote Motivation Regression Models 
Table 3.5 displays regression coefficients for OLS models examining vote 
motivation. Model 1 includes promotion, prevention, and standard demographic controls 
regressed on vote motivation. Vote motivation is coded so that higher scores indicate 
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choosing a candidate based on distaste for the opposition while lower scores reflect a choice 
based on how much the candidate is liked. 
This model shows a lack of relationship between vote motivation and regulatory 
focus, which is likely due to a disconnect between their places in the conceptual hierarchy of 
motivation within the regulatory focus framework. While regulatory focus is, overall, 
concerned with approaching desired end-states and avoiding undesired ones, strategic 
eagerness and vigilance provide an overall pattern associated with approaching matches to 
goals under a promotion focus and avoiding mismatches to desired end states within a 
prevention focus. However, the lowest rank in the hierarchy is the tactical level, in which 
behaviors reflect how best to meet goals based on the current environment and general 
strategic inclinations; sometimes vigilance requires risk and eagerness requires conservative 
behavior (Cornwell & Higgins 2015; Scholer et al. 2008; Zou, Scholer, & Higgins 2014). For 
example, vigilance requires avoiding mismatches to safety and responsibilities. However, 
there are times when this requires an active, more approach oriented behavior to ensure a 
threat is not overlooked or to get back to a certain status quo. While vote motivation may be 
too far removed within the hierarchy of regulatory motivation to have a direct connection 
with focus scores, promotion and prevention orientation directs general goal pursuit 
tendencies, which guide a specific tactic within one context. 
Model 2 in Table 3.5 adds general life strategy scales to the model and shows support 
for the hypothesis concerning the connection between strategy use and vote motivation. 
Increased use of eager strategies is associated with a decrease in vote motivation scores, 
while strategic vigilance is positively associated with vote motivation. Coefficients for Model 
3 include the addition of political strategies. Strategic eagerness within the political domain is 
negatively related and strategic vigilance positively related to vote motivation. In addition, 
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general life eager strategy use is no longer associated with vote motivation and general life 
vigilant strategy use is now only marginally significant.  
 
These findings support the assumption that the relationship between regulatory 
focus and vote choice motivation, based on preference or blackballing, works through goal 
meeting strategies in general life and, subsequently, political life. As the connection between 
general and political strategy use in the previous analyses suggest, behavior in general life 
continues to appear to be a mediator between motivational orientation and political 
behavior. These models expand upon the goal-mean interconnections by showing that 
general patterns of strategic behavior in the political domain mediates the relationship 
between daily life activities and tactics used in deciding which candidate to support. 
 
RF Only RF and Gen. Life
RF, Gen., and 
Pol. Life
Promotion -.15 (.23) .13 (.24) .27 (.23)
Prevention -.01 (.18) .11 (.19) -.003 (.18)
Gen. Life Eager -.68 (.23)** .06 (.27)
Gen. Life Vigilant .59 (.20)** .37 (.20)^
Pol. Life Eager -1.11 (.21)***
Pol. Life Vigilant .72 (.17)***
age .03 (.01)* .03 (.01)** .04 (.01)***
education .00 (.11) -.01 (.11) -.01 (.10)
income .03 (.10) .02 (.10) .01 (.09)
white .56 (.34)^ .58 (.33)^ .68 (.32)*
male .58 (.28)* .52 (.28)^ .53 (.27)*
Constant 2.71 (1.17)* 2.21 (1.57) 1.76 (1.54)
F 1.74^ 2.74** 5.80***
N 438 438 438
MSE 8.17 7.98 7.38
R2 change .03** .08***
R2 change F (df) 6.11 (2, 429) 18.57 (2, 427)
R2 .027 .054 .130
Table 3.5. Vote Motivation OLS Models
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001
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3.4.2 Regulatory Focus, Strategy, and Vote Motivation Path Model 
Based on the previous models and conceptual hierarchy of motivation, the 
assumption is that regulatory focus indirectly influences voting strategy through the general 
goal pursuit process used in daily and political life. In order to fully examine the relationships 
between regulatory orientation, behavior, and vote motivation, a structural model is used. 
Figure 3.6 displays the hypothesized relationships, with solid lines representing positive 
associations and dashed lines represent negative ones. The model uses chronic regulatory 
focus scores as exogenous variables, as the first set of variables in the sequence of the model, 
based on the association between chronic promotion and prevention and cognitive 
differences that make-up a person’s personality (Higgins 1996; Higgins et al. 2001; Manczak 
et al. 2014; Manian et al. 2006). Since people are more likely to make decisions and meet 
goals throughout daily life prior to and more often than political objectives, general eager 
and vigilant strategy scales immediately follow promotion and prevention in the model. 
Frequency in using strategic eagerness and vigilance are third within the sequence. Both 
general and political life strategies represent the middle level of the regulatory focus 
hierarchy. Vote motivation, the extent people use available candidate information to vote in 
support for a preferred nominee or to oppose a disliked nominee in the 2012 election, is the 
final variable within the path sequence, representing the tactical level within the motivational 
hierarchy.  
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Figure 3.6. Hypothesized Path Model for Vote Motivation 
 
 
Only participants reporting voting in the 2012 election are used for the analysis, 
leaving a total sample of 440 for the path analysis. Table 3.6 displays the covariance matrix, 
along with skew and kurtosis index values.1 In order to account for the slight non-normality, 
robust standard errors are used and the model fit statistics utilize Satorra-Bentler corrections 
(Kline 2011). 
Model Identification and Parameters  
 The hypothesized model has seven observed variables, which allows for 28 
parameter estimates. A total of 20 parameters are freely estimated: a) two exogenous 
variances – promotion and prevention; b) one covariance between the exogenous variables; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1!The kurtosis of several variables is out of normal range, but the multivariate residuals are 
normal. Using the square root of the all the variables or just for the vote motivation variable 
in order to reduce the variance to align with the other variables does not change the 
parameter coefficients or standard errors. Given the lack of difference, the original values 
rather than normalized ones are used in the analyses. 
Gen. Life 
Vigilant 
Strategies 
Gen. Life    
Eager    
Strategies 
Pol. Life   
Vigilant 
Strategies 
Pol. Life      
Eager    
Strategies 
Prevention 
Promotion 
Vote   
Motivation 
Note. N = 440 
! 79 
c) five residual variances for the endogenous variables – eager and vigilant general life 
strategies, eager and vigilant political life strategies, and intention to vote; d) two residual 
covariances - one between the eager and vigilant general life strategies and one between the 
eager and vigilant political life strategies; and, e) ten path coefficients. The residual 
covariances for each set of strategies are estimated because the eager and vigilant strategy 
scales concern identical target behaviors, leading to likely commonalities in measurement 
error and/or associated non-measured variables.  
 
The general pattern of strategic behavior used in everyday and political life can 
partially or fully mediate the regulatory focus and vote motivation relationship within each 
step of the proposed sequence. Therefore, partial mediation is examined by comparing three 
additional models to the hypothesized one. The first alternative model examines if general 
life strategies fully mediate the relationship between focus and meeting political goals, which 
includes four additional pathways: promotion focus scores to 1) political eager and 2) vigilant 
strategies; and, prevention to 3) political eager and 4) vigilant strategies. The second 
alternative model tests the extent political strategies mediate the relationship between goal 
pursuit in general life and vote motivation with two additional paths: 1) general life eager and 
2) vigilant strategies to vote motivation. The final alternative model examines the extent 
strategies within both domains mediate the relationship between RFQ scores and vote 
Promotion Prevention
Gen. Life 
Eager
Gen. Life 
Vigilant
Pol. Life 
Eager
Pol. Life 
Vigilant
Vote 
Motivation
Promotion .41
Prevention .07 .58
Gen. Life Eager .14 .09 .50
Gen. Life Vigilant -.06 -.06 .19 .59
Pol. Life Eager .14 -.01 .38 .18 .74
Pol. Life Vigilant -.02 -.04 .12 .27 .25 .77
Vote motivation -.03 -.05 -.18 .17 -.43 .39 8.31
Skewness -.18 -.16 -.65 -.05 -1.08 .06 1.44
Kurtosis 3.58 2.70 4.08 3.17 5.05 3.17 2.61
Table 3.6. Variance and Covariances Across Variables in Path Models
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001
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motivation with two additional paths: 1) promotion and 2) prevention scores to vote 
motivation. Table 3.7 displays the specific paths used in each alternative model. Model fit 
tests are used to compare the expected model against the alternative ones. The expected 
model is nested within each alternative model, so model fit tests are used to make fit 
comparisons. 
 
3.4.3 Path Model Results 
Maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors using the Lavaan 
package in R was used to estimate all models (Rosseel 2012). Each model terminated 
normally and the residuals did not show a large problem with the model structure. Table 3.8 
displays the fit indices as well as the chi-square difference test between the hypothesized and 
alternative models and the RMSEA-based power of each model using the R-code from 
Preacher and Coffman (2006). According to the Hu and Bentler (1999) criteria, the 
hypothesized model does an adequate, although not great, job representing the data. The chi 
square coefficient is significant, pointing towards a significant difference between the 
observed and estimated covariance matrices, but the approximate fit indices – Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized 
Root Mean Residual (SRMR) – are all within the expected range for a well-fitting model. 
According to the chi-square difference tests, the first alternative model fits the data better 
Causal Variable Endogenous Variable Hyp. Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3
Regulatory Focus Gen. Life Strategies X X X X
Political Life Strategies X
Vote Choice X
Gen. Life Strategies Pol. Life Strategies X X X X
Vote Choice X
Pol. Life Strategies Vote Choice X X X X
ModelParameter
Table 3.7. Estimated Pathways for the Hypothesized and Alternative Mediation Models
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than the hypothesized one. The second and third alternative models fit the data as well as the 
hypothesized model. However, the power of each model is lower than the traditional .80 
necessary to be confident in adequately rejecting the null hypothesis.  
 
In addition to the fit indices, the normal probability plots and histograms of the 
residuals show normal distributions. Residual correlations for the hypothesized model, as 
well as the second and third alternative models, show insufficient modeling of the 
relationship between prevention and the political eager strategy scale (rresid.corr. = -.109). All 
other residual correlations were within the ± .10 range. Normalized residuals also showed 
inadequate modeling of this relationship (resid. cov. = -.375).  All other residual covariances 
were within the ± 1.96 threshold. Normalized residuals and the residual correlations for 
Alternative Model 1 show this model is a better fit across all relationships, including between 
prevention and political eagerness. Based on the residuals and fit indices, the first alternative 
Hyp. Alt. 1 Alt. 2 Alt. 3
χ2 18.150 3.709 17.206 15.786
df 8 4 6 6
p .020 .447 .009 .015
Correction Scaling 
Factor 1.082 1.09 1.04 1.125
CFI .976 1.00 .974 .977
RMSEA .054 .000 .065 .061
90% CI RMSEA .022 - .085 .000 -.067 .031 - .101 .027 - .096
RMSEA ≤.05 .379 .844 .206 .262
SRMR .026 .014 .024 .026
Power .486 .313 .212 .211
Δdf ----- 4 2 2
Δχ 2 ----- 14.523** 1.447 1.9723
Δ"Power ----- .728 .438 .466
Note. N = 440.
Table 3.8. Model Fit Indices 
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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mediation model, which includes parameters between regulatory focus and political 
strategies, is a better fit to the data compared to the hypothesized and other alternative 
models. Therefore, general life behavior partially, rather than fully, mediates the relationship 
between regulatory focus and political strategies. 
How Regulatory Focus Affects Vote Motivation 
Results of the hypothesized model are in Figure 3.7, which includes the 
unstandardized coefficients and error terms.2 Non-significant paths and covariances are 
grayed out in the figure and solid lines represent positive relationships and broken lines 
delineate negative relationships. The model predicts eight percent of the variance of vote 
choice, the extent to which the participant’s 2012 presidential vote choice was based on how 
much the candidate and his platform was liked (1) versus how much the opposing candidate 
and his platform is disliked (10). The structural model findings mirror the trends from the 
previous regression models, including: 1) promotion scores and strategic eagerness is 
positively related; 2) prevention lacks an association with vigilant strategy; and, 3) general and 
political strategies are strongly connected. 
First, looking at the paths from regulatory focus to general life strategies, there is a 
positive path coefficient between promotion and eager life strategies as well as a negative 
coefficient with general vigilant strategies. Therefore, increasingly higher promotion strength, 
with keeping prevention scores constant, is associated with an increase in using strategic 
eagerness in everyday life and a decrease in reliance on vigilant strategies. In addition, and 
contrary to the expectations, the effect of prevention strength mimics the pattern of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!Table B.1 holds the results of the model. The table includes the unstandardized coefficients 
and standard errors, standardized coefficients, 95 percent confidence boundaries, and R2 for 
each parameter estimated. 
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promotion scores but the decrease in vigilance is only marginally significant. As before, 
promotion is found to be positively associated with eager strategies but there is a lack of 
association between prevention and vigilant strategies.  
Figure 3.7. Unstandardized (SE) Coefficients for Vote Motivation Path Model 
 
Moving to the right within the sequence, the positive relationships between general 
and political life strategies show that people use the same goal pursuit methods in both 
domains. An increase in the use of eager strategies in everyday life, holding vigilance 
constant, correlates with an increase in the use of strategic eagerness in political life. 
Participants reporting a higher reliance on vigilant strategies in general life, are more likely to 
rely on the same strategies in the political world. In addition, there is no relationship between 
opposing strategies across the domains – increased use of eager (vigilant) strategies in daily 
life does not lead to a decrease or increase in people’s use of strategic vigilance (eagerness) in 
the political world.  
The final step in the model’s sequence is the connection between political life 
strategies and vote motivation. Both parameters are significant and show that vote 
Gen. Life 
Vigilant 
Strategies 
Gen. Life    
Eager    
Strategies 
Pol. Life   
Vigilant 
Strategies 
Pol. Life      
Eager    
Strategies 
Prevention 
Promotion 
Vote   
Motivation 
.32 (.05)* 
-.13 (.06)* 
.11 (.04)* 
.75 (.05)* 
.44(.05)* 
-.84 (.19)* 
.78 (.15)* 
.44 (.03)* 
.44 (.04)* 
.41 (.03)* 
7.62 (.50)* 
.58 (.04)* 
.58 (.04)* 
.64 (.04)* 
Note. * p ≤ .05. 
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motivation is positively associated with political vigilant strategy use and negatively related to 
political life eager strategy scores, aligning with the hypothesized relationships. For each 
increase in political vigilance, there is a .84 increase in emphasizing the extent the opposition 
is disliked – picking the better of two evils. On the other hand, for each increase in eager 
strategy frequency, there is a .78 increase in choosing a candidate motivated by how much he 
is liked.  
The model better explains strategic eagerness (R2 = .401) and vigilance (R2 = .164) in 
the political world compared to how likely people are to use eager (R2 = .111) and vigilant 
(R2 = .022) strategies in general life. The larger level of variance explained for political 
strategies re-emphasizes the connection between behavior in daily life and political life, in 
which people are likely to base political goal pursuit on how they successfully reach desired 
end states within normal routines. 
Overall, how regulatory focus guides general goal pursuit strategies partially explains 
the specific tactic used to decide which candidate to support in the 2012 election. As 
promotion strengthens, people also increasingly use eager strategies, ultimately leading to 
candidate choice motivated by preferring him and his policies. The role of prevention is less 
clear because prevention strength does not increase the likelihood people use vigilant 
strategies. However, using vigilant strategies in everyday scenarios does lead to candidate 
support motivated by distaste of the opposition – a blackball strategy. In addition to the path 
parameters, the significant and positive residual covariances between strategy scores within 
each domain support the existence of common measurement error or an unmeasured 
variable across the two strategies. 
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Indirect Effects within the Regulatory Focus and Vote Motivation Model 
 The indirect effects for the hypothesized model are in Table 3.9, breaking down the 
separate pathways in which promotion, prevention, and general life strategies affect the 
reasoning behind a vote choice. The starting point of each indirect effect path is in the first 
column of Table 3.9 and the mediating variables, general and political life strategies, that 
each path passes through to vote motivation are in second and third columns. Overall, 
indirect effects show support for the hypotheses concerning promotion and life strategies 
but not prevention.  
 
There is mixed evidence for H4 and H5, as evidenced by the indirect pathways 
highlighted in bold in Table 3.9. Promotion shows a negative indirect effect on vote 
motivation, indicating people with stronger promotion scores are more likely to be 
motivated to vote for a preferred candidate. The specific expectation is that this relationship 
is due to how people utilize strategic eagerness to meet goals. The path from promotion, 
General Life Political Life
Promotion Eager Eager -.20 (.06)*** -.05 -.32 - -.10
Eager Vigilant .02 (.01) .00 -.01 - .05
Vigilant Vigilant .04 (.02)* .01 .01 - .08
Vigilant Eager -.01 (.00) .00 -.02 - .00
-.15 (.06)** -.03 -.27 - -.04
Prevention Vigilant Vigilant -.03 (.02) -.01 -.07 - .01
Vigilant Eager .00 (.00) .00 .00 - .01
Eager Eager .08 (.04)* .02 .01 - .17
Eager Vigilant -.01 (.01) .00 -.02 - .01
.05 (.04) .01 -.02 - .14
Gen. Eager Eager -.63 (.14)*** -.15 -.91 - -.35
Vigilant .05 (.04) .01 -.03 - .13
-.58 (.14)*** -.14 -.86 - -.30
Gen. Vigilant Vigilant .34 (.08)*** .09 .19 - .49
Eager -.05 (.03) -.01 -.13 - .01
.29 (.08)*** .08 .14 - .45Total Indirect Effect (Gen. Life Vigilant)
95% Confidence 
Intervals
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Table 3.9. Indirect Effects for Hypothesized Model in Figure 3.5
Causal 
Variable
Mediated by
Total Indirect Effect (Gen. Life Eager)
Unstandardized (SE) Standardized 
Coefficient
Total Indirect Effect (Promotion)
Total Indirect Effect (Prevention)
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through both eager strategy scales, to vote motivation is negative and significant, providing 
support for H3.4. However, there is also a positive effect of promotion on vote choice 
through vigilant strategy use in general and political life. This indicates that as promotion 
orientation becomes stronger, there is an increasingly likelihood that a vote choice 
emphasizes oppositional dislike based on how often vigilant strategies are used. In this case, 
tactics used to meet goals influence vote motivation contrary to the expectations of having a 
stronger promotion focus. Although this contrary finding exists, the expected relationship 
regarding eager strategies has a larger effect than vigilant strategies. 
The total indirect effect of prevention is positive, which is the expected direction, 
indicating motivations behind vote choice is a dislike for the opposing candidate, but is not 
significant. In addition, the specific indirect effect from H3.5,, that the relationship between 
prevention and vote motivation is mediated by strategic vigilance, is not significant. The only 
significant indirect effect regarding prevention strength shows that variance in how people 
use eager strategies in general and political life mediate the relationship between focus and 
vote motivation. Here, a person performs based on the expectations of regulatory focus, but 
not strategy use.  
 Goal pursuit strategies within general life have a stronger indirect effect on vote 
motivation compared to regulatory focus. The eager general life strategy scale has a negative, 
significant, indirect effect on vote motivation while the vigilant general life strategy scale has 
a positive indirect effect. People who are more likely to use eager strategies in general life 
vote for a specific candidate because they like him. On the other hand, when people 
increasingly rely on vigilant strategies in general life, motivation behind candidate choice is 
more about opposition to other nominees. The overall effects support H3.3, as well as the 
specific indirect effects that drive the relationship. Therefore, people meet goals in a similar 
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fashion across general and political life and broad patterns of goal pursuit affect motivations 
behind the specific tactic in vote choice.  
Examining Alternative Mediation Effects between Regulatory Focus and Vote 
Motivation 
 
In order to examine the extent to which strategies mediate the different relationships 
within the model several alternative analyses were performed. As previously stated, the first 
alternative tests the mediation effect of life strategies between regulatory focus and political 
strategies. The second looks at the extent political strategies mediate the relationship 
between general life goal pursuit and vote motivation. The final alternative model examines 
whether strategies across both domains fully mediate the relationship between regulatory 
focus and vote motivation. The previously discussed Table 3.7 summarizes the paths in each 
model and Table 3.8 provides the fit statistics for each. 
 The parameter coefficients and indirect effects across the alternative models do not 
substantially change from the coefficients in the hypothesized model. Therefore, attention 
will be placed on the degree general and political life strategies mediate the regulatory focus 
and vote motivation relationship by focusing on the previously absent pathways in each 
alternative model. Figure 3.8 displays the results, using the unstandardized parameter 
estimates and standard errors, of this first alternative mediation model. As done with the 
hypothesized model results, solid lines indicate positive relationships and negative ones are 
marked by broken lines and non-significant relationships are in grey. In addition, the 
covariances are removed for clarity and the new parameter estimates, which were absent in 
the hypothesized model, are in boxes.  
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 The previous parameter estimates from the hypothesized model do not substantially 
change in the partial mediation model depicted in Figure 3.8. However, there is evidence that 
general life strategies only partially, rather than fully, mediate the relationship between the 
RFQ and political life strategy scale scores. An increase in promotion strength leads to an 
increase in the use of eager strategies in political life. In addition, an increase in prevention 
strength leads to a decrease in using eager strategies in political decisions and activities – 
general life strategies only partially mediate the relationship between regulatory focus and 
strategic eagerness when confronted with political goals. However, there is no connection 
between prevention and vigilant political strategies.  
Prior analyses showed that prevention strength was associated with an increase in 
strategic eagerness in general life and no relation with political activities. Within the 
structural model, however, prevention scores are significantly related to political eager 
strategies in the expected direction – increased prevention strength leads to a decrease in the 
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Strategies 
Gen. Life    
Eager    
Strategies 
Pol. Life   
Vigilant 
Strategies 
Pol. Life      
Eager    
Strategies 
Prevention 
Promotion 
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.32 (.05)* 
-.13 (.06)* 
.11 (.04)* 
.74 (.06)* 
.43 (.06)* 
-.84 (.19)* 
.78 (.16)* 
.44 (.04)* 
.43 (.04)* 
.41 (.03)* 
7.62 (.51)* 
.58 (.04)* 
.58 (.04)* 
.64 (.04)* 
Note. Estimates in box are the new parameters to the model. 
 * p ≤ .05. 
.13 (.06)* 
-.14 (.04)* 
Figure 3.8. Partial Mediation Model for Vote Motivation (Alternative Model I) 
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frequency of strategic eagerness. This finding continues to show how strategic eagerness 
consistently plays a larger role than vigilance within the relationship between regulatory 
focus and pursuing goals, both in general and political life. Perceiving political activity within 
the context of hopes and dreams or frequently meeting political goals with eagerness 
correlates with more consistent motivation and action by citizens. 
 
The indirect effects of the alternative mediation model reflect the same pattern of 
effects as the hypothesized model, so only the simple indirect effects of the new parameters 
are displayed in Table 3.10. The additional indirect effect of promotion on vote motivation, 
mediated by strategic eagerness in the political domain only (skipping over general life) is 
negative, as expected. As promotion scores increase, eager strategy use leads to being 
motivated to vote for a preferred candidate. 
Looking at prevention orientation, the overall indirect effect is marginally significant 
and in the hypothesized direction, indicating vote choices made by people with a stronger 
prevention orientation are motivated more so by a dislike of the opposition. However, the 
hypothesis is not supported because the frequency of eager, rather than vigilant, strategies in 
the political domain is the significant indirect effect driving the relationship. Contrary to 
expectations, informally blackballing candidates increases based on the frequency eager 
strategies are used, not vigilant ones.  
General Life Political Life
Promotion ----- Eager -.11 (.05)* -.02 -.23 - -.01
------ Vigilant -.01 (.06) .00 -.12 - .11
-.26 (.09)** -.06 -.45 - -.10
Prevention ----- Vigilant -.03 (.04) -.01 -.12 - .05
----- Eager .11 (.05)* .03 .04 - .22
.14 (.08)^ .03 -.01 - .28
Total Indirect Effect (Promotion)
Total Indirect Effect (Prevention)
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Table 3.10. Indirect Effects for AlternativeMediation Model in Figure 3.6
Paths From Mediated by Unstandardized (SE) Standardized 
Coefficient
95% Confidence 
Intervals
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Results of the second and third alternative models are in Appendix B. Neither of 
which demonstrate significant changes in parameter estimates compared to what has been 
reported. The second alternative model shows that political strategies mediate the 
relationship between goal pursuit in everyday life and vote motivation. The additional direct 
path from the general life eager strategy scale to vote motivation is not significant, (B = .12 
SE = .28, CI = -.44 - .67), and neither is the pathway from general vigilant strategies (B = 
.21, SE = .22, CI = -.21 - .63).  
The third alternative model supports the notion that the relationship between 
regulatory focus and vote motivation is mediated by what strategies people use in both the 
general and political world. The parameter estimates between regulatory focus and vote 
choice are insignificant. Neither promotion (B = .29, SE = .22, CI = -.12 - .75) nor 
prevention (B = -.07 (SE = .17, CI = -.40 - .25) have a direct effect on vote choice. 
Therefore, within the motivational hierarchy based on regulatory focus, the broad strategies 
used to meet goals direct specific tactics used when people make the decision of which 
candidate to support.  
3.5 Discussion: How Regulatory Focus Impacts Candidate  
      Choice 
 
Just as in general life, political life can be represented as an attempt to reach a set of 
goals. RFT posits people develop a motivational orientation where goals are represented as 
either ideal or ought concerns, creating distinct goal-mean cognitive structures that help 
shape people’s worldview and personality. Ideal goals, which activate a promotion focus, are 
pursued with strategic eagerness. On the other hand, ought goals are reflected under a 
prevention focus and vigilance is the main mechanism pursued (Higgins 1997). Based on 
these tenants, I expected that increased levels of chronic promotion correlate with utilizing 
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eager strategies across everyday and political life while prevention strength increases a 
preference for vigilant strategies within both (H3.1 and H3.2) and that goal pursuit strategy 
would be the same between general and political life (H3.3). I then expected that these general 
patterns of goal pursuit, based on chronic regulatory focus, would dictate motivations 
behind supporting particular candidates within the 2012 presidential election (H3.4 and H3.5). 
Promotion focus strength is associated with behavior within people’s everyday life as 
well as when they enter the political environment. The general pattern of increased use of 
strategic eagerness by promotion-focused people was also associated with making a vote 
choice based on liking the chosen candidate. On the other hand, prevention strength was 
not found to have a relationship with vigilant strategies. Rather, people without a strong 
motivational focus report behavior associated with ought goals and vigilant strategies. 
However, being strategically vigilant in daily activities was associated with using the same 
goal directed behavior in political; this, ultimately is tied to using a tactic based on the dislike 
of the opposition. 
Following these findings, the looming question concerns why a promotion-eager 
relationship exists and not a prevention-vigilant one. Stronger promotion scores are 
associated with strategic eagerness in both daily and political life. And, while vigilant 
strategies in general life beget vigilance in the political arena, their use is not tied to a 
person’s prevention strength. One reason for the imbalance of the two foci may be due to 
the survey. The vigilant items reflect aspects associated with viewing goals as minimal, as 
avoiding doing more than what will maintain a status quo or minimum qualifications, and a 
pronounced negativity bias based on the literature surrounding regulatory focus. While these 
behaviors are not as sensitive as issues of race and illicit drug use, social desirability effects 
are well known in survey research (Berinsky 1999, 2002; Streb, Burrell, Frederick, & 
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Genovese 2008; Tourangeau & Yan 2007). Therefore, reporting a negativity bias or low 
effort may lead to social desirability effects  
In addition to social desirability related to the strategy items, characteristics between 
the regulatory systems likely play a role in the disparate findings. Promotion strength 
activates an eager strategy that is based on a general tendency to approach a desired end-
state. This results in a broader degree of categorization regarding people and their behavior, 
including one one’s actions to endorse a broader range of behaviors for both themselves and 
others, as well as their own under a promotion compared to prevention focus (Crowe & 
Higgins 1997; Liberman et al. 2001; Molden & Higgins 2004, 2008). Therefore, people with a 
stronger promotion score may be using broader category boundaries in reflecting back on 
their goal directed activities compared to people with a stronger prevention focus. The 
overall lower scores in both general and political life vigilant strategy scales demonstrate the 
possibility of these two issues being present. 
3.5.1 Moving from Daily Life to the Political World 
Political behavior often mirrors social behavior and the same is true in how goals are 
pursued. Daily life and political ends are met with a sense of being either eager or vigilant. 
However, much of the research into personality not only examines direct connections 
between traits and characteristics, but what behaviors are expected based on interactions 
with particular contexts. This is also the case with regulatory focus – momentary focus and 
the environment often play into people’s behavior within the goal pursuit process. Within 
the context of U.S. politics, especially regarding elections, different aspects are likely to 
activate a promotion-eager or prevention-vigilant goal representation and pursuit strategies.  
Structural characteristics of the political environment align with a promotion-eager 
regulatory focus and strategy combination. The main activity people pursue within the 
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political world is voting by selecting the candidate one desires, which aligns with strategic 
eagerness. This notion is corroborated by a poll by Pew Research Center (2015) showing 
about two-thirds of people prefer to choose a candidate based on issue correspondence 
rather than electability. When choosing a candidate, the decision incorporates abstract 
information and ideas of the proper structure for society and government. Promotion goals 
are abstract versus prevention ones which are more concrete. Therefore, many times, this 
should lead to a stronger connection between promotion and interest in politics (Forster & 
Higgins 2005; Semin et al. 2005).  
In addition to the structural aspects of politics, campaigns, themselves, invoke 
eagerness. Many campaign slogans often reflect promotion concerns, the most obvious 
being President Obama using “Hope”. Opinion polls ask about enthusiasm towards 
candidates, which is supposed to indicate momentum, as well as favorability ratings as a way 
to gauge electability. These aspects of the political environment are conducive to viewing 
political goals as promotion concerns and using strategic eagerness to pursue them. The 
findings above show the strong connection between promotion and eager strategies within 
the political arena. 
Campaigns also reflect strategic vigilance, such as when candidates use messages 
concerning how s/he will fight against the establishment and that voting for him or her will 
put government back in the hands of the people, President Donald Trump’s slogan, “Make 
American Great Again” is a prime example of this. These messages reflect two notions 
dealing with prevention concerns: 1) success is equated to reaching a previous status quo; 
and, 2) representing the goal in reference to a negative state. Strategic vigilance is highlighted 
also by the extent of the negativity in President Trump’s campaign.  
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Beyond campaigns, there are also contexts where prevention goals and vigilant 
strategies exist within the political world. For example, a third of the population is willing to 
select a candidate that is likely to win rather than one that better matches their own policy 
preferences (Pew Research Center 2015). The preference to blackball and/or focus on 
electability is characteristic of vigilant strategies – and while people can informally do this, 
the election rules are more of a promotion-eager strategy. These decision strategies are not 
formally instilled within the electoral rules, but people still use them. While I expected 
prevention oriented people would use these tactics, people with little motivation did so.  
Growing negative attitudes towards government have been the trend for a number 
of years may be connected to the low motivational and vigilant political behavior. Welzel 
(2007; Welzel and Inglehart 2010) argues that when economic circumstances are bad, the 
prevention focus strength of society grows and predicts political preferences. Low opinion 
and trust may lead to a societal effect similar to the finding that economic conditions alter 
goal-mean structures at the societal level. The negativity may create cynical views and actions 
but it might get a person motivated to participate. 
The 2016 election between Hillary Clinton and President Donald Trump may be one 
signal of an increase in a prevention centric political environment and reliance on vigilance. 
About half of Republican and Democratic candidate supporters report that their vote 
reflects a choice against the other candidate (Pew Research Center 2015). As the election got 
closer, the negativity of the electorate increased. Another Pew Poll in 2016 found that over 
60 percent of Republicans and Democrats identify with their own party because they believe 
the opposing party’s policies are bad for the country. As for independents, over half had 
negatively oriented motivations behind their vote choice; independent leaners reported that 
their vote choice was made because the other party’s policies were perceived as bad (Pew 
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Research Center 2016). Last, 25 percent of registered voters that did not cast a ballot gave 
the reason that they disliked the candidates (Lopez & Flores 2017). The electorate appeared 
to have swung more than usual towards prevention motivations for candidate support and 
abstaining.   
Campaigns also appeared to take on a more prevention orientation. While many 
aspects of his campaign are not necessarily new, such as his slogan mentioned above and the 
negative tone of the campaign his has been seen as taking these aspects to the extreme. The 
New York Times even has been tracking his insults and updates a blog post with the list of 
who and what Trump has insulted on Twitter (Lee & Quealy 2017). 
Donald Trump was continuously connected with getting non-voters to participate 
because his rhetoric and platform emphasizing the anger and disenfranchisement felt by a 
sect of the population, mainly white males and the less educated. Trump’s rhetoric very 
much highlights strategic vigilance in his policy stances focused on protecting U.S. citizens 
from different ethnic groups, in his slogan, and in the extent he portrayed other candidates 
negatively. Strategic vigilance may the driving force in the ability for Trump to increase 
interest in the election by people who are habitual non-voters.  
There was a large amount of anti-Trump activity, which focused on doing anything 
to not get him elected – essentially trying to get voters to blackball him. Not only were anti-
Trump sentiments coming from Hillary Clinton, the Democratic nominee, but also from 
Republicans during the primary season. Several super PACs, such as Keep America Great 
and Not Who We Are, have formed with the only goal of blocking the election of Donald 
(Dovere 2016; Narayanswamy 2016). These aspects of the 2016 election created a prevention 
related and vigilant environment which could have invigorated people not traditionally 
motivated to participate become active participants in the 2016 election.  
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3.5.2 Conclusion 
 People meet goals, within both political and everyday activities, in similar fashions. 
Eagerly meeting general life goals coincides with using eager strategies in political life; 
strategic vigilance in daily life corresponds with an increasing use of vigilance in political acts. 
Promotion induces eagerness, but prevention does not equate to an increase in strategic 
vigilance. Different aspects of the political world’s structure and current environment affect 
the connections between regulatory focus, strategy, and political behavior. The interaction of 
motivational orientation and the environment are further explored in later chapters.  
Aunt MaryBelle may very well display variation in personality when it comes to 
politics, but these variations are likely reflected in other daily life situations, such as when the 
Astros are playing the Texas Rangers or making a judgment about a new restaurant. If she is 
likely to eagerly meet goals, using previous success as a guide and focusing on approaching 
end-states, Aunt MaryBelle is more inclined to vote for the candidate she likes the most. On 
the other hand, if the hostility to Republicans reflects an increased reliance on strategic 
vigilance, with a focus on avoiding past mistakes and ensuring against a loss, her vote choice 
is more likely impacted by dislike of the opposition.
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CHAPTER 4 Promotion and Prevention: Ideological and Issue 
Attitude Differences 
 
 Recent studies have begun to question whether ideological differences coincide with 
regulatory focus orientation. However, the results and underlining logic of these studies are 
contradictory. Whereas some researchers argue that there is a direct relationship between 
ideology and regulatory focus, another set of researchers argue that the relationship is not 
about the individual but the type of policy under question. While these hypotheses are both 
valid and situated well within the literature, there is a third possible way in which regulatory 
focus and political attitudes are related that has yet to be tested. In contrast to the 
connection between an individual or policy content driving the relationship, the third 
possibility is that that the policy environment relates regulatory focus and political attitudes. 
Specifically, whether or not the status quo of a policy may be a deciding factor in whether 
promotion or prevention focus corresponds with political attitudes.  
 I will test the relationship between issue attitudes, ideology, and regulatory focus 
using the Regulatory Focus and Ideology Survey introduced in Chapter 2. First, I examine 
the direct correlation between ideology and regulatory focus based on common 
psychological profiles associated with liberals (conservatives) and promotion (prevention 
focus), as suggested by Jost and his colleagues (2003). Second, I test the competing 
hypothesis provided by Lucas and Molden (2011), that promotion scores and policies with a 
growth-related goal will correlate, while prevention strength is associated with security-
related policies. Finally, I test the implication that a policy’s status quo affects the connection 
between regulatory focus and political attitudes by giving participants background 
information about an issue prior to asking for their policy attitude.  
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4.1 Ideology and Regulatory Focus 
 Ideology, in the past, has often been described as a consistent set of attitude beliefs 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes 1960; Converse 1964). However, the definition of 
ideology has expanded beyond a set of policy preferences and many researchers look at it as, 
at least partially, derived from numerous psychological constructs (Jost et al. 2003; Mondak 
2010; Smith, Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing 2011). There is a widening range of 
research that looks at the underlining construction of ideology stemming partially from 
genetics (Alford, et al. 2005; Fowler, Baker, & Dawes 2008; Settle, Dawes, Christakis, & 
Fowler 2010), personality (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter 2008; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, 
Dowling, & Ha 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak, Hibbing, Canache, Seligson, & Anderson 
2010), cognitive differences (Deppe, et al. 2015; Dodd et al. 2012; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, 
Hutchinson, & Chamberlin 2002), moral predispositions (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; 
Janoff-Bulman 2009), and psychological needs towards uncertainty and threat (Jost et al. 
2003; Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout 2007), all of which demonstrates a cleavage 
between those with conservative and liberal positions.  
4.1.1 Direct Relationship between Ideology and Regulatory Orientation 
 Many of the same psychological constructs that covary with ideology also relate to 
regulatory focus orientation. The psychological aspects of liberals parallel those of 
promotion focus individuals and those of conservatives are similar to those having a 
dominant prevention focus. These differences include: information processing, sensitivity to 
negative stimuli, personality traits, and moral predispositions.  
 Information processing across both regulatory foci is similar to differences in 
processing differences among the ideological spectrum. The cognitive flexibility that has 
been associated more so with liberals compared to the rigidity of conservatives (Amodio et 
! ! 99 
al. 2004; Rock & Janoff-Bulman 2010) has also been associated with promotion and 
prevention focus (Friedman & Forster 2000).  For example, when asked to perform tasks 
while pressing down on the top of a table (promotion) versus pushing up on the bottom 
(prevention), more cognitive flexibility was displayed and more alternatives were generated 
(Friedman & Forster 2000, 2001). In addition, prevention focus is associated with having an 
inclination for negative information (Fazio et al. 2004; Forster et al. 2001; Lockwood, et al. 
2002), which is also more prevalent for conservatives (Carraro, et al. 2011; Dodd, et al. 2012; 
Hetherington & Suhay 2011; for review, see Hibbing, et al. 2014). 
 The way in which people explore and what information is used to learn is similar 
across regulatory focus and ideological differences.  Fazio et al. (2004) used a computer 
game, Bean Fest, in order to examine how people use negative versus positive information 
about an unknown, target object to learn and create an attitude towards it. Prevention focus 
was associated with learning through negative reinforcement where the opposite was true for 
promotion focused individuals.  In a similar study Shook and Fazio (2009), using the Bean 
Fest game, looked at differences in learning behavior between liberals and conservatives.  
The results indicate that conservatives had a similar learning style observed under a 
prevention focus, with increased learning of negative over positive valenced beans. 
 These cognitive similarities – the salience of negative information and lower-effort 
preferences – may be what ties prevention to conservatism and promotion with liberalism. 
Recently, Hodson (2014) in a commentary addressing the negativity bias in relation to 
conservatism argued that the cognitive ability and style of conservatives leads to heightened 
awareness to threats. In turn, this leads to a prominent prevention focus, and ultimately a 
preference for social conservative attitudes. Certain thinking styles, such as cognitive rigidity 
and uneasiness with uncertainty (e.g. Jost et al. 2003) along with the higher use of low effort 
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thinking (e.g. Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar 2012; Deppe et al. 2014; Skitka et 
al. 2002) create the foundation to be sensitive to negative information, requiring an adoption, 
to some degree, of a prevention focus behavioral system over a promotion one in order to 
deal with a threatening world-view. Within this adoption, then socially conservative policies 
triumph, but at the same time create a feedback loop where they become more attuned to 
any sort of social threat within the environment. While many studies have correlated the 
psychological underpinnings associated with ideology and regulatory focus, Hodson (2014) 
offers an initial model hypothesizing the mechanisms of how these are related with cognitive 
style and abilities leading to conservatism through a heightened prevention focus. In 
addition, Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) showed that conservatives’ mental rigidity was 
mediated by avoidance motivation, which supports Hodson’s model. 
 Studies examining personality correlates of each regulatory focus also align with trait 
differences between liberals and conservative. Promotion focus is associated with the Big 5 
trait of openness (Vaughn, et al. 2008) and conscientiousness is associated with locomotion, 
which is behaviorally similar to prevention focus (Higgins 2008).  Liberman et al. (1999) 
argue that it is the aspect of openness to new experiences that leads to promotion focused 
individual to be willing to take a new object or change tasks in studies on endowment effects 
and task substitution. These align with the personality correlates of conservatives and liberals 
with liberals being more likely to score higher on openness of the Big 5 and conservatives to 
have higher conscientiousness scores (Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010; 
Mondak et al. 2010).  Creativity has also been associated with promotion focus (Friedman & 
Forster 2001), which also correlates with liberal attitudes and conservatives being less 
creative or mentally flexible (Carney et al. 2008; Dollinger 2007; Jost et al. 2003). Therefore, 
both in terms of personality characteristics, information processing and learning strategies, 
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the psychological characteristics between prevention and conservatism and between 
liberalism and promotion seem to align. 
 Beyond psychological correlates, the predisposition to hold certain moral beliefs are 
tied to regulatory focus and connects to policy goals and ideological beliefs. Janoff-Bulman, 
Sheikh, and Hepp (2009) examine the underlining goals of policy and equates them to 
promotion and prevention focus. Their work argues that the motivations with promotion 
focus are tied to prescriptive policies where positive force by the government are more 
preferred in order to obtain social justice (see also, Janoff-Bulman 2009; Janoff-Bulman, 
Sheikh, & Baldacci 2008; Janoff-Bulman and Carnes 2013). On the other hand, prevention 
focus is tied to prescriptive policies where the focus is about what government should be 
inhibited from doing and negative actions by government. Another study by Janoff-Bulman, 
et al. (2008) shows that conservatives score higher on avoidance morals, which leads to a 
preference for policies that reflect self-restraint and social order and a positive relationship 
with Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA).  On the other hand, liberals have moral 
motivations which are approach based, focusing on self-reliance and social justice, ultimately 
leading to a negative relationship with Social Dominance Orientation (SDO).  
 More recently, Cornwell and Higgins (2013) found the relationship between 
regulatory focus and ideological attitudes is mediated by the extent to which one uses each of 
the five moral foundations (Graham, et al. 2009). The study shows that prevention focus 
individuals are more likely to prescribe to the binding foundations, ingroup/loyalty, 
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity, which partially mediates the relationship between 
conservatism and regulatory focus. Promotion focus is negatively related to the same binding 
morals, which leads to lower levels of conservatism. The moral motivations and values 
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associated with promotion and prevention focus seem to connect regulatory focus and 
ideology. 
 In terms of more direct evidence, Dolinski and Drogosz (2011) do not specifically 
look at ideological differences but do find them. Polish citizens voting for the liberal party 
had higher promotion scores than prevention scores. In addition, binding moral foundations 
only partially mediated the relationship between regulatory focus and conservatism in the 
Cornwell and Higgins (2013) study. There was a direct, negative relationship between 
promotion and conservatism and a direct, positive relationship between prevention focus 
scores and conservatism.  
 Based upon research showing similarities between psychological profile differences 
of the two regulatory foci and ideological leanings, along with the patterns of moral 
motivation and foundations, the following hypotheses will be tested. 
H4.1:  Conservatives will have a higher mean prevention RFQ scores than 
liberals and liberals will have a higher mean promotion RFQ score than 
conservatives. 
 
H4.2: Self-reported ideology and issue attitudes, with higher scores indicating 
stronger conservatism, will be positively associated with prevention focus 
scores and negatively related to promotion focus scores. 
 
4.1.2 Not Ideology, but Issues …  
 Lucas and Molden (2011) argue that rather than looking at the psychological 
correlates, the main focus should be on the common motivations between regulatory foci 
and political policies. Some policies reflect a broad motivation for personal security and 
public safety while others reflect an underlying motivation to create opportunities for a 
community to grow. Just as regulatory focus is concerned with how individuals perceive 
goals and their motivational style, many political policies can be categorized as advancing the 
community while others protect it (Lucas & Molden 2011). Therefore, higher promotion 
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focus scores should show support for policies that create opportunities for growth such as 
school funding and healthcare. Prevention focus should then correlate positively with 
policies that have safety as the goal, such as strong military and protecting the environment. 
 This argument is similar to the one made by Janoff-Bulman and colleages (Janoff-
Bulmann 2009; Janoff-Bulman and Carnes 2013; Janoff-Bulman, et al. 2008, 2009). Their 
research argues that prevention and promotion lead to a preference for certain policies based 
on those policies’ goals. Promotion focus, in its association with approach, aligns with a 
higher likelihood of supporting social justice morals, leading to a higher desire for liberal, 
prescriptive policies that focus on helping the group advance. On the other hand prevention 
focus, in its association with avoidance, is related to conservative, prescriptive policies that 
focus on ensuring the group’s safety and social order. 
Just as the work of Janoff-Bulman and colleagues make the connection between 
regulatory focus and political attitudes about the ultimate, overarching goal of the policy, so 
does Lucas and Molden. However, there is a large difference between the two. Lucas and 
Molden argue that ideology has nothing to do with it and show no relationship between 
regulatory focus and ideology and all of their models control for ideology. On the other 
hand, Janoff-Bulman’s work, in taking into account different policy goals, argues that these 
goals create a line between conservatives and liberals. In order for Lucas and Molden’s 
argument to stand, the issues that are associated with growth versus security cannot group 
into those supported by liberals and conservatives, respectively. 
 Based on the argument of the Lucas and Molden piece, I attempt to replicate their 
findings with additional policies. The first two hypotheses below reflect their findings and 
the third questions whether this relationship is moderated by ideology, integrating the view 
that there is a common psychological profile between regulatory focus and political attitudes. 
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Examination of the interaction between self-reported ideology with promotion and 
prevention focus scores to see what happens if one – either ideology or regulatory focus – 
would be expected to contradict the other. For example, while higher prevention scores 
should be associated with an increased preference for environmental protection policies 
because it has a security related goal. However, based on the direct relationship argument, 
environmental protection should be positively associated with promotion focus scores 
because these policies tend to be supported by liberals rather than conservatives. In this case 
does one trump the other in terms of influence on policy preferences? If both regulatory 
focus and ideology arguments parallel one another, for instance both would expect 
prevention to be positively associated with a preference for increased border security, what 
does the relationship look like? 
H4.3:  Issues related to security (coded so preference for more government 
intervention is higher) will be positively correlated with prevention RFQ 
scores and have no significant relationship with promotion RFQ scores. 
 
H4.4: Growth-related issue attitudes (coded so preference for more 
government intervention is higher) will be positively correlated with 
promotion RFQ scores, but not significantly related to prevention RFQ 
scores. 
 
H4.5: Ideology moderates the relationship between promotion and prevention 
scores and issue positions. 
 
4.1.3 ... Or Policy Environment 
 Public policy does not work in a vacuum, but rather within a certain environment. In 
this case, the environment is the status quo of an issue, even if that status quo involves no 
government action. In a broad sense, the current status of a policy either corresponds to or 
contradicts an individual’s preference. The political environment has been shown to 
influence how psychological characteristics correlate to political attitudes (Kossowska & 
VanHiel 2003). For example, Thorisdottir et al. (2007) found that the need for security was 
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positively related to right-wing attitudes in Western Europe but positively associated with 
left-wing attitudes in Eastern Europe due to the historical differences between the two. Also, 
openness was positively associated with left leaning attitudes in the west and with right 
leaning attitudes in the east. 
 The last hypothesized relationship between regulatory focus and political attitudes 
takes into account the policy environment. In this case, the context is defined as the status 
quo of a policy in relation to the person’s political preference. Research examining how 
promotion versus prevention focus dominance leads to different behaviors and attitudes 
based on the status quo offers a novel way to examine the relationship between policy 
attitudes and regulatory focus.    
 At face value, promotion focus tends to be associated with higher risk behaviors, 
including moving away from the status quo, whereas prevention focus strength is associated 
with less risk taking and a preference for the familiar (Crowe & Higgins 1997; Hamstra, et al. 
2011; Liberman et al. 1999; Scholer et al. 2010). This has been demonstrated in the political 
arena with the Boldero and Higgins (2011) finding that given hypothetical economic policies, 
people who are have a prevention orientation or are induced into one preferred the status 
quo and those with naturally higher promotion focus scores or induced into a promotion 
state preferred a change to the status quo. Under this notion, prevention focus individuals 
would prefer to maintain policies in existence at all times.  However, in real life this is most 
likely not the case. If a policy’s status quo is incongruent with an individual’s preference, 
then it would not be rational to prefer the policy position just because it was the status quo. 
 The negativity bias of those in a prevention focus will lead to risky behavior under 
certain circumstances, such as when required to classify negative stimuli in a signal detection 
task (Scholer, et al. 2008). In addition, Scholer et al. (2010) argues and finds in four studies 
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that going below the status quo does not affect those with a higher promotion focus because 
their attention is on gains (everything above the status quo or what is between 0 and 1). 
However, higher prevention focus leads people to be sensitive to losses and, therefore, pay 
attention when a situation is below the status quo – everything between -1 and 0. In order to 
remove a threat to their security, prevention focus individuals will make a risky choice when 
in a state of loss if that option will get them back to the status quo. When the risky option is 
the only way to get one out of a loss situation and the conservative option will not, those 
with a higher prevention focus are motivated to choose the risky choice because it is the 
lesser of the two evils (Scholer et al. 2010).  
 The deciding factor in whether or not regulatory focus is associated with a political 
attitude may depend on whether one’s issue preference is the policy status quo or if it is not. 
For instance, if the status quo of a policy is not what an individual favors, even though they 
are high on prevention focus, they may be more willing to take a risk on trying to change the 
policy. On the other hand, having a policy status quo different from one’s own preference 
may not be related to someone’s promotion focus scores simply because being in a point of 
loss does not reach their attention to the extent as it does for a prevention dominant person. 
However, promotion focus should be tied to policy preferences for people who have a 
preference for the policy status quo that exists. This would indicate that that they may be 
able to move even further in their policy preference pursuit – move from the status quo to 
positive one. 
 Using the theoretical arguments and current empirical research on regulatory focus, 
loss aversion, and risk, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H4.6:  If the status quo of an issue is in an opposing direction than the 
participant’s own preference, there will be a positive relationship between 
prevention focus and attitude strength. 
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H4.7:  If the status quo of an issue is in the same direction as the participant’s 
own preference, there will be a positive relationship between promotion 
focus and attitude strength. 
 
4.2 Testing the Connection between Political Attitudes and  
Regulatory Focus 
  
I test the connection between regulatory focus and political orientation using the 
Regulatory Focus and Ideology Survey. This survey is distinct from the one used in the 
previous chapter, using a different MTurk sample. Regulatory orientation, the main 
independent variable, is measured with the RFQ (Higgins et al. 2001). Ideology, partisanship, 
and demographic measures previously discussed in Chapter 2 are also used in the models. 
Prior to the analysis, I discuss the issue battery and status quo policy items, which are unique 
to this chapter. 
4.2.1 Policy Attitudes 
 The Regulatory Focus and Ideology Survey included 20 political issue attitudes 
stretching across a variety of topics. These items include both foreign and domestic issues, 
with ten having to do with societal growth and ten with the security of it in order to test 
Lucas and Molden’s argument. Security topics include: 1) the War on Terror; 2) citizenship 
for undocumented immigrants; 3) government spending to stop crime; 4) border security; 5) 
the death penalty; 6) regulating business; 7) gun control; 8) strong military; 9) environmental 
protection; and, 10) abstinence only education. Growth-related policies include: 1) universal 
healthcare; 2) prescription drug coverage for seniors; 3) government spending on social 
security; 4) government spending on the poor; 5) foreign aid; 6) same-sex marriage; 7) 
government spending on infrastructure; 8) government spending on research; 9) the right to 
have an abortion; and, 10) government funding for public schools. All issue questions utilize 
a format adapted from many of the ANES issue items with the stem, “How much do you 
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favor or oppose _____?” and response options ranged from “favor a great deal” (7) to 
“oppose a great deal” (1). These items are used twice. First, the responses are coded so that 
higher scores indicate stronger attitudes towards security or growth, regardless of ideological 
direction, to test the connection between policy content and regulatory focus. Second, the 
direct relationship between political attitudes and regulatory focus is tested by recoding the 
items based on their ideological direction and correlating them, individually and as a scale, 
with regulatory focus. 
 The means and standard deviations for each issue policy, ideology, and RFQ scores 
can be found in Table 4.1. Correlations between each issue and ideology are in the expected 
direction, with higher ideological scores indicating a more conservative position. In order to 
examine the connection between ideology and regulatory focus by looking at an overall 
conservative issue preference, all items were recoded so that higher scores indicate a more 
conservative policy stance and averaged together (α = .88).  The sample, which is skewed 
towards liberal in self-reported ideology is also skewed liberal on specific policy preferences 
(M = 2.97, SD = .93). 
 In order to test whether security or growth policies are related to regulatory focus all 
issue items were coded so that higher scores indicated a more favorable position towards the 
issue, regardless of ideological direction. Analyses were performed on each issue individually 
as well as an index of each category of policy by averaging the scores for the growth policies 
(M = 5.35, SD = 1.02) and the security policies (M = 4.39, SD = .70).  
!
!
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
1.
 I
de
ol
og
y
1
2.
 P
ro
m
ot
io
n
.1
0*
*
1
3.
 P
re
ve
nt
io
n
.0
6
.1
1*
*
1
4.
 C
it
iz
en
sh
ip
.5
0*
**
-.0
04
.0
2
1
5.
 C
ri
m
e
.1
0*
*
-.0
8*
-.1
0*
*
.0
3
1
6.
 B
us
in
es
s 
R
eg
ul
at
io
n
.5
6*
**
.0
5
.0
7^
.3
4*
**
.2
1*
**
1
7.
 G
un
 c
on
tr
ol
.5
3*
**
.0
3
-.0
9*
.4
1*
**
.2
7*
**
.4
5*
**
1
8.
 E
nv
ir
om
en
ta
l
P
ro
te
ct
io
n
.4
7*
**
-.0
5
.0
3
.3
2*
**
.2
4*
**
.4
3*
**
.3
3*
**
1
9.
 H
ea
lth
ca
re
.7
0*
**
.1
0*
.0
4
.4
8*
**
.1
9*
**
.5
7*
**
.5
0*
**
.4
8*
**
1
10
. P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n
dr
ug
s
.3
6*
**
-.0
6^
-.1
0*
.1
9*
**
.2
4*
**
.3
7*
**
.2
7*
**
.4
0*
**
.4
5*
**
1
11
. S
oc
ia
l S
ec
ur
it
y
.4
0*
**
.0
1
-.0
3
.2
0*
**
.2
7*
**
.4
5*
**
.3
0*
**
.4
0*
**
.5
1*
**
.6
3*
**
1
12
. W
el
fa
re
.5
6*
**
.0
4
-.0
3
.4
3*
**
.2
7*
**
.5
0*
**
.4
6*
**
.4
2*
**
.6
3*
**
.5
2*
**
.5
8*
**
1
13
. F
or
ei
gn
 A
id
.3
0*
**
.0
1
-.0
6
.4
1*
**
.1
7*
**
.2
5*
**
.3
2*
**
.2
8*
**
.3
5*
**
.2
2*
**
.2
8*
**
.3
9*
**
1
14
. G
ay
 M
ar
ri
ag
e
.5
4*
**
.0
8*
.1
4*
**
.4
4*
**
.0
3
.3
7*
**
.3
1*
**
.3
7*
**
.4
9*
**
.1
9*
**
.1
8*
**
.3
4*
**
.2
0*
**
1
15
. R
oa
ds
.2
8*
**
-.0
6
-.0
2
.1
6*
**
.2
3*
**
.3
7*
**
.1
5*
**
.3
9*
**
.3
5*
**
.4
2*
**
.4
2*
**
.3
6*
**
.1
7*
**
.2
1*
**
1
16
. R
es
ea
rc
h
.4
1*
**
-.0
5
.0
4
.3
3*
**
.2
7*
**
.4
1*
**
.2
9*
**
.4
6*
**
.4
7*
**
.3
9*
**
.3
8*
**
.4
3*
**
.2
8*
**
.3
7*
**
.4
6*
**
1
17
. A
bo
rt
io
n 
R
ig
ht
s
.5
4*
**
.0
8*
.1
0*
.3
8*
**
.0
3
.3
3*
**
.3
0*
**
.3
9*
**
.4
5*
**
.2
2*
**
.2
1*
**
.3
2*
**
.1
6*
**
.6
8*
**
.2
3*
**
.3
7*
**
1
18
. P
ub
lic
 
E
du
ca
ti
on
.4
4*
**
-.0
6^
-.0
1
.2
8*
**
.3
2*
**
.4
2*
**
.3
6*
**
.4
0*
**
.5
0*
**
.4
8*
**
.4
6*
**
.5
2*
**
.2
7*
**
.3
3*
**
.4
2*
**
.5
0*
**
.3
2*
**
1
19
. W
ar
 o
n 
T
er
ro
r
.3
0*
**
.0
7*
.1
0*
.2
5*
**
-.2
6*
**
.1
9*
**
.0
3
.1
3*
**
.2
2*
**
-.0
02
-.0
3
.1
2*
*
-.0
3
.2
9*
**
.0
4
.1
6*
**
.2
5*
**
.0
6
1
20
. D
ea
th
 P
en
al
ty
.4
0*
**
.0
4
.0
3
.3
8*
**
-.1
3*
**
.2
4*
**
.2
4*
**
.2
3*
**
.3
2*
**
.2
0*
**
.1
8*
**
.3
2*
**
.2
5*
**
.2
3*
**
.1
4*
**
.2
0*
**
.1
3*
**
.1
6*
**
.3
8*
**
1
21
. S
tr
on
g 
M
ili
ta
ry
.3
9*
**
.1
2*
*
.0
8*
.3
0*
**
.2
8*
**
.2
1*
**
.1
3*
**
.1
0*
*
.2
6*
**
-.0
1
-.0
4
.2
0*
**
.0
5
.3
1*
**
-.0
8*
.0
9*
.2
8*
**
.0
6
.6
2*
**
.4
0*
**
1
22
. A
bs
ti
na
nc
e 
O
nl
y 
E
du
ca
ti
on
.4
1*
**
.0
7^
.1
2*
*
.3
0*
**
-.0
8*
.3
2*
**
.1
3*
**
.2
7*
**
.3
0*
**
.1
1*
*
.1
1*
*
.1
9*
**
.0
6^
.5
8*
**
.2
1*
**
.3
0*
**
.5
4*
**
.2
3*
**
.3
7*
**
.2
3*
**
.3
5*
**
1
23
. B
or
de
r 
Se
cu
ri
ty
.3
8*
**
.0
9*
.0
8*
.5
7*
**
-.2
3*
**
.2
1*
**
.2
2*
**
.0
9*
.3
0*
**
-.0
4
-.0
4
.2
0*
**
.2
1*
**
.3
7*
**
-.0
9*
.1
1*
*
.3
1*
**
.0
8*
.4
7*
**
.3
9*
**
.6
1*
**
.3
9*
**
1
M
ea
n
3.
24
3.
37
3.
50
3.
79
2.
95
2.
99
3.
48
2.
18
2.
79
2.
25
2.
63
2.
63
4.
10
2.
53
2.
21
2.
41
2.
69
2.
26
3.
47
3.
83
4.
55
2.
63
4.
80
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
ti
on
1.
59
0.
64
.7
5
1.
92
1.
29
1.
57
2.
05
1.
26
1.
99
1.
22
1.
39
1.
51
1.
58
2.
01
1.
11
1.
36
1.
88
1.
30
1.
88
2.
00
1.
70
1.
79
1.
67
N
ot
e.
 ^
p 
≤
 .1
0;
 *
p≤
.0
5;
 *
*p
≤
.0
1;
 *
**
p≤
.0
01
N
ot
e.
 A
ll 
po
lit
ic
al
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 c
od
ed
 s
o 
th
at
 h
ig
he
r s
co
re
s 
in
di
ca
te
 a
 m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
at
tit
ud
e.
Ta
bl
e 
4.
1.
 M
ea
ns
, S
ta
nd
ar
d 
D
ev
ia
tio
ns
, a
nd
 C
or
re
la
tio
ns
 fo
r P
ro
m
ot
io
n,
 P
re
ve
nt
io
n,
 a
nd
 P
ol
iti
ca
l A
tti
tu
de
s
109
! ! 110 
In the previous chapter I found a difference in overall motivation between people 
with higher promotion versus prevention scores. With this in mind, I folded self-reported 
ideology, making it have a range of 1 to 4, with higher values indicate a more extreme 
position (M = 2.45, SD = 1.00). In addition, I folded each individual policy position as well 
and calculated the mean to obtain a measure of overall issue attitude strength ranging from 1 
to 4, with higher values indicating stronger attitudes (M = 2.78, SD = .52). I use these two 
variables to test whether regulatory focus strength is associated with a tendency to have 
stronger versus more moderate attitudes. 
4.2.2 Status quo policy information 
 In addition to the basic issue battery, I gave all participants a set of items dealing 
with four policies. The items included a description of the current policy situation along with 
information about a possible change to the status quo of each. Two of these issues showed a 
liberal status quo position, border security and abortion, and two issues held a conservative 
status quo, business regulation and gun control. After being given the policy information, 
participants were asked three questions: 1) which of the following three options they would 
prefer to do: have the government take a more liberal position, a more conservative position, 
or do nothing and maintain the status quo; 2) the strength of preference for each of the 
three options; 3) whether their decision encompassed a vigilant or eager strategy, with 
wording adopted from Boldero and Higgins (2011).  
For example, gun policy was described as relaxed and favoring the 2nd Amendment 
right to possess firearms. Then information demonstrated a risk to this status quo by 
describing a push by some politicians to restrict the right to possess firearms by wanting 
more in-depth background checks, banning certain weapons, and reducing the amount of 
ammunition cartridges can hold. Participants were asked whether they preferred, “restricting 
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the rights of gun owners”, “extending the rights of gun owners”, or “maintaining the status 
quo”. The second set of items asked, “How strongly do you prefer or oppose laws restricting 
gun rights [extending gun rights/doing nothing]?” Attitude strength for each of the three 
directions was asked using a 5-point scale ranging from “strongly prefer” to “strongly 
oppose”. Finally, participants were asked if they “were being enthusiastic and thinking about 
maximizing America’ future” and if they were being “careful or thinking about what was 
necessary” when making the decision on gun policy. Responses for the final two items 
ranged from “not at all” (1) to “very” (5). The specific wording for each of the four policies 
is in Appendix A.  
Gun Policy. When given the initial information on gun laws, 47.8 percent of the participants 
reported a preference for restricting the rights of gun owners, 19.5 percent desired extending 
gun rights, and 32.8 percent preferred maintaining the status quo. The means and standard 
deviations for strength of each preference towards gun policy, as well as the other three 
issues, are found in Table 4.2.  
 
Border Security Policy. The second set of policy questions concerned attitudes towards 
government spending on border security. Once given initial information on the status quo of 
Restrict gun rights Extend gun rights Status Quo
3.21 (1.43) 2.62 (1.27) 3.07 (1.12)
Increase spending Decrease spending Status Quo
3.00 (1.29) 2.80 (1.26) 3.03 (1.04)
Pro-choice Pro-life Status Quo
3.75 (1.36) 2.34 (1.39) 2.97 (1.00)
Deregulation Strong Regulation Status Quo
2.57 (1.17) 3.44 (1.17) 2.91 (.92)
Note. All items are coded so that higher scores indicate a stronger 
preference for target attitude on a 5-point scale.
Table 4.2 Mean (SD) Self-Reported Attitudes towards Issues Used in Testing 
Significance of  Policy Status Quo
Business 
Regulation
Abortion
Border 
Security
Gun   
Control
Strength of  Preference
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the policy, 37.2 percent of participants indicated a preference for increasing spending on 
border security, 26.8 percent preferred decreasing the money spent on border security, and 
36 percent wanted to maintain the status quo. 
Abortion Policy. The third status quo policy issue concerned abortion rights. A majority, 
61.4 percent, indicated an initial preference for stronger pro-choice laws, 19.2 percent 
indicated they preferred stronger pro-life laws, and another 19.2 percent indicated a 
preference to maintain the status quo.  
Business Regulation Policy. The final issue topic concerned business regulation. 
Following information given the status quo of regulatory policy, 15.9 percent of participants 
indicated a preference for increasing deregulation of business, 51.5 percent preferred 
creating strong business regulations, and the remaining 32.6 percent indicating they would 
prefer the current laws.  
4.3 Analysis of Regulatory Focus, Policy Positions, and 
Ideology 
 
 The analyses are broken down based on my three sets of hypotheses. I first examine 
whether or not there is a direct relationship between regulatory focus and ideology. The 
second set of analyses look at how regulatory focus and issue attitudes are related based on 
common motivations between the two. The final set of analyses examine the connection 
between what the current status quo of the policy is in relation to a person’s preferred policy 
stance and how, together, these connect to motivational systems. 
4.3.1 Direct Connection Between Attitudes and Regulatory Focus 
 The first hypothesis suggests that there is a direct connection between regulatory 
focus and ideology. Specifically, the hypothesis states that conservatives should be more 
prevention focused and liberals more promotion focused. In order to test this hypothesis, I 
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look at the relationship between self-reported ideology and issue attitude preferences, all 
coded so that higher scores indicate a more conservative issue stance, and RFQ scores. 
First, looking at self-reported ideology and the political issue attitude scale, 
participants were divided based on whether they had stronger promotion or prevention RFQ 
scores. Figure 4.1 displays the mean ideological placement and issue attitude score broken 
down by those categorized as promotion or prevention dominant. There were not significant 
ideological (F(1,676) = 1.083, p = .298, MSE = 2.541) or issue attitude (F(1,620) = .014, p = 
.906, MSE = .842) differences based on being considered promotion or prevention oriented. 
  Note. Ideology N = 677; Issue Attitudes N = 621. 
 I also looked at ideology and motivational orientation using the four regulatory focus 
categories – High Promotion, High Prevention, High Overall, and Low Overall. Participants 
were placed into each category based on the method discussed in Chapter 2. Mean 
ideological and issue attitude scores, with higher scores indicating a more conservative 
attitude, for each regulatory group is in Figure 4.2. The breakdown into four groups offers a 
Figure 4.1. Mean (SE) Issue Attitudes and Self-Reported 
Ideological Placement Across Regulatory Focus 
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little more discrimination in regard to ideological attitudes. Participants in the High Overall 
group are ideologically more conservative than participants in the Prevention and Low 
Overall groups (F(3, 690) = 4.896, p = .002, MSE = 2.492). Looking at issue scores, there is 
no mean policy attitude differences across the four groups (F(3, 695) = .856, p = .464, MSE 
= .860). Overall, the hypothesis that conservatism is related to prevention focus and 
liberalism is associated with promotion is not found. 
!
In addition, correlations from Table 4.1 show the direction and strength of the 
relationship between self-reported ideology and promotion focus scores (r = .10, p = .009) 
and prevention (r = .06, p = .15). The bivariate correlations do not corroborate the expected 
pattern that promotion is negatively correlated with political attitudes and prevention 
positively related. Table 4.1 also does not show a strong pattern among the individual issue 
items and regulatory focus. Promotion scores are significantly related to three issues in the 
expected direction, including spending to stop crime, public education, and prescription 
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Figure 4.2 Mean (SE) Ideology and Issue Attitude Score Based on Regulatory 
Focus Category 
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drugs for seniors. There is a slightly more consistent pattern for prevention strength and 
political attitudes, with positive correlations for five of the individual issue items. Overall, 
eight of the twenty items show the expected relationship between political attitudes and 
regulatory motivations. 
Regression results that have promotion and prevention scores, as well as 
demographic controls, can be found in Table 4.3. The overall model for self-reported 
ideology is only marginally significant and promotion focus (b = .22, p =.03) is positively 
related to conservatism, which is opposite of the expectation. However, based on the 
analysis of group differences, this relationship is being driven by participants who have 
higher promotion and prevention scores. In addition, prevention focus scores are not 
significantly related to ideology. Neither promotion nor prevention are related to the issue 
attitude index. 
SR Ideology Issue Attitudes
Promotion .21 (.48)* .07 (.06)
Prevention .11 (.08) .05 (.05)
Age .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Male .04 (.13) >05 (.07)
White .35 (.15)* .05 (.09)
Education .03 (.04) -.03 (.03)
Income -.01 (.04) .02 (.03)
Constant 1.68 (.48)* 2.60 (.28)*
R2 .02 .01
F (df) 1.96 (7, 657)^ .81 (7, 683)
N 665 691
Table 4.3. OLS Regression Coefficients (SE) 
for Self-Reported Ideology and Issue Attitudes
Note. ^p<.10; *p<.05. All attitudes are coded 
so that higher scores indicate a more 
conservative issue attitude.
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Overall, the analyses do not correspond with the hypothesis that prevention is 
related to conservatism and promotion with liberalism. However, when looking at how the 
subscales work together, the findings based on the regulatory focus categories show that the 
promotion-conservatism relationship may be characterized as one of having high motivation 
overall rather than strictly related to promotion focus. To test this notion, I folded the 
ideology and issue attitude scales and examine if attitude strength, rather than direction, is 
related to regulatory focus. 
Correlations between promotion, prevention, and the attitude strength measures 
show mixed results. Promotion is positively associated with stronger issue attitudes (r = .12, 
p = .003), but not with ideological strength (r = .05, p = .230). On the other hand, 
prevention is positively associated with a stronger ideological stance (r = .08, p = .034), but 
not to issue attitude strength (r = .03, p = .499). The same pattern exists in a more complete 
OLS model using promotion and prevention as well as control variables. The promotion 
coefficient is positive in the ideological strength model (b = .10, SE = .03, p = .002), but not 
significant in the issue attitude scale model (b = .04, SE = .06, p = .502). In addition, 
prevention strength is positively related to issue strength, although it is marginally significant 
(b = .09, SE = .05, p = .084) and not related to ideological strength (b = .01, SE = .03, p = 
.716).  
I also examined the relationship between strength using the categorical regulatory 
focus variable. There were no mean ideological strength differences across the regulatory 
focus categories (F (3, 690) = 1.79, MSE = 1.00, p = .149). However, there are significant 
mean differences among the regulatory focus groups in issue attitude strength (F (3, 630) = 
5.48, MSE = .266, p = .001). The mean and standard errors for each group are in Figure 4.3 
and shows participants with low promotion and prevention scores tend to also have more 
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moderate attitudes. Participants in the Low Overall regulatory group have the lowest scores 
on the issue strength scale. This pattern corresponds with the previous chapter’s findings 
demonstrating a lower degree of engagement in general and political life for people without a 
sense of regulatory orientation. 
 
People lacking a strong regulatory orientation tend to be less extreme in their 
political attitudes. However, a correlation between regulatory focus and political attitudes is 
missing in the present data. Beyond attitude strength, several studies have alluded to or 
shown that the relationship between attitudes and regulatory focus is mediated by other 
constructs, such as a negativity bias or moral foundations (Cornwell & Higgins 2013, 2015; 
Hodson 2014). Therefore, the models looking at a direct correlation between regulatory 
focus and political attitudes may be too simplistic to capture the way in which the two 
correspond with each other. 
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4.3.2 Growth versus Security Related Issues 
 The second set of hypotheses relate back to the work of Lucas and Molden (2011) 
who argued that regulatory focus relates to political attitudes based on a policy issue’s broad 
domain. Specifically, growth related policies should be positively associated with promotion 
focus scores and security related policies positively related to prevention scores.  
 In order to test this hypothesis, I ran OLS models on each individual policy issue, 
coded so that higher scores indicated a stronger preference for the policy regardless of 
ideological direction. Each model was run with promotion and prevention as the main 
independent variables and standard demographic variables as controls. Table 4.4 presents the 
coefficients for promotion and prevention focus for each security issue.  
 
The overall pattern shows that prevention scores and promotion scores are both 
positively related to stronger attitudes towards security related policies. This corresponds 
with previous findings that show a connection between motivational orientation strength in 
general and increased attitude strength. As for the specific hypothesis, prevention scores, 
controlling for promotion and demographics, are positively associated with four of the ten 
Promotion Prevention R2 F N
Death Penalty .13 (.12) .06 (.12) .01 .83 693
Strong Military .30 (.10)** .14 (.09) .04 3.50** 689
Crime .13 (.08)* .12 (.07)* .04 3.71** 691
Business Regulation -.13 (.10) -.14 (.08)* .01 1.38 690
Environment .11 (.08) -.07 (.07) .01 1.01 687
Border Security .22 (.10)** .14 (.09) .03 3.10** 692
War on Terror .15 (.11) .21 (.10)** .04 4.42** 693
Abstinence Only Education .21 (.11)** .22 (.09)** .05 4.85** 688
Gun Control -.19 (.12) .20 (.10)* .04 4.02** 690
Immigration .03 (.12) -.06 (.10) .02 1.79* 693
Table 4.4. OLS Coefficients (Std. Error) Predicting Security Policy Preferences
Note.*p≤.10; **p≤.05. Models include controls for age, education, and income set at the mean 
and race (white = 1) and gender (male = 1).
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individual policies: spending on crime, the War on Terror, abstinence only education, and 
gun control. Contrary to the hypothesis, promotion focus scores, controlling for 
demographic variables and prevention focus, is positively correlated with three of the ten 
security issues. As for the composite security issue variable, prevention focus is positively 
associated with stronger attitudes towards security issues overall. However, promotion focus 
is also associated with stronger attitudes for security, although it is only marginally 
significant. Increased prevention is associated with a stronger preference for security related 
policies, supporting the hypothesis. 
Moving to growth related policies, with the OLS results in Table 4.5, there is little 
evidence of the expected relationship, that promotion focus is positively associated with 
these types of policies and prevention focus not related. As expected, promotion focus is 
positively associated with an increased preference for spending on prescription drug 
coverage for seniors, but only marginally, and increased prevention scores are related to 
lower preferences for abortion and same-sex marriage policies. However, promotion focus is 
negatively associated with three attitudes towards growth-related issues and prevention focus 
scores are positively associated with one. Looking at the composite of growth policies, 
neither promotion nor prevention scores are associated with these types of issues overall. 
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Interacting Ideology with Regulatory Focus 
The final hypothesis regarding policy content is that ideology interacts with 
promotion and prevention focus to create a more nuanced relationship between growth and 
security related issues and regulatory focus. In order to test this hypothesis, I ran OLS 
regression models on all 20 of the issues, similar to the models above. However, this time 
ideology was added to the model, as well as the interaction between ideology and promotion 
and prevention focus scores.  
I use the interactions between regulatory focus and ideology to try and tease out the 
relationship between ideological preferences and policy content that Lucas and Molden do 
not fully address in their models. Issues hold a broad policy goal that can be associated with 
promotion or prevention and be categorized as ideologically liberal or conservative. These 
two goals could match or contradict each other and the interactions are needed to explain 
these circumstances. 
First, looking at the general pattern of results found in Table 4.5, as promotion or 
prevention strength increases, preference towards security policy increases as well. However, 
Promotion Prevention R2 F N
Welfare -.06 (.09) .06 (.08) .03 2.93** 688
Research .09 (.08) -.07 (.07) .02 2.21** 693
Social Security .01 (.08) .05 (.07) .05 5.01** 691
Public Schools .12 (.08) -.02 (.07) .01 1.01 692
Roads and Highways .10 (.07) .04 (.06) .01 1.34 693
Foreign Aid -08 (.10) .10 (.08) .02 1.97* 689
Healthcare -.24 (.12)** -.11 (.10) .03 2.95** 693
Abortion -.23 (.12)** -.23 (.10)** .02 1.81** 683
Same Sex Marriage -.25 (.12)** -.33 (.10)** .04 4.17** 692
Drug Coverage .12 (.07)* .14 (.06)** .06 6.30** 689
Table 4.5. OLS Coefficients (SE) Predicting Growth Policy Preferences
Note.*p≤.10; **p≤.05. Models include controls for age, education, and income set at the mean 
and race (white = 1) and gender (male = 1).
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at mean regulatory focus strength, ideology is mixed in how it relates to the security policies 
– it is positively and negatively related to these types of policies. The main focus is the
interaction coefficients though; these examine what happens when regulatory focus and 
ideological goals within a policy coincide or contradict each other. 
The model for how much participants prefer the government to spend more money 
on combatting crime shows a significant interaction between prevention and ideology. At 
mean levels of promotion and ideology, an increase in prevention RFQ scores is associated 
with an increased preference for government spending to stop crime. This is expected given 
the connection between safety needs and prevention focus. In addition, at mean levels of 
promotion and prevention, increased conservatism is associated with a decrease in 
government spending on crime. However, these trends may not be descriptive based on the 
interaction term. The pattern of the interaction is shown in Figure 4.4, with fit lines 
representing the sample’s mean ideology, more conservative ideological stances (one 
standard deviation above the mean), and more liberal placement (one standard deviation 
below the mean).  
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As Figure 4.4 shows, when self-reported ideological attitudes are at the mean or lean 
conservative, each increase in prevention focus is associated with an increase in support for 
government spending to stop crime. On the other hand, more liberal participants show a 
decrease in support for spending on crime with each increase in prevention strength. This 
highlights the tension between regulatory and ideological goals. Conservatives are likely to 
prefer policies that stop crime and when this same group of people also has a stronger 
regulatory focus that is sensitive to security needs, policy preferences become even stronger. 
On the other hand, liberals do not increase their preference for spending to stop crime even 
if their motivational orientation is associated with being concerned about safety. Prevention 
strength moves liberals and conservatives differently; conservatives match the hypothesis 
proposed by Lucas and Molden, but liberals do not. Regulatory focus appears to exasperate 
the inclinations to meet safety needs for conservatives without having the same effect on 
liberals. 
 
Figure 4.4. Interaction between Prevention and Ideology for Spending on Crime 
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As for growth related policies, Table 4.7 shows that there is a significant interaction 
between promotion and ideology when looking at government funding for public schools. 
As seen in Figure 4.5, participants reporting ideological attitudes that are moderate or lean 
conservative are more likely to support funding for public education with each increase in 
promotion scores on the RFQ. However, this relationship is not significant for participants 
reporting more liberal attitudes. Again, conservatives align with the expectations of Lucas 
and Molden, so that promotion strength and support for public education, a growth-related 
policy, are positively related. Liberals, on the other hand, do not show this pattern, but this 
may be due to a ceiling effect based on the strong preference for public education held by 
this group. 
 
In addition to the hypothesized interactions discussed above, there is a significant 
interaction between prevention scores and ideology in the models examining abortion (see 
Figure 4.6) and same-sex marriage policy (see Figure 4.7). Both interactions have similar 
patterns. Participants reporting mean or conservative ideological attitudes decrease abortion 
rights support with each increase in prevention strength. The relationship between regulatory 
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focus and abortion attitudes is not significant for more liberal participants. Again, 
conservative attitudes are altered based on prevention scores but liberal ones are not. 
 
 
While the pattern is similar between support for abortion rights and gay marriage, 
there are differences in the relationship between policy attitudes and prevention. Figure 4.7 
displays the interaction for same-sex marriage attitudes. Just as for abortion, participants 
with moderate and more conservative ideological stances lower their support for gay 
marriage as prevention strength increases. However, increased prevention strength increases 
support for gay marriage among participants who report a more liberal orientation. The 
decrease for support of abortion and gay marriage with a rising prevention strength by 
participants with more conservative attitudes may be due to the perception that traditional 
attitudes towards society means that its safety requires these types of policies to be blocked. 
On the other hand, the increased support for gay marriage as prevention increases for 
liberals may be due a sense of providing security for civil rights. 
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Lucas and Molden argue that the relationship between policy attitudes and regulatory 
orientation is driven by common goals; promotion focus scores should be positively related 
to growth-related policies and prevention focus scores positively related to preferences 
towards security related policies. The analyses do show limited support for these hypotheses. 
Prevention focus is positively related to a stronger preference for security related policies, 
those towards the War on Terror and abstinence only education. However, promotion 
scores are negatively related towards a preference on three growth related policies - universal 
healthcare, abortion, and same-sex marriage. 
Addition of the interaction term between regulatory focus scores and self-reported 
ideology into the models was used to determine what happens when regulatory focus and 
ideological goals conflict or converge. While there was no consistent pattern or relationship 
between regulatory focus and political attitudes, the interactions that were positive show that 
regulatory focus scores seem to effect policy attitude for people who are more conservative 
but not for those that are on the liberal side of the spectrum. Promotion scores increased 
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policy preferences regarding public education and prevention scores increased the support 
for crime prevention. In addition, prevention strength lowered support for abortion and 
same-sex marriage policies.  
This asymmetric finding between liberal and conservative participants may be due to 
an artifact of the sample. The sample is skewed to the liberal side of the spectrum and the 
findings that regulatory focus disproportionately impacts attitudes for conservatives may be 
due to this. While 40 percent of the sample identify as liberal or strong liberal, only 10 
percent identify as conservative or strong conservative. Therefore, it may not be 
conservatives per se that are more likely to show a regulatory effect, but people who are 
ideologically moderate.  
4.3.3 Status Quo versus Change 
 The final set of hypotheses reflect the notion that the relationship between political 
attitudes and regulatory focus is not about a direct relationship between any specific political 
attitude, but more about whether the current policy is one that the person prefers or if it is 
contrary to his/her preference. The final set of analyses seeks to test my last two hypotheses: 
1) prevention scores are tied to a stronger preference for a change in policy when the status 
quo of the policy is undesirable; and, on the other hand, 2) when the status quo of the policy 
is desirable to the individual, promotion scores will be positively associated with a stronger 
preference for change. 
In order to test the hypotheses, the extent participants prefer and oppose movement 
from the status quo in both policy directions are averaged to create the dependent variable 
for each model. Higher values indicate a stronger preference to move past the current policy 
state in the same direction of the status quo. For example, abortion policy environment is 
described as leaning towards pro-choice so the dependent variable is coded so that higher 
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values indicate a stronger pro-choice attitude. Each model includes promotion and 
prevention scores, the person’s initial preference, as well as the interaction of both, along 
with standard demographic control variables. Participant’s initial preference includes three 
categories – maintaining the status quo, a preference corresponding with the current policy 
direction, and a position opposing the current direction. Results of each Model are in Table 
4.8, using participants who oppose the status quo as the comparison group. For example, the 
comparison group for the abortion attitude model is pro-life participants. 
The expectations for the models are derived from movement in the policy 
environment in reference to the status quo. Participants initially desiring policy in the same 
direction of the status quo are interested in a change that represents a move from 0 to 1, 
which is tied to the promotion system. Therefore, promotion strength should have a positive 
relationship with attitude strength for people who want to move beyond the status quo. On 
the other hand, participants with attitudes in the opposing direction as the status quo should 
show a correlation between the attitude and prevention scores. This is due to a concern 
about moving from an undesired policy environment, -1, towards a neutral point, 0, which is 
tied to prevention concerns. The latter should be negative because the dependent variables 
are coded so that lower scores indicate a stronger attitude that is opposite of the current 
policy direction.
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Business Regulation Attitudes 
The first model in Table 4.8 concerns the policy preference for business regulation. 
Attitudes towards regulation and deregulation are highly correlated (r= .79, p < .001) and 
averaged together to create the dependent variable. Deregulation was given as the policy 
environment so there should be a positive relationship between regulatory attitudes and 
promotion for people who prefer deregulation. As the first column of Table 4.8 shows, the 
promotion by increasing regulation interaction is negative, indicating the relationship 
between promotion focus and business regulation attitudes for people who prefer 
deregulation is more positive than it is for those preferring increasing regulations. The 
pattern of the interaction is broken down in Figure 4.8 and supports the expectation that 
attitudes associated with moving to a more positive policy environment, going from 0 to 1, is 
related to promotion focus strength. 
 
On the other hand, the prevention focus by regulatory preference interaction should 
be negative for participants who prefer more regulation. This would indicate that increases in 
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prevention strength correspond with an increasingly stronger preference for more regulation, 
which, at a minimum, moves from an oppositional policy environment to a neutral one – a 
move from -1 to 0. While the interaction between prevention and preferring regulations is 
negative in Table 4.8, the slope for prevention is not significant for this group (b = -.05, SE 
= .05, p = .331). In addition, the relationship between prevention focus and regulatory 
attitudes is positive for those preferring deregulation, which does not correspond with the 
hypothesis. The hypothesis for the connection between people who want to deregulate is 
supported – their attitude is tied to promotion focus, but the hypothesis is not supported for 
the connection between prevention and regulatory attitudes for people who prefer to have 
more regulation. Promotion focus is associated with a stronger motivation to push 
deregulation policy farther from where it is currently – moving from 0 to +1. 
Border Security Attitudes 
The model in the second column in Table 4.8 concerns attitudes towards border 
security with the limited spending on the issue as the status quo description. The dependent 
variable is coded so that higher scores indicate a stronger preference for decreasing the 
amount of spending by taking the mean of people’s preference to decreasing and increasing 
spending (r = .71, p < .001).  
I expected to find a more negative relationship between prevention and border 
security attitudes for people who initially report interest in increasing border security as well 
as a positive relationship between promotion and policy attitudes for those who initially 
stated a preference for decreasing spending on border security. As Table 4.8 shows, there is a 
positive, marginally significant relationship between promotion and attitude strength for 
people who want to decrease spending, which is in line with expectations. In addition, the 
promotion by increase spending interaction is negative. The model provides support for the 
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hypothesis concerning promotion focus and border security attitudes. When border security 
policy is already in a person’s preferred direction, attitudes towards providing additional 
security strengthen with increases in promotion strength. Again, promotion motivation is 
tied to the desire to move from 0 to +1. 
While the prevention coefficient for people initially preferring more spending is 
negative, recoding using people who want to increase border security as the comparison 
group shows that there is no relationship between prevention and attitude strength (b = -.04, 
SE = .05, p = .458). The model shows little evidence to support the hypothesis relating 
prevention focus and attitudes towards border security as a function of the current policy 
environment. 
Abortion Attitudes  
The third policy area I explored is abortion, with results in the third column of Table 
4.8. The dependent variable is composed of attitudes towards making laws more pro-choice 
and more pro-life (r = .78, p < .001). Higher values on the dependent variable indicate a 
stronger pro-choice attitude, which is in the same direction of how the status quo was 
described.  
Contrary to expectations, promotion is not positively related to attitudes towards 
pro-choice abortion policy for people with this initial attitude. However, the prevention by 
pro-life attitude interaction is negative and significant. The pattern of the interaction is in 
Figure 4.9. While prevention scores are not connected to attitudes for abortion policy for the 
pro-choice and status quo group, as prevention scores increase, participants reporting a 
preference for pro-life policies have an increasingly stronger attitude (b = -.26, SE = .08, p = 
.002). Prevention motivation strengthens a person’s desire to move from a negative state 
towards a desirable status quo – from -1 to 0 – by strengthening their original attitude. While 
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the previous two attitudes connected promotion focus to attitudes based on a reference to 
the status quo, abortion attitudes are related to prevention strength in relation to the current 
policy environment.    
 
Gun Rights 
The final policy I examine within these models is gun rights. The items asking 
participants how strongly they opposed/preferred extending and restricting gun rights were 
recoded so that higher values indicate a stronger preference in the same direction as the 
status quo, extension of gun rights, were strongly correlated (r = .71, p < .001) and were 
averaged together to create the dependent variable. Again, expectations are that promotion is 
positively associated with attitudes for people who prefer extending gun rights and 
prevention negatively associated with attitudes for people who want more restrictive policies. 
 The findings, using participants who desire an extension of gun rights as the 
comparison group, are in the right-hand column of Table 4.8. Promotion scores are 
positively related to attitudes towards extending gun rights for participants with a preference 
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to do so. In addition, the promotion by restricting gun right preference is negative. The 
pattern of the promotion by attitude interaction is in Figure 4.10. While there is a positive 
slope between participants who wish to extend gun rights, there is no relationship between 
promotion and attitudes for participants with a desire to restrict gun rights. However, the 
prevention score by initial attitude interactions are not significant. Again, the examination 
shows the expected pattern for promotion scores but does not demonstrate any correlations 
between prevention scores and attitudes based on the current policy environment. 
 
The hypotheses are partially confirmed across the four issues looking at how 
motivational orientation affects attitudes in relation to the status quo. In the abortion right 
model, prevention scores correlate with attitude strength for participants whose policy 
preference was in the opposite direction of the current policy. An increase in prevention 
strength is associated with a stronger attitude for people who are pro-life. When the frame of 
reference involves a need to move from an undesired starting point to a desirable one – 
going from -1 to 0 – the motivation comes from a prevention focus. In this case, people 
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who prefer pro-life policies had a positive relationship with attitude strength and prevention 
scores.  
In three of the four cases, when the status quo and participant’s direction of policy 
coincided, promotion scores were related to attitude strength. In these cases, participants 
whose policy attitude was in the same direction as the status quo and desired the policy to 
continue in the same manner, a move from 0 to +1, attitude strength was related to their 
promotion scores. This supports the hypothesis, based on the work of RFT and signal 
detection, that moving beyond the status quo is related to promotion, but not prevention. 
Promotion focus involves motivation to go beyond an already positive status quo.
4.4 Discussion 
I examined the relationship between political attitudes and regulatory foci in three 
separate ways. I first tested whether there was a direct connection between ideology and 
regulatory focus – whether liberalism was related to higher promotion scores and 
conservatism related to higher prevention scores. These hypotheses, looking both at self-
reported ideology and issue positions, were not confirmed. Second, the connection between 
type of issue attitude and regulatory focus was examined. Here, growth- and advancement-
related policies were suggested to be positively associated with promotion while security-
related policies were expected to be tied with higher prevention focus scores. These 
hypotheses were not confirmed either. Third, the link between the status quo of a policy in 
concert with a person’s policy preference was expected to related to regulatory foci. Here, 
prevention focus scores were hypothesized to be related to a person’s issue preference when 
there is an undesired status quo whereas promotion focus scores were suggested to be 
related to issue attitudes when the status quo is desired policy. This relationship was 
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supported by the data in regard to the expectations with promotion but less so with 
prevention.  
 The data does not demonstrate that the similar behavior patterns across distinct 
ideological backgrounds and dominant focus discussed earlier equates to a direct connection 
between the two. This contradicts the research that has suggested the two are connected 
(Janoff-Bulman 2009; Jost et al. 2003). This may be due to a missing moderator, such as the 
propensity to focus on negative aspects within the environment, as suggested by Hodson 
(2014). While the direct relationship was not found, people who hold onto one or both 
regulatory orientations have stronger attitudes than those that have low promotion and 
prevention levels. Having a motivational compass, in general rather than a specific one, 
appears to drive attitude strength. 
 The findings of the Lucas and Molden study confirm their hypotheses about 
prevention and promotion across several issue attitudes in two studies.  However, the results 
of the present study question their conclusions. Their first study uses a previously used 
measure of regulatory focus but is done on an undergraduate sample with a very limited 
number of issues, specifically the response to Hurricane Katrina, protection of the 
environment, the economy, the War in Iraq, and law enforcement for security related 
policies and only one item on whether the government should do more to encourage artistic 
and cultural events for a growth-related policy.  
 As for the second study, Lucas and Molden (2011), measure regulatory focus with a 
proxy consisting of several sub-indices from the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS; Schwartz 
1992). However, the correlation between the three values used for prevention – tradition, 
security, and conformity – and promotion – stimulation, hedonism, and self-direction – 
positive and somewhat high (r = .24), which is not what other measures of regulatory focus 
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find. It is also not to be expected based on the work of the SVS because these sets of values 
are on opposing sides of the circular structure. The reason for this may the lack of creating 
proportional sum variables to control for the participants’ use of the scale, which was used 
by Kluger et al. (2004) and recommended in the SVS manual (Schwartz 2009). This error in 
scale creation makes their findings suspect, especially given the inability to replicate in this 
sample. 
4.4.1 Negativity bias 
 In the present study I did not show that regulatory focus and political attitudes are 
directly related to each other. However, the best way to represent their connection may be to 
model it through the negativity bias. The sensitivity to negative information is a key 
component to differentiating between those of different regulatory dominant foci as well as 
those who are on different sides of the left-right ideological spectrum.  
 While people generally have a negativity bias, research has pointed out that it is 
heightened in conservatives and those with prevention dominant focus. Many researchers 
speculate and have found a correlation between conservatism and a stronger negativity bias, 
environments inducing negative emotions shift attitudes to the right, and conservatives tend 
to use negative information more so than liberals when forming attitudes (Castelli & Carraro 
2011; Dodd et al. 2012; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav 2005; Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 
2009; Inbar et al. 2009; Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson 2009; Oxly et al. 
2008; Shook & Fazio 2009). People with a stronger prevention focus also display a larger 
negativity bias compared to those with a stronger promotion orientation (Fazio et al. 2004; 
Higgins & Tykocinski 1992; Seibt & Forster 2004).  
 Regulatory focus is believed to develop in childhood, as a result of the caretaker-
child relationship. A caretaker who focuses on negative reinforcement will likely lead to a 
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child that is prevention focus and one that uses positive reinforcement is likely to yield a 
promotion focused individual (Higgins 1987, 1989, 1991; Higgins & Silberman 1998; Keller 
2008). Related to this, Block and Block (2006) find that children who show fearful 
tendencies, which is an indication of a negativity bias, tend to grow up to be more 
conservative. Regulatory focus and ideology potentially influence one another from early on 
or the development of each may stem from a common underlining attribute.  
 The similarities between regulatory focus and ideology in terms of negativity bias as 
well as the potential for both developing and/or being influenced at similar times in life 
indicate this as the most likely place to continue research. Recently, Hodson (2014) created a 
conceptual model of how the negativity bias seen in conservatives is mediated by prevention 
focus. While the present project did not find a direct correlation, looking empirically into a 
meditational model similar to what Hodson (2014) conceptualized may be more fruitful. The 
similarity in conditioning towards negative information and emotions across both prevention 
and conservativism lends itself to being the most likely place to find a relationship. 
4.4.2 Establishing the Status Quo as a Reference Point 
Looking at the status quo versus the participants’ issue preferences in relation to the 
regulatory focus-attitude connection has not been examined before this point. However, 
taking into account a reference point shows the most consistent pattern of how political 
attitudes and regulatory focus correlate. Promotion orientation is associated with attitude 
strength for participants who agree with the current policy environment. In addition, in 
regards to abortion, prevention scores correlate with attitudes for people who prefer policy 
to move in the opposite direction than where the current policy stands. 
For each issue, participants were given a quick overview of the four issues with the 
intention of providing a current status quo of the policy. However, even with the 
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description, the perceptions of the participants may compete with the given information. If 
this is the case, the reference point assumed to be used by the participant being the policy 
description could be erroneous. This may be especially true for policies that are in 
disagreement already with the participant’s own preference. For instance, a participant that 
prefers restricting gun rights may perceive the policy on the extreme side of gun owners and 
believe that merely increasing restrictions would not create a policy neutral environment. 
According to Scholer et al. (2010), in order for prevention focus to lead to a risky choice that 
option must be able to get them back to the status quo. Some people may not perceive that 
government action would get them to a desirable status quo, in which there would be no 
relationship between prevention and gun control attitudes. Further examination of how 
perceptions of policies and the possibilities in changing may shed light on if there is a time 
when the status quo of a policy matters differently for prevention versus promotion focused 
individuals. 
4.4.2 Conclusion 
 While a couple of papers have argued that there is a connection between regulatory 
focus and political attitudes (Jost et al. 2003; Janof-Bulman 2009) and several have found a 
connection to political attitudes (Boldero & Higgins 2011; Cornwell & Higgins 2013; 
Dolinski & Drogosz 2011; Lucas & Molden 2011; Janoff-Bulman, et al. 2008), the present 
study did not find a connection in the traditional sense. Promotion was not connected to 
self-reported liberalism or liberal policy issues nor was it associated growth-related policies. 
Prevention was not found to be associated with self-reported conservatism or conservative 
policy preferences or security related policies. However, the policy environment, whether the 
status quo was desirable or not, appears to matter in how regulatory focus, at least 
promotion focus, is associated with political attitudes. 
! ! 141 
 Further examination of regulatory focus and political attitudes should include 
emphasizing the negativity bias of conservatism and prevention or taking in a person’s 
perception of the policy environment. Regarding the connection between regulatory focus 
and political attitudes, the next step may be to examine perceptions of a policy’s status quo 
and what it would take to make a policy match a person’s preference. In attempting to set up 
a direct connection between regulatory focus and political attitudes, the negativity bias seems 
to be the best lens to use considering it seems to be a strong common denominator between 
both.
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CHAPTER 5 Regulatory Fit and External Efficacy 
 Jackie, introduced in the first chapter, believed that her support meant something to 
the Green Bay Packers, her favorite sports team; the team needed her to accomplish their 
goal of winning the Super Bowl. Just as Jackie holds a perception of how much of an impact 
she has on the Packers, she holds a similar attitude about the political world. Specifically, 
political efficacy, the knowledge needed to participate in the political process and ability to 
influence government, is similar to that of Jackie’s attitude about her relation to her favorite 
team. Does she have the ability to make a difference in the Packer’s and electoral systems? 
Do these similar attitudes correspond with each other? 
 Efficacious attitudes are influenced by how goal-directed activities are performed in 
specific ways. For example, if Jackie is promotion focused she should be more inclined to 
participate in politics using eager strategies. She votes for a Democratic candidate because 
she likes his policy platform. If she does this, regulatory fit will induce a sense of what she is 
doing feels right, subsequently increasing the positivity of her actions, including how much 
of an impact her participation has on government. However, if Jackie goes through the 
political world using vigilant strategies, such as deciding to vote Democratic because she 
really dislikes the Republican candidate, those same attitudes will not have the same positive, 
emotional boost.  
 Given the impact regulatory fit has on making decisions and the subsequent 
increases in value, enjoyment, and motivation to everyday objects and tasks, these spillover 
effects should also occur with political decisions and activities too. Within this chapter, I 
examine the effect of regulatory fit on external efficacy by looking at the combination of 
chronic regulatory focus strength and goal-directed behavior in the political world and how 
they correlate with attitudes towards participation. I use the Regulatory Focus, General, and 
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Political Life Survey to determine if people who meet political goals in a way that matches 
their dominant regulatory orientation have increased levels of external efficacy compared to 
those who do not.   
5.1 Regulatory Fit, Attitudes, and Behavior 
 As previously discussed, RFT posits people perceive goals as related to security or 
nurturance needs, creating qualitatively different motivational orientations. Promotion 
focused individuals, seeing goals as ideals and aspirations, and prevention focused people 
who see goals as obligations and responsibilities behave differently, are attuned to different 
types of information, and see end states and the outcomes of their actions differently 
(Higgins 1997). An extension of this concept, regulatory fit, is the experience of feeling right 
that occurs when the dominant focus matches the current environment or the person’s 
current goal-directed activities. Regulatory fit increases motivation towards the goal, the 
value of the targeted goal or object, and the subsequent emotional outcomes (Cesario et al. 
2004; Frietas & Higgins 2002; Higgins 2000; Hong & Lee 2008; Idson et al. 2000). 
5.1.1 External Efficacy and Regulatory Fit 
 It is important to look at what attitudes associated with voting and participation may 
be affected under regulatory fit, as these attitudes either increase or decrease the desire to 
participate. Again, previous work has shown behavior towards the target changes under 
regulatory fit, but attitudes toward the behavior and target itself are also intensified. Political 
efficacy is the attitude regarding the ability to influence government and the assessment of 
the likelihood government will respond to attempts of influence (Campbell, et al. 1954; Lane 
1959; Madsen 1987; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). External efficacy, the perception that 
government will respond to one’s demands, is a necessary condition for participation 
(Pateman 1970) and high levels are beneficial for both the individual and society (Balch 
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1974). Therefore, it is imperative to understand how the association between the 
environment and a citizen impacts external efficacy. If regulatory fit increases external 
efficacy through the emotional boost of making participation feel “right”, future political 
activity could be increased. 
 While the distinction between external and internal efficacy was made early on in the 
research (Lane 1959), understanding variation in external efficacy is limited. Instead, research 
on efficacy has looked almost entirely at environmental or group aspects of variance (i.e., 
Anderson 2010) and places heavy emphasis on internal efficacy (e.g. Caprara, Vecchione, 
Capanna, & Mebane 2009). Chamberlain (2012) recently attempted to understand efficacy at 
the aggregate level using presidential approval and the consumer sentiments index, but with 
little success.  It may be more profitable to focus on psychological aspects that potentially 
influence external efficacy, such as the motivation.  
 The theoretical and empirical literature surrounding external efficacy somewhat 
contradicts itself. Madsen (1987) claims efficacy attitudes are derived from socialization. In 
addition, dominant and higher educated groups have larger amounts of efficacy presumably 
because they psychologically transfer their effectiveness from private to political life (Lane 
1959; Converse 1972). Stemming from this argument, Converse (1972) postulates that the 
decrease in efficacy for the highly educated in the 1960s was due to blaming the system for 
not responding to their demands. The less educated, on the other hand, blamed themselves 
for their inadequacies (which also is tied to their status in private life). However, Campbell, 
Gurin, and Miller (1954) argues efficacy is a motivational variable, dealing with a person’s 
psychological background, finding it not associated with socioeconomic status. 
 Other researchers claim aspects of the political environment influence perceived 
efficacy and attitudes toward the government, such as having one’s own party win an 
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election (Anderson & LoTempio 2002; Anderson & Tverdova 2001; Clarke & Acock 1989; 
Finkel 1985, 1987; Iyengar 1980) or government officials that pursue the individual’s policy 
preferences (Weissberg 1975). In addition, having women candidates increases external 
efficacy among women (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). However, other aspects of the 
political environment, such as party composition within a person’s district, does not seem to 
effect efficacy levels (Weissberg 1975). 
 These different accounts of political efficacy may not be mutually exclusive. There 
may be a baseline level of efficaciousness held by a citizen that is developed from 
socialization and status. However, there may be intra-individual movement around this 
baseline based on the current political environment and motivation and recent experiences 
within the political world. One example of why a person’s efficacy varies is how the 
individual pursues political goals. A promotion or prevention oriented person feeling right 
about how s/he participates is likely to see an increase in efficacy versus one who lacks that 
emotional and motivational boost stemming from regulatory fit. 
5.2 Overview of Study and Hypothesis 
 RFT offers an avenue to understand why some people feel very important to 
government while others do not. If one is experiencing the “rightness” from regulatory fit by 
using participatory strategies that match their regulatory orientation (promotion-eager or 
prevention-vigilant), the individual should sense a stronger ability to influence government. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the ways in which regulatory fit and nonfit occur. The top half depicts 
promotion focus. For those dominant in promotion focus, when eager strategies are used 
regulatory fit occurs. Here, motivation increases, as well as external efficacy. However, when 
vigilant strategies are used, regulatory nonfit occurs. In addition, the bottom half depicts the 
outcomes for a dominant prevention focus. Here, a person using vigilant strategies will 
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experience regulatory fit while a person using eager strategies will experience regulatory non-
it. Within the nonfit circumstances, the “feeling of rightness” is absent as well as the boost 
to motivation and efficacy.   
  
 My main hypotheses for this chapter examine external efficacy and regulatory fit. I 
use survey data to assess the correlation between regulatory fit – based on self-reported 
behavior and decision making in the political world – and external efficacy scores. Each 
hypothesis reflects looking at regulatory fit as an interaction variable between regulatory 
focus and strategy use and as categorical variable. 
H5.1a:  As promotion strength and use of eager strategies increase together, external 
and political activity efficacy scores will become more positive. 
 
H5.1b: Use of eager strategies will be positively associated with external and political 
activity efficacy scores for participants with high promotion and low prevention 
scores. 
 
H5.2a: As prevention strength and use of vigilant strategies increase together, external 
and political activity efficacy scores will become more positive. 
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Figure 5.1. Regulatory Fit Between Focus and Strategy 
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H5.2b: Use of vigilant strategies will be positively associated with higher external and 
political activity efficacy scores for participants with high prevention and low 
promotion scores. 
 
 I look into the correlation between the extent participants create regulatory fit by 
participating in the political world in ways that coincide with their regulatory orientation. 
While the environment certainly induces a type of orientation, people can also experience 
regulatory fit by making decisions and seeking to meet goals in particular ways (Aaker & Lee 
2006; Higgins 2000). In the case of political participation, and especially voting, the goal is 
often assumed to get one’s preferred set of policy issues into law or candidate into office. 
However, this may not be the case. As Dolinski and Drogosz (2011) found, some people – 
those who are more prevention oriented – would rather vote against someone. And, as 
demonstrated in the third chapter, people who use vigilant strategies participate based on 
which candidate they dislike. My main question at hand is whether people who navigate the 
political world utilizing strategies that coincide with their dominant focus is correlated with 
the perception that their participation means more, even if it goes against the common 
assumption of what voting means.  
5.2.1 Differences between Experiencing Electoral Success versus Failure  
“Losing feels worse than winning feels good.” 
-Vin Scully 
 
  The most basic political act within the American political system is choosing a 
candidate for office, and even more so, electing the President. The winner-take-all system 
present in the United States is inherently one oriented towards a promotion focus 
perspective or environment. Voters decide who they want in office, not who they wish to 
see out of office.  
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 With this as the environment in which much of the political activity takes place, 
having a strong promotion focus or frequently using eager strategies gives people an 
advantage, at least in regard to feeling right about their political participation. As previously 
mentioned, there are two ways in which regulatory fit is created: 1) process-based in which 
someone chooses a tactic to meet a goal that matches their regulatory focus at the time; or, 
2) outcome-based where the environment creates a fit through framing (Aaker & Lee 2006). 
I focus on the former in the above hypotheses, but the latter may also be a factor.  
Regulatory fit can be beneficial in that it increases goal directed behavior, motivation, 
and value towards the target. In conjunction, emotional reactions to the outcome intensify 
under regulatory fit and evaluations of the behavior and outcome, both positive and 
negative, are more polarized (Cesario, et al. 2004; Frietas & Higgins 2002; Higgins et al. 
2003; Idson, et al. 2004). While intensified emotions related to regulatory fit would be good 
for those who succeed, these can backfire for those who fail at meeting political goals.  
 While there is some controversy as to whether efficacy is stable or dependent on the 
current political situation, there have been several studies documenting variance in efficacy 
based on whether someone’s preferred candidate won or lost a recent election (Finkel 1985; 
Iyengar 1980; Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2009; Weissberg 1975). However, 
there has been a lack of attention towards the underlying cause for success or failure leading 
to variation in external efficacy. Emotions likely play a role in this relationship considering 
partisans show increased anxiety when the electoral outcome is unknown (Britt 2003) and 
that losing decreases happiness (Pierce, Rogers, & Snyder 2016; Stanton, Beehner, Saini, 
Kuhn, & LaBar 2009) and increases stress at the biological level (Stanton, LaBar, Saini, 
Kuhn, & Beehner 2010).  
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Based on this, I expect that emotions stemming from success and failure, which are 
boosted under regulatory fit may be tied to efficacious attitudes. The following hypotheses 
were developed based on, both, the connection between political outcomes and external 
efficacy attitudes, and the connection between regulatory fit and emotions experienced 
regarding goal success or failure. The hypotheses include my expectations for people who 
voted for Obama in 2012 – indicating political success – and for people who did not – 
political failure. They are also broken up by when I expect regulatory fit and non-fit to 
increase efficacious attitudes. 
H5.3a: Participants with high promotion and low prevention scores will have a 
positive relationship between the increased use of political eager strategies 
and higher political efficacy scores if they experienced electoral success in 
2012. (regulatory fit) 
 
H5.3b: Participants with high prevention and low promotion scores will have a 
positive relationship between the increased use of political eager strategies 
and higher political efficacy scores if they experienced political failure in 
2012. (regulatory non-fit) 
 
H5.4a: Participants with high prevention and low promotion scores will have a 
positive relationship between the increased use of political vigilant strategies 
and higher political efficacy scores if they experienced political success in 
2012. (regulatory fit) 
 
H5.4b:  Participants with high promotion scores and low prevention scores will 
have a positive relationship between the increased use of political vigilant 
strategies and higher political efficacy scores if they experienced political 
failure in the 2012 election. (regulatory non-fit) 
 
 
 If a citizen is operating within regulatory fit and succeeds, the positive feelings 
associated with meeting a goal increases. These feelings are then transferred to the related 
values and attitudes of participation. On the other hand, if a citizen working under regulatory 
fit voted for the losing candidate, the negative emotions and evaluation of performance are 
intensified, including a potential reduction in efficacy. However, the negativity and lower 
efficacy associated with experiencing political failure may be mediated by regulatory non-fit. 
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Under non-fit conditions, electoral failure does not necessarily lead to intensifying negative 
emotions.  
5.3 Methodology 
 I use several items from the Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life Survey to 
test the previous hypotheses. The RFQ (Higgins et al. 2001), the Political Life Strategy 
Items, external efficacy, self-reported participation in the 2012 Presidential election, and 
demographic items were previously discussed in Chapter 2. In addition to these, traditional 
internal efficacy is also used to control for the connection between both forms of efficacious 
attitudes. 
5.3.1 Measures 
My main interest in the analyses is to examine how external efficacy is affected by 
regulatory fit and non-fit. I measure external efficacy in two ways in order to test the affect 
regulatory fit has on political attitudes. The first involves items traditionally used to measure 
external efficacy and the second includes the extent that people feel their involvement in the 
political activities used in the Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life Survey.  
In addition, I asked four questions commonly used to measure internal efficacy. These 
include items about whether the person considers him/herself to be qualified to participate, 
how much s/he understands political issues, that s/he could do a good job in public office, 
and how informed the s/he is compared to others. I averaged these items together and used 
the measure to control for the correlation between internal and external efficacy (M = 3.23, 
SD = .03). 
In order to see if political success or failure affects how regulatory fit relates to 
external efficacy, participants were categorized as electoral winners or losers based on their 
2012 vote. A dummy code was created separating out those voting for President Obama (n 
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= 313; coded as 1) and those voting for Romney (n = 101) or a third party (n = 34), both 
coded as zero3. 
All models include the RFQ (Higgins et al. 2001) measuring promotion and 
prevention focus strength. The regulatory focus group measure, discussed in Chapter 2 and 
used in the previous analyses, is also used based on the combination of participants’ 
regulatory orientation. In addition, demographic variables are used in the models, including 
age, education, income, gender, and race. 
5.3.2 Modeling Regulatory Fit and External Efficacy  
 The hypotheses predict that there is a positive relationship between regulatory fit and 
feeling more politically efficacious. OLS models with two different dependent variables – the 
traditional external efficacy scale and the scale developed from the efficacious attitudes 
towards each political action are used to test the main hypothesis. The correlation between 
the traditional external efficacy scale and the political life efficacy scale is moderately strong 
and positive (r = .57, p <.001), suggesting that the two are tapping similar, but different, 
constructs.  
 The two coefficients of interest in both models represent regulatory fit – the 
interaction between promotion and the use of eager strategies as well as the interaction 
between prevention and use of vigilant strategies. One of the two regulatory focus sub-scales 
is interacted with one of the two political life strategy scales so that two interaction terms 
represent regulatory fit – promotion focus/eager strategies and prevention focus/vigilant 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In order to ensure that the results examining election winners and losers are not being 
driven by ideology since the measure only uses one election, the models were also run with 
ideology. When ideology is used instead of the election winner dummy variable none of the 
three way interactions between regulatory focus group, eager and vigilant strategy use, and 
ideology are significant. 
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strategies – and two represent regulatory non-fit – promotion focus/vigilant strategies, and 
prevention focus/eager strategies. Both models include standard demographic controls, 
including age, gender, education, income, and race. In addition, internal efficacy is included 
in each model to control for its correlation with external efficacy.  
 The first set of analyses look at the interactions between focus and strategy scores, 
maintaining their status as continuous variables to test H5.1a and H5.2a. Follow-up analyses for 
the first two models include re-centering the promotion and prevention variables to one 
standard deviation above and below the original mean in order to examine the simple effects 
of the interaction, specifically determining the direction and significance of the strategy-
efficacy slopes at the different levels of regulatory focus.  
 The second sets of analyses create regulatory focus categories in order to further 
explore the relationship between regulatory focus orientation, use of eager and vigilant 
strategies, and efficacy, testing H5.1b and H5.2b. Because regulatory focus is theoretically two 
orthogonal dimensions, a person may be high on both, low on both, or high on one and low 
on the other. Each of the four regulatory focus categories (previously described in Chapter 2 
and 3) is interacted with the vigilant and eager political strategy scales and OLS models are 
used to examine the effects of regulatory fit and non-fit on external efficacy. In order to 
examine the complete set of results, additional models were run with each regulatory focus 
category as the comparison group.  
 The third set of hypotheses adds an additional term to the model indicating whether 
the participant experienced electoral success or failure. This dichotomous variable is 
included in a three-way interaction with regulatory focus category and political strategy 
scales. Therefore, the models testing H5.3 and H5.4 include two three-way interaction 
coefficients: 1) regulatory focus category, election winner versus loser, and political eager 
! ! 153 
strategy scale; and, 2) regulatory focus category, election winner versus loser, and political 
vigilant strategy scale. A general linear model is used to test the differences between 
regulatory fit and external efficacy based on electoral outcome. 
5.4 How Regulatory Fit Connects to External Efficacy 
 Table 5.1 shows an initial look into how regulatory focus is associated with external 
and political activity efficacy. The table consists of OLS regression coefficients with both 
promotion and prevention scores as the independent variables. Promotion scores are 
positively associated with both efficacy scales and prevention scores correlate with the 
traditional external efficacy scale. In addition, the bottom of Table 5.1 displays the results of 
how people behave and make decisions in the political world, by either being more likely to 
use eager and vigilant strategies regressed onto both efficacy variables. The use of eager 
strategies is positively correlated with both efficacy scales. The use of vigilant strategies is 
only positively associated with the political life efficacy scale. As reported in Chapter 3, 
people are more likely to use eager strategies, and as seen in Table 5.1, the increased use of 
this type of goal-directed behavior is related to a higher sense of holding influence in a more 
consistent manner compared to the frequency vigilance is used.  
 
 To further illustrate the initial correlations between focus and strategy with efficacy, 
Figure 5.2 provides the means for external efficacy based on whether someone was above or 
Promotion Prevention Constant F (df) R2
External Efficacy .24 (.05)** .09 (.04)* 1.06 (.22)** 15.18 (2, 636)** .05
Political Life Efficacy .40 (.07)** .02 (.05) 1.69 (.28)** 19.04 (2, 636)** .06
Eager Strategies Vigilant Strategies Constant F (df) R2
External Efficacy .09 (.04)* .04 (.04) 1.63 (.20)** 4.93 (2, 636)* .02
Political Life Efficacy .29 (.04)** .16 (.05)** 1.00 (.24)** 42.53 (2, 636)** .12
Table 5.1. OLS Standardized Regression Coefficients Looking at Direct Correlations between Regulatory 
Focus and Strategies with Efficacy
Note. ^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .001
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below the mean for each focus and strategy scale. First, looking at the traditional efficacy 
measure on the left hand side of the figure, people with a stronger promotion orientation 
(F(1, 628) = 16.88, MSE = .72, p < .001) and people with a stronger prevention focus (F(1, 
628) = 2.74, MSE = .74, p = .098) have higher mean external efficacy. In addition, as 
participants using eager strategies (F(1, 628) = 4.84, MSE = .74, p = .028) and vigilant tactics 
(F(1, 628) = 4.51, MSE = .74, p = .034) more frequently also have higher mean external 
efficacy scores.  
A similar pattern is seen regarding efficacy towards individual political behaviors for 
all four variables, except prevention. Mean political activity efficacy is higher for participants 
with a stronger promotion focus (F(1, 628) = 18.25, MSE = .74, p < .001), but there is no 
difference between the high versus low prevention categories (F(1, 628) = .19, MSE = 1.20, 
p = .663). In addition, participants more likely to use eager strategies (F(1, 628) = 32.01, 
MSE = 1.14, p < .001) and vigilant strategies have stronger political activity efficacy (F(1, 
628) = 17.96, MSE = 1.17, p = .000).  
Figure 5.2. Efficacy Means for High and Low Focus and Strategy Use 
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 At this point, without looking at the combination of regulatory focus and strategies, 
the data suggests using eager strategies are more often observed in the political world and 
these are consistently correlated with increased feelings of efficaciousness. On the other 
hand, based on the findings in Chapter 3, using vigilant strategies is not dependent on 
regulatory orientation, however choosing these tactics is also associated with increased 
efficacy. As for focus, high promotion scores are associated with increased efficacy, whereas 
this is not necessarily the case for prevention. Therefore, the effects of regulatory fit may 
matter more so for prevention focused individuals than promotion focused individuals. 
The larger impact of eager strategies and promotion is not necessarily surprising 
given the political environment. As previously discussed, democratic systems in general, and 
specifically in the US, electing officials is more aligned with a promotion orientation and 
eager strategy use because the ultimate goal is to select a candidate for office rather than 
blocking a candidate from obtaining an elected office. However, dissatisfaction with both 
political parties is tied to a lack of participation and political alienation (Adams, Dow, & 
Merrill 2006; Plane & Gershtenson 2004; Ragsdale & Rusk 1993). Dissatisfaction and 
alienation may be associated with a mismatch between regulatory focus and goal directed 
behavior. In this case, the negative attitudes directed at the political institutions lead some 
people to make electoral decisions based on the candidates and policies that are least 
disliked, which goes against the more promotion and eager oriented environment. If this is 
the case regulatory non-fit may arise and abstention from voting may be, at least in part, due 
to lower levels of efficacy coming from a lack of regulatory fit. In addition, because the 
environment is more consistent with a promotion focus, high prevention oriented people 
may feel a disconnection between the goal and their preference for meeting the goal. 
Dolinski and Drogosz (2011) offer some evidence that this may happen. Their findings show 
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that offering an option to blackball a party increases voting intentions for prevention-
oriented individuals, likely due to the sense of regulatory fit negative voting offers these 
individuals.  
 In addition to the environment creating a bias towards a stronger relationship 
between promotion and/or eager strategies is the emotional profile differences between the 
regulatory foci. The positive, cheerfulness-related emotions that correspond with reaching a 
goal under promotion are stronger than those under prevention, which are more 
acquiescent. On the other hand, the negative, agitation-related emotions of not meeting a 
goal under prevention are stronger than under promotion, which are dejection related (Idson 
& Higgins 2000; Idson, et al. 2000, 2004). Therefore, under a promotion orientation success 
feels very good and failure feels somewhat bad but under a prevention orientation failure 
feels very bad and success feels only somewhat good.  
Given that winning and losing on the political battlefield effects people’s emotions, 
regulatory focus may be a partial driving force in how people feel after electoral success and 
failure and the efficacious feelings that go along too. In addition, these emotions are 
increased under conditions of regulatory fit – making success feel even better and failure feel 
worse (Frietas & Higgins 2000; Idson, et al. 2000; Cesario, et al. 2004). Based on the 
emotional experiences and political environment, promotion and eager strategies have the 
upper hand in the ability to increase efficacy over prevention and vigilant strategies. 
5.4.1 Examining Regulatory Fit Based on Focus and Strategy Scores 
 While the direct connection between regulatory focus and strategy use with external 
efficacy is important, my main hypotheses deal with how the two interact. Table 5.2 displays 
the results for H5.1a and H5.2a using external efficacy (Model 1) and political activity efficacy 
(Model 2) as dependent variables. The hypothesized relationship is that an increase in both 
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promotion strength and the use of eager strategies or an increase in both prevention strength 
and the use of vigilant strategies is associated with a higher sense of external efficacy. 
Therefore, support for the hypothesis would be positive coefficients for these two 
interaction terms. 
First, looking at the main effects of regulatory focus, both models show promotion 
is positively associated with higher efficacy scores and prevention is not. In addition, higher 
use of eager strategies is associated with higher efficacy scores in both models, although it’s 
marginal for external efficacy. Increased use of vigilant strategies is associated with higher 
efficacy scores in both models. The mixed results of prevention and the positive association 
between promotion and eager strategies with efficacy correspond with the earlier results 
looking at each individually. However, the interaction terms suggest that these main effects 
may not be completely descriptive.  
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Promotion Focus Results 
 The interaction terms provide mixed support for H5.1a. Figure 5.3 displays the 
interaction between promotion and the use of eager strategies for Model 1, looking at 
external efficacy. At high levels of promotion focus, there is a positive relationship between 
using eager strategies more frequently and increased external efficacy (b = .14, SE = .06, p = 
.02), but this relationship does not exist at low levels of promotion (b = -.003, SE = .05, p = 
Model 1 Model 2
Promotion .23 (.06)** .26 (.07)**
Prevention .07 (.04) -.01 (.05)
Eager Strategies .07 (.04)^ .29 (.05)**
Vigilant Strategies .09 (.04)* .18 (.05)**
Regulatory Fit
Promotion X    
Eager Strategy
.11 (.06)^ .05 (.07)
Prevention X 
Vigilant Strategy
-.03 (.05) -.16 (.06)**
Regulatory Un-fit
Promotion X 
Vigilant Strategy
.003 (.06) .15 (.07)*
Prevention X    
Eager Strategy
.07 (.05) .09 (.06)
Controls
White -.15 (.08) -.35 (.10)**
Male .03 (.07) -.16 (.08)^
Education .07 (.03)* -.06 (.03)^
Income -.02 (.02) .02 (.03)
Age -.01 (.003) -.01 (.004)*
Internal Efficacy -.08 (.04)^ .08 (.05)
Constant 2.42 (.21)** 3.77 (.25)**
F (df) 4.21 (606)** 11.54 (606)**
N 621 621
R2 .09 .21
Table 5.2. OLS Coefficients (SE) for the Relationship 
between Regulatory Fit and External Efficacy
Note. ^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .001
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.95) and is marginal when promotion scores are at the mean (b = .07, SE = .04, p = .07)4. In 
addition, there is a positive relationship between the use of vigilant tactics and external 
efficacy at mean levels of promotion (b  = .09, SE = .04, p = .02), and marginally positive for 
those on the high end of promotion (b = .10, SE = .06, p = .08), but this relationship is 
absent for people with low promotion scores (b = .09, SE = .06, p = .12). Promotion 
strength is associated with increased efficacy regardless of how one chooses to participate – 
either with eager or vigilant strategies – but the relationship is stronger under regulatory fit. 
Figure 5.3. Interaction Between Promotion and Eager Strategy Scores 
 
 As for Model 2, political activity efficacy, the relationship between eager strategy use 
and efficacy is positive and significant at low (b = .26, SE = .06, p < .001), mean (b = .29, SE 
= .05, p < .001), and high levels of promotion (b = .26, SE = .06, p < .001). The main effect 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 The OLS coefficients reported in this section are for the eager strategy and vigilant strategy 
variables in models where the promotion score has been re-centered to one standard 
deviation below or above the mean. In addition, in the prevention section, the OLS 
coefficients reported are for each strategy in models where prevention has been re-centered 
at one standard deviation above and below the mean. These represent the slopes of the 
relationship between strategy and efficacy at where promotion or prevention was centered.  
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of promotion is descriptive – eager strategy scores are positively associated with political 
activity efficacy.  
 In addition, there is a positive interaction term in Model 2 for promotion and the use 
of vigilant strategies. The pattern mirrors the one in Figure 5.3, with a positive relationship 
between vigilant strategies and political activity efficacy when people hold a strong (b = .27, 
SE = .07, p < .001) or mean (b = .18, SE = .05, p < .001) level of promotion focus, but not 
for people with low promotion scores (b = .08, SE = .07, p = .24). Therefore, contrary to the 
hypothesis, when higher promotion scores correspond with a more frequent choice to use 
vigilant tactics in the political world, there is a corresponding increase in efficacy. Overall, 
the data shows that having average or higher promotion scores is associated with larger 
efficacious attitudes the more often any strategy is used – regardless of regulatory fit. 
However, for people with low promotion scores, on average, use of either strategy does not 
impact efficacious attitudes. 
Prevention Focus Results 
 The effect of using vigilant strategies and efficacy based on the extent a person holds 
a prevention focus is contrary to the expectation of H5.2a that there is a positive relationship 
between vigilant strategies and efficacy. Findings show non-fit for those with higher 
prevention focus is associated with higher external efficacy, because the relationship is due 
to increased use of eager, rather than vigilant, strategies. While the interaction terms in the 
first model are not significant, re-centering prevention to examine the relationship between 
strategy and efficacy reveals similar patterns for both dependent variables. As for Model 1, 
using the traditional efficacy scale, increased use of vigilant strategies is associated with an 
increase in efficacy when prevention scores are set at one standard deviation below the mean 
(b = .12, SE = .07, p < .001) and at the mean (b = .09, SE = .04, p = .02), but not for those 
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one standard deviation above the mean (b = .07, SE = .06, p = .21). In addition, higher use 
of eager strategies is associated with higher efficacy scores when prevention is set at one 
standard deviation above the mean (b = .12, SE = .05, p = .03) and at the mean (b = .07, SE 
= .04, p = .07), but not when set one standard deviation below the mean (b = .02, SE = .06, 
p = .73). Participants with high prevention scores have a positive relationship between eager 
strategy use and efficacy, an indication of regulatory non-fit, but not with vigilant strategies 
where regulatory fit should occur. 
Figure 5.4. Political Life Efficacy Based on Prevention and Vigilant Strategy Scores 
 
 Model 2 looks at the same effects with political life efficacy as the dependent 
variable, but this time the interaction between prevention and vigilant strategies is significant. 
However, contrary to expectations, the coefficient is negative. Figure 5.4 displays the pattern 
of the interaction, which mirrors that of the traditional efficacy score. The positive 
relationship between use of vigilant strategies and political life efficacy exists for participants 
who report having prevention scores one standard deviation below the mean (b = .30, SE = 
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high prevention orientation (b = .06, SE = .07, p = .41). In addition, the main effect for 
using eager strategies is descriptive with higher scores being associated with higher political 
activity efficacy reports for those with prevention scores below the mean (b = .22, SE = .07, 
p = .001), at the mean (b = .29, SE = .05, p < .001), and above the mean (b = .36, SE = .06, 
p < .001). Again, eager strategies increase efficacy scores and vigilant ones do not for those 
with a higher prevention orientation. 
 Overall, the results show using vigilant strategies increase efficacy only for those with 
average or lower prevention scores. However, even with high levels of prevention, utilizing 
eager strategies within the political environment is associated with higher efficacy. The effect 
of using eager strategies in the political world overcomes the effect of having higher 
prevention scores by creating an outcome-based fit between strategy and the how the 
political environment frames the goals of participation. Whereas strategy selection does not 
appear to matter for those with higher promotion focus scores, it does for those high on 
prevention. Use of vigilant tactics by those with higher prevention scores decreases efficacy 
whereas using more eager ones increases efficacy. Both regulatory fit and non-fit is 
associated with increases in efficacy for citizens with a stronger promotion focus, regulatory 
non-fit increases efficacy for higher prevention oriented ones. 
5.4.2 Examining Regulatory Fit and Efficacy using Regulatory Focus 
Categories 
 Promotion and prevention scores are orthogonal (Higgins 1986; Scholer et al. 2010). 
Therefore, an individual may be high on both, low on both, or high on one and low on the 
other. The combination of promotion and prevention in which a person stands may lead to 
different results than what is given in the previous analysis. Specifically, it may give insight 
into the findings regarding prevention focus, where eager but not vigilant strategies increase 
efficacy. Under regulatory fit, the effect of strategy selection should be larger for those high 
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on promotion (prevention) and low on prevention (promotion) versus those who are low or 
high on both. 
 In order to test H5.1b and H5.2b, that the effect of regulatory fit should be more 
pronounced among those who have either a high promotion or high prevention focus, the 
categorical regulatory focus variable discussed in Chapter 2 is used. While each group is 
considered in the analysis, the main focus is on the High Promotion and High Prevention 
groups, which emphasize the distinction between those who only have a high promotion or 
high prevention orientation. 
Figure 5.5 displays the means across the groups for external efficacy and political 
activity efficacy. External efficacy scores were highest among those in the High Overall 
group. In addition, mean efficacy scores for the High Promotion group are more positive 
compared to the High Prevention group (F(3, 625) = 7.36, MSE = .70, p < .001, lsdmmd  = 
.19). As for the political activity efficacy scale, the High Prevention group has the lowest 
mean scores. The High Overall and High Promotion groups do not significantly differ. In 
addition, the mean score for the High Overall group has higher activity efficacy scores 
compared to the Low Overall group (F(3, 625) = 8.25, MSE = 1.12, p <.001, lsdmmd  = .24). 
Based on just looking at regulatory focus and efficacy, a strong promotion orientation is 
associated with high efficacy scores. Holding a strong prevention focus or having no strong 
regulatory orientation is associated with lower efficacy scores. 
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 The previous results have shown that high promotion and more use of eager or 
vigilant strategies are associated with increased efficacy but high prevention scores are only 
shown to be associated with increases in efficacy with the use of eager strategies. By looking 
at regulatory fit using a categorical variable the interaction between motivational focus, 
behavior, and efficacy may be teased out further. Specifically, I want to focus on the High 
Promotion and High Prevention groups – those who have high scores on one focus and low 
scores on the other. Based on the hypotheses, I expect the following two findings: 1) a 
positive relationship between efficacy and the use of eager strategies for those in the High 
Promotion group and for the use of vigilant strategies for people categorized as High 
Prevention; and, 2) the slope for eager strategy is expected to be more positive for the High 
Promotion group than the remaining groups and the slope for using vigilant strategy is 
expected to be most positive for the High Prevention group. 
Figure 3.5. External and Political Life Efficacy by Regulatory Focus 
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Table 5.3 displays four regression models looking at the interaction of strategy by 
regulatory group. The two models on the left use the High Promotion group as the 
comparison for both external (Model 1) and political activity (Model 2) efficacy. The right 
two columns use the High Prevention group as the comparison. This allows comparison of 
the other groups in relation to the two main regulatory foci groups and gives a direct test of 
the strategy and efficacy relationship for both. Looking at the main effects, increased use of 
eager strategies is associated with higher efficacy scores in each model for both High 
Promotion and High Prevention groups. In addition, the only significant effect for vigilant 
strategies is the positive association between their use and political life efficacy for those in 
the High Promotion group. However, there are significant interactions in both models, 
indicating that these main effects may be misleading. 
Eager Strategy Results 
 There is a positive relationship between eager strategy use and external efficacy, for 
the most part, across the regulatory focus categories. However, as people in the Low Overall 
group increase their use of eager strategies, external efficacy scores become lower, as seen in 
Figure 5.6. As previously discussed, there are two ways in which regulatory fit can manifest. 
First, regulatory fit may occur when someone participates and makes decisions using the 
strategies that match their own orientation. Here, promotion oriented individuals who are 
more likely to use eager strategies experience regulatory fit and there is an associated increase 
in external efficacy. Second, fit can also occur when the strategies used match the regulatory 
orientation of the environment, such as using eager strategies when meeting political goals, 
which often are couched within promotion concerns. Therefore, even if people have high 
preventions scores, regulatory fit may be in effect because people are using eager strategies 
that match the environment, leading to increased external efficacious attitudes. However, if 
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someone does not have a go-to regulatory orientation, regulatory fit cannot exist. The lack of 
a strong motivation mechanism for the Low Overall group may be leading to an inability for 
any participatory strategy to effect efficacy through regulatory fit.  
 
 
Main Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Eager Strategies .22 (.09)* .34 (.10)** .15 (.08)^ .39 (.10)**
Vigilant Strategies -.03 (.09) .22 (.10)* -.05 (.09) -.16 (.11)
High Promotion ----- ----- .20 (.10)^ .34 (.12)**
High Prevention -.20 (.10)^ -.34 (.12)** ----- -----
High Overall .16 (.09)^ .12 (.11) .37 (.10)** .46 (.12)**
Low Overall -.17 (.10)^ -.04 (.12) .03 (.10) .31 (.12)**
Eager Strategy Interactions
High Promotion ----- ----- .07 (.12) -.05 (.14)
High Prevention -.07 (.12) .05 (.14) ----- -----
High Overall -.03 (.11) -.01 (.13) .04 (.11) -.06 (.13)
Low Overall -.39 (.11)** -.16 (.13) -.32 (.11)** -.20 (.13)
Vigilant Strategy Interactions
High Promotion ----- ----- .02 (.12) .38 (.15)*
High Prevention -.02 (.12) -.38 (.15)* ----- -----
High Overall .18 (.11) .04 (.13) .20 (.11)^ .42 (.14)**
Low Overall .25 (.12)* .03 (.14) .27 (.12)* .41 (.14)**
Controls
White -.18 (.08)* -.37 (.10)** -.18 (.08)* -.37 (.10)**
Male -.02 (.07) -.19 (.08)* -.02 (.07) -.19 (.08)*
Education .07 (.02)** -.06 (.03)* .07 (.02)** -.06 (.03)*
Income -.01 (.02) .03 (.03) -.01 (.02) .03 (.03)
Age -.004 (.003) -.01 (.004)* -.004 (.003) -.01 (.004)*
Internal Efficacy -.06 (.02) .11 (.05)* -.06 (.04) .11 (.05)*
Constant 2.39 (.22)** 3.74 (.27)** 2.19 (.21)** 3.40 (.26)**
F (df) 4.14 (603)** 9.44 (603)** 4.14 (603)** 9.44 (603)**
N 621 621 621 621
R2 .11 .21 .11 .21
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01
High Promotion as 
Comparison
High Prevention as 
Comparison
Table 5.3. OLS Coefficients (SE) for Regulatory Focus Groups and Strategy Interactions 
with High Promotion and High Prevention as Comparison Groups
Note. Model 1 DV is External Efficacy and Model 2 DV is Poltical Life Efficacy
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 As far as the specific expectations of Model 1 based on the hypothesis, high promotion is 
associated with a positive relationship between using eager strategies and external efficacy. In 
addition, the eager strategy-focus group interaction coefficients show that the eager strategy and 
efficacy relationship for the High Promotion group is more positive than the one for the Low 
Overall group. However, this relationship is equal to the one for the High Prevention and the 
Overall High. Therefore, the hypothesis (H5.1b) is not fully supported. Using eager strategies more 
often is beneficial for efficacy attitudes for people who hold one or both regulatory orientations but 
not for people who have no strong motivational direction.  
  
 Moving on to Model 2, with political life efficacy as the dependent, all groups have a 
positive relationship between eager strategy use and efficacy. In addition, none of the 
interactions for regulatory group by strategy are significant – the slopes for eager strategy use 
and efficacy do not differ between the regulatory categories. While the High Promotion 
Figure 5.4. External Efficacy and Eager Strategy Use by Regulatory Focus Category 
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group does show the relationship between strategy use and efficacy characteristic of 
regulatory fit, where increased use of eager political strategies is related to increased efficacy, 
it is not unique to this particular regulatory profile. External efficacy directed at specific 
attitudes is positively affected by a more frequent use of eager strategies for people across all 
regulatory focus categories. 
 These findings somewhat correspond with the previous findings using focus scores 
as continuous variable; low mean promotion or prevention scores and using eager strategies 
was not associated with a boost in efficacy scores. However, by grouping the sample, the 
Low Overall group is singled out as the only one that does not have a positive relationship 
between using eager strategies and external efficacy. As long as someone has a strong 
promotion or preventions score, eagerness is associated with higher levels of efficacy. 
 As previously stated, the assumption behind the hypothesis on regulatory fit was a 
process-based one where it is created or not based on the strategy chosen by someone 
matches or mismatches his dominant regulatory focus. However, because much of the 
political environment is geared towards a promotion focus – getting one’s candidate in office 
– using eager strategies may be creating an outcome-based regulatory fit effect. Rather than 
people meeting goals based on their orientation, the fit comes from meeting goals that 
match how the environment is oriented and frames the outcome. Therefore, it does not 
matter which regulatory focus orientation a citizen holds as long as they have at least a solid 
stance on one way of seeking goals in general if they use eager strategies. If this is the case, 
then the only people who do not benefit from regulatory fit would be those who do not 
have a go-to orientation for meeting goals – those with low promotion and low prevention 
scores. 
 
! ! 169 
Vigilant Strategy Results 
 Moving on to the effect of regulatory fit by using vigilant strategies (H5.2b), 
participants in the High Prevention group do not show a positive relationship between these 
strategies and external efficacy. Rather, people in the Low and High Overall groups have 
higher efficacy levels as vigilant strategies are more often used. These findings are displayed 
in Figure 5.7, showing the interaction between regulatory focus category and vigilant strategy 
for Model 1 (external efficacy). As for Model 2, with political activity efficacy as the 
dependent variable, efficacious attitudes strengthen with each increase in vigilant strategy for 
participants in the High Promotion, the High Overall, and the Low Overall Groups, but not 
for the High Prevention group. Whereas, promotion does not benefit those without a clear 
motivational orientation, vigilant strategies do increase efficacious attitudes among this 
group of participants. 
Specifically looking at the tests of H5.2b – the High Prevention group has increasing 
efficacy scores corresponding with higher vigilant strategy use – the right hand side of Table 
5.3 shows that the hypothesis is not confirmed. The relationship between vigilant strategy 
use and efficacy attitudes for people in the high prevention group is not significant for either 
the traditional external efficacy or the political life efficacy model. Vigilant strategy use and 
external efficacy is positively related for the High and Low Overall groups. In addition, 
political activity efficacy and vigilant strategy use is positive for the other three regulatory 
focus groups but not the High Prevention group. Overall, using vigilant strategies is not 
associated with increases in efficacy for people who are only prevention orientated.  
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Whereas using eager strategies may create regulatory fit for all because it corresponds 
with the political environment, at least in the most basic form of American politics – electing 
candidates, this opportunity does not exist with using vigilant strategies. In both models, the 
Low Overall and High Overall regulatory groups showed a pattern where using vigilant 
strategies increased efficacy. The High Overall group may be experiencing some process-
based fit effects by choosing a strategy to participate that matches a stronger regulatory 
orientation that overcomes the outcome based non-fit of the political environment, 
however, the Low Overall group does not have this possibility. Therefore, it still remains a 
question of why using vigilant strategies for people who lack a strong regulatory orientation 
benefits efficacious attitudes. 
Figure 5.5. External Efficacy and Vigilant Strategy Use by Regulatory Focus 
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5.4.3 Differences between Electoral Success and Failure and Efficacy 
 So far, there are two trends that have emerged from the data. First, increased 
promotion focus is associated with higher efficacy regardless of which strategy is used. In 
accordance, increasing the use of eager strategies is associated with increases in political 
activity and external efficacy for every regulatory focus group except the Overall Low group. 
This suggests eagerly meeting goals or holding a more promotion orientation is beneficial for 
attitudes concerning one’s role as an effective political agent. The final set of hypotheses 
focus on what happens with the relationship between regulatory fit and efficacy depending 
on if a person experiences electoral success or failure. According to the argument, efficacy 
should increase when regulatory fit exists and the person meets their political goal. On the 
other hand, failure under the experience of regulatory fit may decrease efficacy because 
negative emotions are heightened. In addition, not meeting the political goal under 
regulatory non-fit conditions should not be associated with feeling less efficacious and may 
even increase efficacious attitudes to some extent. 
Prior to looking at the full models, Table 5.4 shows the means and F-tests for 
ANOVA models looking at differences in promotion, prevention, eager strategy, or vigilant 
strategy scores between participants who experienced electoral success versus failure. The 
only significant mean difference shows that people who were election losers in 2012 
reported using vigilant strategies more frequently than those who voted for the winner. In 
addition, the bottom of Table 5.4 shows mean differences across the groups for the two 
main dependent variables, external and political activity efficacy. In both cases, mean efficacy 
scores were lower for those who voted for a losing candidate. Given the connections 
between efficacy and electoral success, this is not surprising and suggests there is room for 
effects related to regulatory fit. 
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 The question at hand is how does electoral success or failure affect the relationship 
between regulatory fit and efficacy. The previous findings showed, for the most part, that 
using eager strategies increases efficacy for all participants but there is a less consistent 
pattern when examining the frequency vigilant strategies are used. Taking into account that 
increased positive emotions and attitudes result from regulatory fit under goal success and 
increased negativity with goal failure, there should be differences in efficacious attitudes 
based on regulatory focus group and strategy use. 
Promotion Scores N Mean Std. Dev.
Electoral Success 313 3.51 .62
Electoral Failure 135 3.49 .67
Prevention Scores
Electoral Success 313 3.60 .78
Electoral Failure 135 3.55 .74
Eager Political Strategy
Electoral Success 313 5.25 .86
Electoral Failure 135 5.14 .93
Vigilant Political Strategy
Electoral Success 313 4.02 .85
Electoral Failure 135 3.75 .89
External Efficacy
Electoral Success 313 2.33 .84
Electoral Failure 135 2.14 .89
Political Activity Efficacy
Electoral Success 313 3.29 1.07
Electoral Failure 135 3.05 1.04
F (1, 446) = 4.85, MSE =1.13, p = .028
F (1, 446) = .45, MSE = .59, p = .504
F (1, 446) = 1.57, MSE = .78, p = .211
F (1, 446) =8.64, MSE  = .75, p = .003
F (1, 446) =4.86, MSE = .73, p = .028
Table 5.4. ANOVA Results for Group Mean Differences for 
Election Winners and Elections Losers
F (1, 446) =.073, MSE = .40, p = .786
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 Each model in Table 5.5 contains six three-way interactions, the product term for 
eager and vigilant strategy use and electoral outcome for three of the regulatory focus groups 
(one group is used as a comparison). These interactions test whether being successful or not 
in meeting the political goal of having your supported candidate win an election affects the 
relationship between regulatory fit and efficacy. Table 5.5 displays the unstandardized 
coefficients for the models, with the left hand side using the High Promotion group as the 
comparison and the right hand side uses High Prevention participants as the comparison. In 
this way, the main effects of the two main groups can be examined as well as the interaction 
effects, showing any differences in the relationship between regulatory fit and efficacy.  
None of the three-way interactions within the political activity efficacy is significant, 
and will not be explored any further. This is not surprising given the election winner variable 
is really concerned with the outcome of a recent election, which has been shown to effect 
efficacious attitudes (Finkel 1985; Iyengar 1980; Valentino, et al. 2009; Weissberg 1975). 
While the political activity efficacy variable does include items related to voting, it takes into 
account a wide variety of political activities and asked participants how their actions towards 
each specific behavior had an effect on others. Therefore, the traditional external efficacy 
scale is more likely to be effected by success or failure at meeting the goal of supporting the 
winning candidate. As the models show, there are significant three-way interactions between 
regulatory focus group, strategy use, and election outcome for external efficacy.  
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Ext. 
Efficacy
Pol. Activity 
Efficacy
Ext. 
Efficacy
Pol. Activity 
Efficacy
Eager Strategies -.01 (.21) .00 (.25) .19 (.18) .53 (.22)*
Vigilant Strategies .63 (.23)** .74 (.28)** -.04 (.20) .05 (.24)
High Promotion ----- ----- .36 (.24) .41 (.28)
High Prevention -.36 (.24) -.41 (.28) ----- -----
High Overall .26 (.20) .32 (.24) .62 (.22)** .73 (.26)**
Low Overall -.18 (.21) .08 (.25) .18 (.22) .49 (.26)*
Eleectoral Success .02 (.19) .27 (.23) .18 (.21) .22 (.25)
Eager Strategy Interactions
High Promotion ----- ----- -.20 (.28) -.53 (.33)
High Prevention .20 (.28) .53 (.33) ----- -----
High Overall -.10 (.26) .44 (.30) -.31 (.23) -.09 (.28)
Low Overall .24 (.27) -.04 (.32) -.45 (.24)^ -.57 (.29)*
Electoral Success .41 (.26) .33 (.31) -.05 (.22) -.16 (.26)
Vigilant Strategy Interactions
High Promotion ----- ----- .68 (.31)* .70 (.36)^
High Prevention -.68 (.31)* -.70 (.36)^ ----- -----
High Overall -.22 (.27) -.46 (.32) .46 (.24)^ .24 (.29)
Low Overall -.37 (.29) -.63(.34)^ .31 (.26) .07 (.31)
Electoral Success -.81 (.26)** -.44 (.31) .01 (.24) -.13 (.28)
Electoral Outcome Interactions
High Promotion ----- ----- -.21 (.29) -.02 (.34)
High Prevention .21 (.29) .02 (.34) ----- -----
High Overall -.13 (.25) -.28 (.30) -.34 (.26) -.30 (.31)
Low Overall .03 (.26) -.19 (.38) -.19 (.27) -.21 (.32)
Eager Strategy Interactions
High Promotion & Electoral Success ----- ----- .46 (.34) .50 (.41)
High Prevention & Electoral Success -.46 (.34) -.50 (.41) ----- -----
High Overall & Electoral Success .04 (.32) -.37 (.38) .49 (.28)^ .12 (.34)
Low Overall & Electoral Success -.24 (.33) -.16 (.40) .21 (.30) .33 (.36)
Vigilant Strategy Interactions
High Promotion & Electoral Success ----- ----- -.83 (.35)* -.30 (.42)
High Prevention & Electoral Success .83 (.35)* .30 (.42) ----- -----
High Overall & Electoral Success .38 (.31) .32 (.37) -.44 (.29) .02 (.35)
Low Overall & Electoral Success .80 (.34)* .65 (.41) -.03 (.32) .35 (.38)
White -.10 (.10) -.35 (.12)** -.10 (.10) -.35 (.12)**
Male -.01 (.08) -.15 (.10) -.01 (.08) -.15 (.10)
Education .07 (.03)* -05 (.04) .07 (.03)* -.05 (.04)
Income -.02 (.03) -.01 (.03) -.02 (.03) -.01 (.03)
Age -.01 (.004) -.01 (.004) -.01 (.004) -.01 (.004)
Internal Efficacy -.08 (.05) .08 (.06) -.08 (.05) .08 (.06)
Constant 2.44 (.33)*** 3.74 (.39)*** 2.08 (.32)*** 3.33 (.37)***
F (df) 2.56*** 4.38*** 2.56*** 4.38***
N 446 446 446 446
R2 .15 .23 .15 .23
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01
Comparison Group = 
High Promotion
Comparison Group = 
High Prevention
Table 5.5. OLS Model Coefficients with Interactions between Electoral Outcome, Regulatory Focus 
Group, and Political Strategies
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Figure 5.8 displays the pattern of the interaction between regulatory focus group, 
participants experiencing electoral success (black lines) or failure (grey lines), and the 
frequency eager strategies are used. The expectations are that two groups of people should 
have a positive relationship between eager strategy use and external efficacy: 1) people with 
high promotion scores that experience electoral success; and, 2) people with a strong 
prevention focus and experienced failure. On the other hand, negative relationships between 
eager strategy and efficacy should exist for high promotion oriented people who experienced 
failure due to emotional intensities regarding regulatory fit for success and failure.  
While there is no relationship between the frequency of eagerly meeting political 
goals and efficacy across all regulatory focus groups when participants experienced failure, 
electorally successful people in the High Promotion and High Overall group do show a 
positive relationship between strategic eagerness and efficacy. However, only for participants 
in the High Overall group is the relationship between eagerness and efficacy more positive 
under electoral success versus failure. The analysis tempers the basic pattern seen up to this 
point regarding using eager strategies and efficacy by demonstrating the positive relationship 
between the two is more prominent for those who have recently been successful in meeting 
their political goals. Specifically, the positive association between eager strategies and efficacy 
for people with high promotion scores is partially dependent on whether or not a person’s 
preferred candidate sits in office. This finding provides some explanation for why efficacy 
rises when a supported candidate wins an election – positive emotions arise from regulatory 
fit and is transferred onto the associated attitudes of political participation.  
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Moving on to the role of vigilance in regulatory fit, again the expectations are that 
there will be a positive relationship between using strategic vigilance and higher external 
efficacy scores for two groups: 1) high prevention focused people who experience success; 
and, 2) high promotion oriented people who experience failure. In addition, highly 
prevention oriented people who experience electoral failure should show a negative 
relationship between using strategic vigilance and external efficacy. Figure 5.9 displays the 
three-way interaction, based on the model in Table 5.5, between vigilance, regulatory focus 
group, and electoral outcome. The figure is organized in the same way as the previous one, 
with grey bars representing participants who experienced electoral failure and the black lines 
representing electoral success. 
Again, there is some support for the hypotheses, but it is not overwhelming. As for 
the High Prevention group, there are no significant relationships between vigilant behavior 
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Figure 5.8. Relationship between Strategic Eagerness and Efficacy based on 
Regulatory Focus Category and Electoral Success versus Failure 
! ! 177 
and efficacy scores. The only group with a positive relationship between vigilance and 
efficacy are participants who were electorally successful in Low Overall group. As for those 
who experienced failure, participants in the High Promotion and High Overall groups show 
a positive relationship between strategic vigilance and increased efficacy. This relationship is 
significantly more positive for those experiencing electoral failure compared to those 
experiencing success. In addition, it shows that the negative effect of failing to meet a goal 
can be dampened when behavior is inconsistent with a person’s motivational orientation. 
 
While complicated, the three-way interactions show important effects for people 
with a strong promotion orientation. First, political success is associated with an increase in 
external efficacy as the use of eager strategies rises. This represents a regulatory fit effect so 
that goal directed behavior that matches one’s chronic motivational orientation increases the 
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Figure 5.9. Relationship Between Strategic Vigilance and Efficacy Based on 
Regulatory Focus Category and Electoral Outcome 
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positive effects when a goal is met. Second, these same high promotion individuals who fail 
to meet a political goal see a reverse of the negative effects when political behavior is 
contrary to one’s orientation. External efficacy increases with a rise of strategic vigilance if 
the promotion oriented person voted for the losing candidate. While efficacy generally 
decreases if a citizen has recently supported a losing candidate, this negative effect is 
reversed when promotion oriented people experience a state of non-fit by meeting goals in a 
way that contradicts their regulatory orientation. This is because the negative emotion of a 
failed outcome is dampened by regulatory nonfit. 
The initial analysis, showed that eager strategies were associated with a positive 
increase in efficacy for all groups except Low Overall. However, adding whether or not 
someone’s desired candidate has recently won or not changes this pattern. For those who 
experienced failure, who did not vote for President Obama, increasing the use of eager 
strategies does not coincide with an increase in efficacy for any group. Following success, 
eager strategies are associated with higher efficay, but only for those with high promotion 
scores – the High Overall and High Promotion groups. As expected, regulatory fit increases 
efficacy for those experiencing electoral success, however, the opposite was not true in this 
case. Efficacy neither increased or decreased among the High Prevention group that failed. 
As for vigilant strategies, prior analysis for external efficacy showed a positive 
relationship between the two for the High Overall and Low Overall groups. Figure 5.9 
displays the breakdown of vigilant strategy use between the regulatory focus groups based on 
whether political failure or success was experienced. The only group where using vigilant 
strategies is positively related to efficacy under electoral succes is the Low Overall one, and 
this is only marginal. However, if the High Overall and the High Promotion groups 
experience failure, use of vigilant strategies is associated with an increase in efficacy. Again, 
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with vigilant strategies, there is not a regulatory fit effect for those in the High Prevention 
group. However, this time the opposite relationship exists – those categorized as High 
Promotion have higher levels of efficacy if they experienced failure using vigilant strategies. 
In this case regulatory nonfit is associated with increased efficacy by dampening the negative 
feedback from electoral failure for those in the High Promotion group. 
 Promotion oriented people have higher efficacy scores under success when the 
amount of eager strategies used increases and failure when vigilant strategies are used. In 
addition, the eager strategy and efficacy relationship is more positive for those who succeed 
versus those who fail to meet their political goal. The “feeling of right” that occurs under 
regulatory fit increases positive evaluations and attitudes towards participation, including 
efficacious attitudes, more so for those who succeed versus those who fail, but only if they 
have a high promotion focus. In addition, whereas that feeling from regulatory fit can 
strengthen negative evalutations when a goal is not met – electoral failure – experiencing 
non-fit can ease the pain and increase efficacy, but, again, only for those with a high 
promotion focus. 
 On the other hand, prevention focused individuals do not seem to increase efficacy 
no matter what strategy is used and if they politically succeed or not. Again, there is no 
regulatory fit effect. Those with neither a predominant promotion or prevention focus only 
show increased efficacy if they use vigilant strategies and succeed, although this is marginal. 
While I have been able to show when and where promotion dominant people have a 
relationship between regulatory fit and efficacy, the models do not help explain the same 
relationship for individuals who do not have a high level of promotion. 
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5.5. Conclusion: When and Why Regulatory Fit Increases 
Efficacy  
 The focus of the hypotheses was that individuals would create regulatory fit by 
selecting different strategies in how they participate and make decisions in the political world 
– a process-based fit. I expected this to increase efficacy. However, based on the data, it 
appears that the political environment, having an relatively eager framed goal of choosing the 
desired person for office, an outcome-based regulatory fit is pervasive. People who rely on 
eager strategies in the political world are more likely to experience higher efficacious 
attitudes. In addition, promotion focus dominant people also have stonger attitudes of 
efficacy, most likely due to the match between their motivational orientation and the 
environment. 
 However, this does not seem to always work. The connection between eagerness and 
efficacy is only seen when people have recently succeeded in meeting their political goals – 
when their chosen candidate is in office. For those who have recently failed, using eager 
strategies does not lead to increases in efficacy. In addition, while high promotion focused 
people do not display a relationship between using vigilant strategies and efficacy when they 
succeed, the association is positive if they have recently failed. High promotion people who 
succeed benefit from regulatory fit and those who fail benefit from nonfit.  
 As for prevention dominant citizens, there is no clear pattern throughout the data. 
The two main reasons for this may be: 1) the political goal of electing a candidate is not 
conducive to vigilant strategies overall, which does not allow for a process-based regulatory 
fit effect; and, 2) the profile of those who are prevention focused (or at least not promotion 
oriented) consist of demographic and political variables associated with low efficacy and 
participation, generally. The causal order of the lack of increased efficacy for prevention 
focus is not clear. It may be that this type of person is inherently not one who enjoys politics 
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or participates much. Or, it may be that the environment does not foster a way in which they 
“feel right” about how they have to participate and make decisions within the political arena 
leading to apathy. 
 As Dolinski and Drogosz (2010) find, being able to blackball a candidate would be 
favorable to prevention dominant people and they report being more likely to vote if this 
was an option. Further research should explore the connection between the political 
environment and prevention. The examination of aspects within politics that are conducive 
to creating regulatory fit for prevention focused citizens should include such things as 
negative advertising and information consumption. In addition, research should focus on 
determining if the profile of people with low promotion orientations do not participate 
because they have become apathetic over time or if the lack of efficacy and participation is 
due to a common underlying variable. 
 One of the main arguments for why regulatory fit should increase efficacy and, 
especially for those who succeed is based on emotions and their increased intensity under 
goal success. However, these emotions were not examined in the current study. Future work 
should open the black box of regulatory fit and efficacy to determine the underlining 
mechanism, especially among promotion oriented people, that is driving the relationship. 
Measuring the positive emotions of happiness and negative ones of dejection for promotion 
focused individuals and calmness and anger for those who are prevention focused would 
help shed light on whether these discrete emotions mediate the relationship between 
regulatory focus and efficacy, especially when dividing groups into those who experience 
political success and failure. 
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CHAPTER 6 Making Voting “Feel Right”: The Role of Regulatory 
Fit in GOTV Messages 
 
 Beginning in 2004, the Democrat and Republican parties changed their tactics from a 
focus on persuading undecided voters to mobilizing their own partisans using get-out-the-
vote (GOTV) campaigns (Green & Gerber 2008). The new emphasis was evident in the 
public with over half reporting being contacted by a campaign in 2004 compared to just 
under 28 percent in 1988. This number jumps to almost 70 percent for those living in 
battleground states (Bergen, Gerber, Green, & Panagopoulos 2005). Since 2004 GOTV 
research has boomed looking at such variables as professional versus amateur phone banks, 
type of message, and social versus traditional media (for review, see Green & Gerber 2008). 
At the heart of all these campaigns is the attempt to persuade citizens, not to vote a certain 
way or to switch allegiances, but to get to the polls on Election Day. How can campaigns 
best maximize their mobilization strategies? 
 Qualities of the source, receiver, and message all matter when it comes to persuasion. 
One persuasion tactic concerns the matching hypothesis, using a message that parallels the 
individual’s psychological or attitude orientation. For example, emotional (cognitive) appeals 
are more likely to be successful persuading an individual with an affect (cognitive) based 
attitude (Edwards 1990; Fabrigar & Petty 1999) or if the person has a higher need for affect 
(cognition) (Haddock, Maio, Arnold, & Huskinson 2008). Mayer and Tormala (2010) find 
simply swapping “feel” and “think” increases the possibility of attitude change for people 
with a high need for affect or cognition, respectively.  
 With the amount of resources used towards voter mobilization, it is important to 
understand what message qualities affect turnout. This chapter focuses on whether GOTV 
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messages that match a person’s regulatory focus are more likely to persuade someone to 
vote. Based on the matching hypothesis, I expect that perceptions regarding the value of 
voting as a form of participation and voter turnout will increase when the message matches 
the person’s regulatory focus versus when it goes against the motivational orientation of the 
citizen. 
 Based on Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT), people are inclined to view and seek 
outcomes or goals differently based on whether a goal does, or is perceived to, meet a 
nurturance or security need (Higgins 1997). In addition, if the environment or message aligns 
with a person’s orientation to outcomes and subsequent goal-directed behavior, a condition 
of regulatory fit ensues. Regulatory fit increases ongoing and prospective motivation and a 
feeling of “rightness” occurs, leading to a higher value placed on the target behavior or 
object (Cesario, et al. 2008; Higgins 2000; Higgins, et al. 2003; Idson, et al. 2004). In essence, 
regulatory fit creates a type of matching paradigm that leads to attitude change. 
 The previous chapter tested the effect of regulatory fit on certain attitudes associated 
with voting. In this chapter, the relationship between regulatory fit and self-reported voting 
intentions and associated attitudes are examined within an experimental setting. The 
experiment manipulates regulatory fit using a regulatory focus induction and different 
GOTV campaign frames to examine how regulatory fit effects the intention to vote and 
associated attitudes. 
6.1 Regulatory Focus, Fit, and Voting 
 Regulatory fit, an extension of RFT, discussed in Chapter 2 and the previous chapter, 
occurs when goal perceptions and behavior align (Higgins 2000; Cesario et al. 2008). Under a 
condition of regulatory fit, there is an increase in ongoing motivation and prospective 
motivation. In addition, the ensuing feeling of “rightness” increases the perceived value in 
! ! 184 
pursuing the goal, the target object or attitude, and the emotions that occur in relation to the 
success or failure of goal pursuit (Cesario, et al. 2004; Cesario & Higgins 2008; Freitas & 
Higgins 2002; Higgins 2000, 2005; Higgins et al. 2003; Idson, et al. 2004). As previously 
found, regulatory fit, in some circumstances, affects attitudes associated with participation. 
Given the previous findings regarding efficacy, regulatory fit could increase motivation to 
vote and its perceived value as a form of participation. 
 The wording of campaign messages influences regulatory fit so it is important to 
note the different ways various words and information are associated with each regulatory 
focus. Altering the wording of the GOTV message can make it more agreeable, persuasive, 
or self-relevant to promotion or prevention oriented citizens. The chances of mobilization 
increase when the message successfully induces a state of regulatory fit. A prevention 
orientation is more compatible with framing goals as responsibilities, loss/non-loss 
information, negative information, vigilant strategies, and anger/acquiescence related 
information. On the other hand, promotion orientation is more compatible with framing 
messages as hopes, gain/non-gain information, positive information, eagerness, or with 
elated/dejected emotional words (Cesario & Higgins 2008; Forster, et al. 2001; Liberman et 
al. 1999; Shah et al. 1998; Tykocinski, Higgins, & Chaiken 1994). Language within the 
environment that matches a person’s dominant or induced orientation can induce process 
based regulatory fit.  
In the current case, looking at regulatory focus and GOTV language, the “D term” 
in Downsian models of voting may be better translated into duty or advancement (Downs 
1957; Riker & Ordeshook 1973). Prevention should be associated with increased motivation 
and positive attitudes towards voting when the message conveys voting as a duty or 
obligation. On the other side, messages describing voting as a way to advance the individual 
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or society ought to increase participation and corresponding attitudes when combined with a 
promotion focus. 
 In addition to matching language with an individual’s regulatory focus, messages can 
be matched to the environment. In this case voting is about choosing a candidate for office, 
the instructional frame of the electoral goal is promotion oriented. Based on the results of 
the previous chapter, outcome based regulatory fit appears to be a factor in altering attitudes 
associated with voting. With this in mind, messages using language associated with 
promotion and eager strategies may be more effective than ones using vigilant and 
prevention language. 
6.2 Regulatory Fit, Persuasion, and Get-Out-the-Vote Appeals 
 Just as the misattribution effect under regulatory fit increases the value of a target 
and attitude, it can also be used as a persuasion tactic. Such things as source credibility, 
attractiveness, trustworthiness, and expertise impact a message’s persuasiveness, especially 
for those who have lower motivation to process the information (Chaiken 1980; Clark, 
Wegener, Habashi, & Evans 2012; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman 1981). In addition, the 
strength and number of arguments given (Chaiken 1980; Petty & Cacioppo 1982), and the 
mood, goal, and involvement of the receiver (Legal, Chappe, Coiffard, & Villard-Forest 
2012; Petty & Cacioppo 1979) all influence persuasiveness. Another powerful tool used to 
persuade people is matching a message to people’s psychological traits. 
 The matching hypothesis, or congruency hypothesis, argues that persuasiveness 
increases if the message parallels the person’s sense of self or the need served by the target 
attitude (Lavine & Snyder 1996; Petty, Wheeler, Bizer, Maio, & Olson 2000; Snyder & 
DeBono 1985). This phenomenon has been documented in numerous studies including 
framing the message to fit a person’s sense of self, such as using language related to 
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extraversion (Wheeler, Petty, & Bizer 2005), using legal versus religious arguments on a 
policy issue (Cacioppo, Petty, & Sidera 1982), or using different racial and ethnic sources 
(Grier & Deshpande 2001).  
Connecting a message to a person’s self-schema or matching characteristics of the 
message or source that relate to the receiver based on their psychological orientation makes 
the message much more persuasive (DeBono & Harnish 1988; DeBono & Snyder 1989; 
Snyder & DeBono 1985). For example, Evans and Clark (2012) find that low-self monitors, 
who act consistently in social interactions based on their own preferences, showed increases 
in persuasion and confidence in their attitude following an expert-given message while high-
self monitors, who adapt to the social circumstance they are in, were more persuaded by a 
message given by an attractive source. This same functional-matching approach was found 
to exert an influence on voting behavior, so that when a message was matched to a person’s 
amount of self-monitoring, attitudes towards voting were more positive and voting behavior 
increased (Lavine & Snyder 1996). Matching messages with other aspects of a person also 
influences persuasion. For instance, matching affective messages for those who have a 
higher need for affect and cognitive ones for those with a higher need for cognition 
increases persuasion (Haddock et al. 2008; Mayer & Tormala 2010). Research that looks at 
matching arguments has continuously demonstrated the effect that modest alterations to a 
message based on psychological orientations of a person can impact attitudes and behavior, 
both inside and outside of politics. 
 One way to use the matching hypothesis to increase attitude change is to parallel the 
motivational style of an individual with a message (Hevey & Dolan 2013).  Updegraff, 
Sherman, Taylor, and Mann (2007) found that matching messages to a person’s motivational 
style, based on approach and avoidance, increases persuasion. Although similar, regulatory 
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focus is theoretically different than the distinction between approach and avoidant behavior. 
It has been theorized and empirically demonstrated that regulatory focus systems are 
independent of valence (Crowe & Higgins 1997) with both orientations involving approach 
behaviors to reach desired end states and avoidance behaviors to stay away from undesirable 
ones (Haws, et al. 2010; Higgins 1997; Ouschan, Boldero, Kashima, Wakimoto, & Kashima 
2007; Summerville & Roese 2008). Just as matching to one’s tendency to use approaching or 
avoiding behaviors, matching to a person’s regulatory focus should also impact the 
persuasiveness of an argument. 
6.2.1 Are GOTV Messages Missing Half the Audience (and Effects)? 
 GOTV campaigns attempt to persuade participation on Election Day. But what if 
one type of message does not work on all people? While it would not be feasible to survey 
every American and get their regulatory orientation in order to cater messages to single 
individuals, it is not above reason to attempt to persuade broad swaths of people. This is 
especially so if a message only needs to be tailored in two ways – one for individuals who are 
predominately promotion focused and one for people with a predominate prevention focus. 
Or, if the message itself can create regulatory fit, persuasion should increase, driving more 
people to the polls. As described above, creating regulatory fit increases the persuasiveness 
of a message, ultimately leading to a more successful GOTV campaign.  
 GOTV campaigns have received lots of attention since Gerber and Green (2000) 
came out with the first published field experiment showing phone banks were not effective 
at increasing voter turnout. Both, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science and Political Behavior have devoted entire issues to research dealing with 
GOTV in addition to the much cited books by Green and Gerber (2008, 2004) that discuss 
the relevant research on increasing turnout.    
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 Although there is a large swath of literature on GOTV messages and effects, a 
majority of it excludes how characteristics of an individual impact the success of campaign 
pleas. Research has looked into the impact of partisan versus non-partisan messages (Cardy 
2005; McNulty 2005; Nickerson, Friedrichs, & King 2006), different types of messages 
(Arceneaux 2007; Arceneaux & Nickerson 2010; Gerber, Green, & Larimer 2010), the 
medium of contact (Ashworth & Clinton 2007; Nickerson 2008; Panagopoulos & Green 
2008; Ramirez 2005), and extent or level of contact (Ha & Karlan 2009) among other 
message and transmitter variables.   
 In addition, much of the research focuses on three types of motivators used in 
GOTV messages: the civic duty treatment, the social pressure treatment, and the 
instrumental benefits treatment (Green & Gerber 2008). All three of these are geared 
towards a prevention focus. Civic duty frames emphasize voting as a responsibility; social 
pressure is negative; and, instrumental benefits is about minimizing a loss. I advocate for a 
different treatment – one that frames a message to be relevant to an individual that holds a 
promotion focus, or uses eager strategies to meet their goals. Without this, prevention 
focused individuals, using vigilant strategies, are much more likely to be affected by GOTV 
campaigns while promotion focused individuals are left to be self-motivated. In addition, my 
previous findings have demonstrated the importance of promotion focus and using eager 
strategies in political behavior and attitudes over those of prevention focus and vigilant 
strategies. GOTV messages geared toward a more promotion focus may be beneficial or 
detrimental to high prevention focused people. 
 Not only do the common GOTV messages in the research appeal more to a 
prevention oriented person, they do not match the frame of the goal. Participation in the 
electoral arena inherently lies within a promotion oriented context – select a candidate for 
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office. Just as process based fit increases persuasion when the message matches the way in 
which a person perceives a goal or corresponds with his goal directed behavior, outcome 
based fit can increase persuasion too. Under outcome based fit, the message should match 
the orientation of the goal, which in the case of US elections requires a message to use 
promotion or eager strategy frames. Messages with this type of language are not prevalent in 
the literature on GOTV but may substantively increase turnout.  
Very few studies have turned towards aspects of the receiver to examine how GOTV 
messages differentially affect various groups of people. Bennion (2005) found that 
canvassing using civic duty and instrumental benefit messages increased turnout for citizens 
younger than 30 years old but not for older voters. In addition, Gerber, Huber, Doherty, 
Dowling, and Panagopoulos (2013) examined the role of personality, using the Big 5, in the 
ability of the three main treatment effects to persuade voters to turn out. Their findings 
suggest people high in openness and emotional stability are roughly 20 percent more likely to 
turnout following a social pressure treatment if they are living in a one-person household. 
Looking at the receiver can shed light on when and why GOTV messages work. 
Without looking at aspects of the receiver, many current studies may be missing 
crucial aspects that could explain their findings or lack of effects. Arceneaux and Nickerson 
(2010) examine the tone of the GOTV strategy, finding that negative and positive messages 
do not have differential affects on turnout. Their field experiment shows a positive, weak, 
non-significant difference when the message critiqued a candidate or focused on the costs 
and losses of an issue. However, their findings may be hiding an interaction effect. Based on 
RFT, promotion focused individuals are more attuned and persuaded by positive 
information and prevention orientated people are sensitive to negative information. 
Therefore, while the effect of the positive messages was not any better than negative ones at 
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getting people to the poll, it may very well be that they were motivating different kinds of 
people. 
 Looking at the recall election in California in 2003, McNulty (2005) targeted 
Democrats, using scripts with vigilant related words, such as “threatened” and “prevent” in 
the GOTV message. While Chapter 4 was unable to make a connection between ideological 
tendencies and regulatory focus, others have shown that liberals are more likely to be 
promotion focused (Cornwell & Higgins 2013; Janoff-Bulman 2009). Given that McNulty’s 
study targeted Democrats, these messages may not have aligned with their motivational 
tendencies resulting in a lack of increased participation. Out of McNulty’s three studies, the 
only positive effect in turnout came from the non-partisan scripts that used the word, 
“encourage,” although the increase was marginal. However, this one positive effect may be 
due to a slight, incidental regulatory fit induction. 
 Gerber, et al. (2010) examine whether priming pride versus shame would increase 
turnout within the social pressure paradigm. The method included sending a notecard with a 
civic duty message along with voting records of the targeted individual. These records either 
showed that the participant had abstained (the shaming condition) or voted in a recent 
election (the pride condition). The findings show a larger treatment effect for the shaming 
condition. However, it may not be shame itself driving the findings, the negative information 
tied to language of responsibility and duty are both associated with prevention focus and 
vigilant strategies. The language used may have created a regulatory fit effect within the 
shame, but not pride, condition. 
 Based on the ability of regulatory fit to increase message persuasiveness, voter 
turnout should increase when GOTV campaigns are able to create this effect. Prevention 
oriented people would benefit from messages that highlight participating as a responsibility 
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or duty. However, promotion oriented people should be more persuaded by pleas that 
include the ability of voting to advance the ideals of democracy. While the former are 
common in GOTV research the latter are, for the most part, ignored. The goal of the 
experiment is to test whether applying the matching hypothesis to regulatory focus, can 
impact the likelihood of voting and corresponding attitudes. 
6.3 Hypotheses Regarding GOTV Messages and Regulatory 
Fit 
 
 The previous chapter demonstrated the conditional effect of regulatory fit on 
efficacy. Specifically, people with a higher promotion orientation were more likely to have 
higher efficacy regardless of strategy used. Not only does regulatory fit increase positive 
attitudes associated with a goal, specifically voting in this case, the experience should also 
increase the motivation to do so. Drawing from the matching or congruency effect and 
regulatory fit literature, GOTV messages should be seen as more or less persuasive and 
differentially motivate people to vote. The following hypotheses are based on matching 
GOTV messages to a person’s regulatory focus to increase the persuasive appeal and 
motivation to vote and learn about campaigns.   
H6.1: When the GOTV message matches the induced focus of the participant 
(regulatory fit), the message will be perceived to be more persuasive than 
when the GOTV message does not match the induced focus (regulatory non-
fit). 
 
 In addition to a GOTV message being more persuasive under regulatory fit, related 
attitudes to voting should also be more positive. The value of voting can be looked at in two 
ways with each offering a glimpse into some of the underlining mechanisms that affect the 
likelihood of participating. The first is to look at external efficacy, or the perception that a 
person can influence the political system. The correlation between efficacy and regulatory fit 
was examined in the previous chapter, but with an experimental protocol may shed more 
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light on this relationship. While external efficacy is a common variable in political science, it 
is uncommon to examine the value of voting in a more general sense. Therefore, a second 
dependent variable is based on questions that tap into how the perception of voting as a 
valuable component of democracy, not just the influence of their participation.  
H6.2: Participants who receive a GOTV message that matches the induced 
regulatory focus (regulatory fit) will report higher external efficacy scores 
compared to participants receiving a GOTV message that does not match 
the induced focus (regulatory nonfit). 
 
H6.3: Participants who receive a GOTV message that matches the induced 
regulatory focus (regulatory fit) will report higher perceived value towards 
voting as a form of political participation compared to participants receiving 
a GOTV message that does not match the induced focus (regulatory nonfit). 
 
 The final hypothesis tests the correlation between regulatory fit and likelihood to 
vote using the experimental protocol. This again allows for the examination of a possible 
causal mechanism between regulatory fit and increased participation in the electoral 
environment. 
H6.4: Participants who receive a GOTV message that matches the induced 
regulatory focus (regulatory fit) will be more likely to report an intention to 
vote in the next election compared to those receiving a GOTV message that 
does not match the induced focus (regulatory nonfit). 
 
 In order to test whether regulatory fit increases the persuasiveness of a GOTV 
message, attitudes associated with voting, and the intention to vote, I utilize an experimental 
design. In the experiment, both regulatory focus and the framing of a GOTV message were 
independently manipulated in order to create groups of people who either experienced 
regulatory fit or did not. Therefore, four groups were created. Participants induced into a 
promotion focus and then receive an eager strategy framed GOTV message and participants 
induced into a prevention focus and then receive a vigilant strategy framed message are 
classified as being in a state of regulatory fit. In addition, one set of participants received a 
! ! 193 
promotion focus treatment and vigilant strategy GOTV message and another received a 
prevention focus induction and eager strategy framed message, classifying these groups as in 
a state of regulatory non-fit. 
6.4 Experimental Methods and Analysis Overview 
The Regulatory Fit and GOTV Study I introduced in Chapter 2 is used to test the 
hypotheses – a GOTV message will be viewed as more persuasive, external efficacy and 
perceived value in voting will be increased, and the motivation to vote will be stronger under 
regulatory fit. I utilize a 2 (prime: promotion or prevention) by 2 (message frame: eager or 
vigilant) experimental design, with the analyses focusing on the contrast between the 
regulatory fit conditions (promotion prime with eager frame/prevention prime with vigilant 
frame) and the non-fit conditions (promotion prime with vigilant frame/prevention prime 
with eager frame).  
There are several reasons for the two manipulations. First, it provides a distinction 
between induced focus and strategy, requiring the participant to engage in both. It creates a 
clean separation of the two. Second, manipulating both ensures an even distribution of 
promotion and prevention induced participants. As was pointed out in previous chapters, 
people can have strong promotion and prevention scores or low on both. By manipulating 
focus the goal is to level the field across the board on the regulatory focus variable. 
6.4.1 Experimental Manipulations 
Regulatory Focus Manipulation 
I used a widely applied regulatory focus manipulation to prime promotion or 
prevention (Freitas & Higgins 2002). Participants were instructed to list three current “hopes 
and aspirations” for the promotion condition and those in the prevention condition were 
instructed to list three “current duties and obligations”.  After listing their goals, participants 
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were prompted to report their level of motivation to each listed goal. For each, participants 
were asked, “You wrote down [goal] as your first (second/third) goal. How motivated are 
you to meet the first (second/third) goal you wrote down?” Response options ranged from 
1, “not at all motivated”, to 10, “extremely motivated”.  
 Participants in the promotion condition reported higher motivation for the first goal 
(M = 8.44, SD = 1.74) than the second (M = 8.19, SD = 1.79) and third goals listed (M = 
7.89, SD = 2.09). In addition, higher motivation was reported for the second goal compared 
to the third (F(2, 594) = 8.63, MSE = 2.56, p < .001). All three items were averaged to create 
the promotion strength scale (α = .53, M = 8.17, SD = 1.35). Figure 6.1 displays the means and 
standard errors for each goal and the composite index.  
 In the prevention condition, there were no mean differences between the motivation 
to meet the first (M = 7.17, SD = 2.74), second (M = 7.08, SD = 2.60), or third (M = 6.97, 
SD = 2.73) goals  (F(2, 620) = .66, MSE = 4.52, p = .516). I averaged the three together, 
creating a prevention strength scale (α = .64, M = 7.07, SD = 2.05). Both strength scales were 
placed into one variable, regulatory focus strength (M = 7.61, SD = 1.83), in order to perform 
additional analyses based on the level of motivation each participant held towards the self-
selected goals listed in the manipulation. 
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the difference between motivational strength between 
people given the promotion versus prevention manipulation. Participants exposed to the 
promotion prime reported a higher mean motivation level towards all three self-reported 
goals compared to participants in the prevention condition. The difference across the means 
is significant for the first (F(1, 609) = 47.07, MSE = 5.30, p > .001), second (F(1, 608) = 
37.74, MSE = 5.02, p > .001), and third goal (F(1, 608) = 21.51, MSE = 5.94, p > .001), in 
addition to the regulatory focus strength scale (F(1, 607) = 60.69, MSE = 3.05, p > .001).  
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Figure 6.1. Mean (SE) Goal Strength Ratings Based on Regulatory Focus 
Manipulation 
  
Note. N = 610 
  
The heightened motivation towards goals within the promotion manipulation 
compared to that of the prevention manipulation may pose a problem on two fronts. First, 
the influence of motivational strength may be a problem within the experimental design. If 
one manipulation is associated with a higher self-reported motivation towards meeting the 
goals used to activate regulatory focus, the entire design may be at risk. As previously 
reported, people within a promotion focus are more motivated in general and the previous 
findings have questioned whether the results are an artifact of a general strength of 
motivation rather than regulatory focus. The motivation strength discrepancies here show 
that an experimental protocol will not be able to provide an answer as to whether the 
findings are due to regulatory focus or general motivation.  
Second, and perhaps more important, the motivational unbalance may pose a 
problem in reality. If some people are prevention oriented, the motivation to meet goals that 
are relevant to their personal lives is lower. If personal goals are less motivating, there is 
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likely even less incentive to meet political goals that are often seen as abstract and not 
personally relevant. Prevention oriented people may be completely lost to the potential pool 
of political participators without strong interventions. 
GOTV Message Manipulation  
Following the induction into a specific regulatory focus, participants were randomly 
assigned, independent of the first assignment, to one of the following two messages. The 
prevention GOTV message used language associated with civic duty and responsibility, while 
the promotion GOTV message used language dealing with advancing as a citizen. I adapted 
the messages from previous GOTV research, which focus only on using civic duty 
arguments to encourage participation (Gerber & Green 2000; Arceneaux, Gerber, & Green 
2006). The first message below is the prevention oriented script, using language associated 
with a vigilant strategy, and the second is the promotion oriented script, using eager strategy 
language. 
Vote 2013 is a nonpartisan effort working to ensure citizens 
vote. We just wanted to remind you that elections are being 
held on Tuesday. We want to ensure everyone does their 
civic duty and remembers their responsibility to vote. 
Democracy depends on our country having responsible 
citizens who vote. We hope you’ll come out and vote this 
Tuesday. Can we count on you to vote next Tuesday? 
(Vigilant Strategy) 
 
Vote 2013 is a nonpartisan effort working to encourage 
citizens to vote. We just wanted to remind you that elections 
are being held this Tuesday. We want to encourage everyone 
to help advance democracy and remember this is an 
opportunity to grow as a citizen. Democracy is advanced 
when there are aspiring citizens who vote. We hope you’ll 
come out and vote this Thursday. Can we count on you to 
vote next Tuesday? (Eager Strategy) 
 
 Table 6.1 displays the breakdown of participants into the four potential conditions 
based on the 2x2, between groups design, with participants independently assigned to the 
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regulatory focus and GOTV conditions. These conditions are referenced as: 1) promotion fit 
(promotion focus induction and eager GOTV message exposure); 2) prevention fit 
(prevention focus induction and vigilant GOTV message exposure); 3) promotion nonfit 
(promotion induction and vigilant GOTV); and, 4) prevention nonfit (prevention induction 
and eager GOTV). There was not a significant difference between the distribution of 
participants between the four conditions (X2(1) = 1.30, p = .222). 
 
6.4.2 Dependent Measures 
Voting Intention 
Following exposure to the GOTV message, participants were directed to another 
screen and asked, “How likely are you to consider voting after receiving the message on the 
previous page?”  Response options were on a 7-point scale, ranging from “very unlikely” (1) 
to very likely (7).  Intention to vote was slightly skewed towards being very likely to vote in 
the upcoming election (M = 4.81, SD = 1.68). 
 
GOTV Condition Promotion Prevention Total
 Eager GOTV
Promotion 
Fit                
n = 140
Prevention 
Nonfit            
n = 162
302
Vigilant GOTV
Promotion 
Nonfit           
n = 158
Prevention 
Fit                 
n = 150
308
Total 298 312 610
Note. Bold entries represent Regulatory Fit combinations.
Table 6.1 Distribution of Participants by Condition
Regulatory Focus Condition
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Value in Voting 
To examine the differences in how much individuals value voting, three additional 
questions were asked. Participants recorded attitudes towards how favorable or unfavorable, 
good or bad, and positive or negative regarding voting as a method of political participation. 
Each item was anchored with the following options: very unfavorable (1)/very favorable (7), 
very negative (1)/very positive (7), and very bad (1)/very good (7), respectively.  
 Mean ratings for the voting as good versus bad item (M = 5.77, SD = 1.31) were 
higher than the favorable versus not item (M = 5.63, SD = 1.30) and the positive versus 
negative question (M = 5.51, SD = 1.39). Ratings for the favorability item were significantly 
higher than positive versus negative self-reports (F(2, 1215) = 31.24, MSE = .32, p < .001). 
All three questions were averaged to create the vote value index (α = .93, M = 5.63, SD = 
1.25). 
Persuasiveness of the GOTV message 
I asked two questions about how persuasive the GOTV message was viewed. The 
first asked participants, “How believable was the message?” with response options ranging 
from “very unbelievable” (1) to “very believable” (7). The second asked, “How persuasive 
was this message?” with seven response options ranging from “very unpersuasive” (1) to 
“very persuasive” (7). 
 Participants reported higher believability (M = 5.48, SD = 1.33) than persuasiveness 
(M = 4.34, SD = 1.54) towards the GOTV messages (F(1, 610) = 477.16, MSE = .83, p < 
.001). I averaged these two items to create the persuasion variable (α = .75, M = 5.20, SD = 
.96).  
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6.4.1 Overview of the Analyses 
 I predict that there will be a positive relationship between experiencing regulatory fit 
and increased persuasion of the GOTV message, value placed on voting as a form of 
political participation, external efficacy, and the intention to vote. Initial examination of the 
hypotheses utilize between-group ANOVAs, comparing participants placed into a state of 
regulatory fit – the promotion and prevention fit conditions – compared to participants 
within a state of regulatory nonfit – the promotion and prevention nonfit conditions. A 
dummy variable, regulatory fit, coded so “1” represents participants induced into a regulatory 
fit state and “0” representing participants in the nonfit conditions to compare mean scores 
between the two groups across each dependent variable. 
 The second set of analyses looks into the relationship between the dependent 
variables and each specific combination of the two manipulations. These conditions were 
referenced earlier in Table 6.1. Within this set of analyses, I perform ANOVAs for each 
dependent variable, using post hoc tests (LSD pairwise comparisons), to compare the four 
conditions. Based on the findings from the previous chapter, looking at the specific 
conditions may reveal differences between how regulatory fit is built – whether it is based on 
a promotion or prevention focus – and attitudes towards voting.  
6.5 GOTV Messages, Regulatory Fit, and Voting Results 
 The four main dependent variables include persuasiveness of the GOTV message, 
motivation to vote following the GOTV message, the value placed on voting as a 
participatory act, and external efficacy. As seen in Table 6.2, the dependent variables are 
positively correlated with each other. In addition, regulatory focus strength is positively 
related to persuasion, the intention to vote, and the perceived value of voting, but is not 
related to external efficacy. 
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Prior to examining the dependent variables based on regulatory fit, I look at the 
mean differences for each, independently as a function of each experimental manipulation. 
Model results for the one-way ANOVA comparing regulatory focus conditions are in the 
top of Table 6.3. Participants in the promotion condition are marginally more likely to report 
a higher intention to vote compared to participants in the prevention condition. In addition, 
mean voting value reports are higher for participants in the promotion condition than ones 
in the prevention condition. As displayed in the bottom of Table 6.3, none of the dependent 
variable scores differ based on GOTV condition. As previously reported, promotion, not 
prevention, is associated with more positive attitudes towards participation.  
 
 
 
Persuasion
Intent to 
Vote
Vote Value 
Index
External 
Efficacy
RF 
Strength
Persuasion 1
Intent to Vote .632*** 1
Vote Value Index .439*** .545*** 1
External Efficacy .178*** .179*** .274*** 1
Regulatory Focus Strength .164*** .118** .126** .060 1
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Table 6.2 Correlations between Continuous Variables
Promotion Prevention
Intent 4.94 (1.63) 4.68 (1.72) 3.78 ^ 1, 610 2.80
Voting Value 5.78 (1.13) 5.50 (1.34) 7.59 ** 1, 607 1.54
Efficacy 2.85 (1.22) 2.89 (1.23) .17 1, 607 1.51
Persuasion 4.99 (1.22) 4.83 (1.25) 2.16 1, 610 2.16
Eager Vigilant 
Intent 4.78 (1.64) 4.82 (1.72) .09 1, 609 2.83
Voting Value 5.63 (1.25) 5.64 (1.25) .01 1, 606 1.56
Efficacy 2.92 (1.24) 2.82 (1.21) 1.05 1, 606 1.50
Persuasion 4.94 (1.22) 4.88 (1.35) .39 1, 609 1.67
Table 6.3 Mean (Std. Dev) and ANOVA results for DVs for each manipulation
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Regulatory Focus Condition
GOTV Condition
F df MSE
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6.5.1 Examining the Impact of Regulatory Fit on Voting Attitudes 
 My main hypothesis predicts that participants induced into a regulatory fit state will 
report increased persuasiveness of the GOTV message, more positive attitudes concerning 
voting, and a higher likelihood of intending to vote in the upcoming election. I categorized 
the participants as being induced into a state of regulatory fit or nonfit to examine mean 
differences between the groups. 
 
 As Table 6.4 shows, there are no mean differences for participants in the Regulatory 
Fit and Nonfit conditions in their attitudes towards the GOTV message or voting intentions 
and attitudes. However, there may be hidden differences between how regulatory fit and 
nonfit is configured within the experimental manipulations. In order to examine this 
possibility, another between-group ANOVA, with follow-up, pairwise analyses, is performed 
with a dummy variable denoting each of the four possible configurations – promotion fit, 
prevention fit, promotion nonfit, and prevention nonfit – to examine mean differences for 
each dependent variable. Figure 6.2 depicts the means for each condition on the four 
dependent variables.  
People exposed to a plea to mobilize consistent with their induced focus should feel 
as though the message is more persuasive. This does not appear to be the case when looking 
at the full model, which is not significant (F(3, 609) = 1.28, MSE = 1.66, p = .620). Looking 
at Figure 6.1, all means are similar but participants in the Promotion Nonfit condition report 
Regulatory Fit
Regulatory 
Nonfit
F df MSE
Intent 4.70 (1.75) 4.90 (1.61) 2.31 1, 609 2.82
Voting Value 5.63 (1.32) 5.64 (1.18) .02 1, 606 1.56
Efficacy 2.91 (1.23) 2.84 (1.22) .60 1, 606 1.50
Persuasion 4.85 (1.36) 4.97 (1.22) 1.22 1, 609 1.66
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Table 6.4 Mean (Std. Dev) and ANOVA results for Dvs based on regulatory fit state
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slightly higher persuasiveness than those in the prevention fit condition (p = .067). The 
difference is marginal and goes against the expected relationship between persuasiveness and 
regulatory fit. 
Figure 6.2. Variable Means (SE) Across Conditions 
 
In regard to external efficacy, there are no mean differences across the four 
conditions (F(3, 606) = .59, MSEI = 1.51, p = .620). Attitudes concerning one’s influence in 
the political world do not differ based on condition. However, the value that voting holds as 
a political act does differ based on condition (F(3, 606) = 2.59, MSE = 1.55, p = .052). 
These differences are driven by which regulatory state has been activated, the promotion 
versus prevention system. Participants in the Promotion Fit condition report a higher voting 
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value than those in the Prevention Fit (p = .051) and Prevention Nonfit conditions (p = 
.061). In addition, participants in the Promotion Nonfit condition report higher perceptions 
of voting than participants in the Prevention Fit (p = .040) and Nonfit conditions (p = .048). 
These findings, distinguishing across promotion versus prevention, align with previous ones 
showing the connection between political activity and democratic values with promotion and 
prevention. The prevention system seems to stymie activity and positive attitudes. 
The attitudes examined so far should ultimately tie into the decision to vote or 
abstain. Regulatory fit is expected to increase the intention to vote compared to regulatory 
nonfit because of the boost in feelings and attitudes. The overall model for the vote value 
index is not significant (F(3, 609) = 2.02, MSE = 2.81, p = .109). However, pairwise 
comparisons show that participants in the Promotion Nonfit condition report stronger 
intentions compared to participants in the Prevention Fit condition (p = .015). This result 
does not correspond with expectations but matches the previous distinctions in activity level 
between people with a promotion versus prevention orientation. 
 None of the hypotheses are supported with the current data; findings show a lack of 
relationship between regulatory fit and increased persuasion, positive attitudes towards 
voting, and the intention to vote. However, there is some evidence that being induced into a 
promotion state versus prevention one is associated with increased positivity towards voting. 
This corresponds with findings in Chapter 5, where levels of promotion rather than 
prevention had stronger, more consistent effects regarding efficacy. The results may be due 
to an increased motivation in general for people induced into a promotion focus based on 
the higher motivation to meet goals within the manipulation task. 
On the other hand, this may be due to the nature of the electoral system in the 
United States where the goal is inherently based within a promotional or eager strategy 
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framework. The experimental effect on prevention-oriented participants may be too small to 
wipe out any previous understanding and association participants have with the electoral 
system. If this is the case, regulatory fit manipulations may not be strong enough to overturn 
previous nonfit experiences with the political system. 
6.5.2 Effects Based on Motivation Strength and GOTV Message 
Persuasiveness  
 
 The connection between regulatory fit and voting intentions and related attitudes 
may differ based on the level of motivation or the perceived persuasiveness of the message. 
Regulatory fit increases the value and positivity of a target object or attitude because people 
misattribute the good feeling that occurs from working within a state that matches the 
current or chronic regulatory focus onto the outcome or process. When this occurs, 
motivation, attitudes, and emotions are elevated (Higgins 2002). Therefore, when initial 
motivation is high, the effects of regulatory fit may be increased. In addition, the extent that 
the message is seen as persuasive may also elevate the effect of regulatory fit on attitudes and 
intentions to vote.  
Regulatory Focus Strength  
 As I found in Chapter 5, the strength of motivation under a promotion or 
prevention focus can impact the relationship between regulatory fit and political attitudes. In 
the present case, self-reported motivation to meet the goals listed in the regulatory focus 
manipulation may affect the degree to which the regulatory fit affected subsequent attitudes. 
Or, as been hinted at previously, there may just be higher motivation to meet goals within a 
promotion focus versus prevention focus. Therefore, regulatory focus strength will be 
interacted with the experimental conditions to examine the connection between regulatory 
fit, level of motivation, and voting attitudes and intention. 
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Table 6.5 shows the models containing the interaction between motivational strength 
and a dummy variable indicating whether the participant was assigned into a regulatory fit or 
nonfit condition. None of the interaction coefficients are significant, indicating that the 
relationship between perceived persuasiveness of the GOTV message and motivation 
strength does not differ across the two states. However, as motivation strength increases, 
participants are more likely to see the message as persuasive. As I previously broke down the 
models into type of fit and nonfat condition, Table 6.6 shows the same models using dummy 
variables for each condition. 
 Overall, Table 6.65 does not show much evidence of an interaction between 
condition and regulatory focus strength regarding attitudes and behavior towards voting. All 
of the groups except the Promotion Nonfit condition have a positive relationship between 
regulatory focus strength and persuasion. People in the Prevention Nonfit condition have a 
stronger positive relationship between motivational strength and message persuasiveness 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Each model looking at the moderators was run four times, using each condition as the 
comparison, in order to obtain the full set of results. The results for the models using 
promotion fit, prevention fit, and prevention nonfit conditions as the comparison condition 
can be found in Appendix C. 
Persuasion Efficacy Vote Value Vote Intent
Regulatory Fit -.10 (.10) .08 (.10) -.01 (.10) -.19 (.14)
Motivation Strength .09 (.04)* .04 (.04) .07 (.04)^ .09 (.05)^
Regulatory Focus x 
Motivation Strength
.06 (.06) -.00 (.05) .04 (.06) .04 (.07)
Constant 4.96 (.07)*** 2.83 (.07)*** 5.64 (.07)*** 4.90 (.09)***
F 6.26 *** .96 3.44* 3.58*
N 608 605 605 608
R2 .03 .005 .02 .02
Table 6.5. OLS Coefficients (SE) for Regulatory Fit by Motivation Strength 
Interaction Models
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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compared to people in the Promotion Nonfit condition, but this difference is only 
marginally significant. 
 
There is no relationship with motivational strength and efficacy across all conditions. 
In addition, the Prevention Fit condition is the only group that has a significant, positive 
relationship between motivational strength and perceived value in voting. Last, the 
Prevention Nonfit condition is the only group of participants who have a positive 
relationship between motivational strength and a higher intention to vote. While these two 
main effects come out of the models, none of the interactions between regulatory fit and 
strength are significant across the models – looking at efficacy, vote value, and vote 
intention. Therefore, strength does not appear to affect the relationship between 
experiencing regulatory fit and voting behavior and attitudes.  
 Whereas, strength of regulatory focus impacted the connection between strategy and 
efficacy in the previous chapter, this is not the case in the experimental setting. Contrary to 
expectations, people in the regulatory fit conditions did not have a stronger sense of efficacy 
Main Effects Persuasion Efficacy Vote Index Intent
Promotion Fit -.048 (.15) .01 (.15) .23 (.15) -.03 (.20)
Prevention Fit -.14 (.15) -.03 (.15) .04 (.15) -.13 (.20)
Prevention Nonfit -.08 (.16) -.17 (.15) .19 (.15) .15 (.20)
Regulatory Focus Strength .05 (.05) .07 (.05) .02 (.05) .03 (.06)
RF Strength Interactions
Promotion Fit .12 (.09) -.05 (.09) .05 (.09) .12 (.12)
Prevention Fit .07 (.07) -.03 (.07) .08 (.07) .07 (.13)
Prevention Nonfit .16 (.10)^ -.06 (.09) .10 (.09) .15 (.13)
Constant 4.95 (.10)*** 2.93 (.10)*** 5.51 (.10)*** 4.78 (.14)***
F 3.15** .75 2.23* 1.96^
N 609 606 606 609
R2 .035 .009 .025 .022
Table 6.6. OLS Coefficients (SE) for Regulatory Focus Strength by Condition 
Interactions (Promotion Nonfit is the comparison condition)
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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as motivation increased. On the plus side, even though participants in the promotion focus 
condition reported stronger motivation to meet their listed goals, this does not appear to 
affect the relationship between regulatory fit and voting behavior and attitudes. 
Persuasiveness 
Second, under regulatory fit, the extent the GOTV message is perceived as 
persuasive should impact voting behavior and attitudes. As the perceived message 
persuasiveness strengthens under regulatory fit, intentions to vote should rise and attitudes 
should be more positive. I interacted each condition with the persuasiveness variable and ran 
a set of models looking at the three main dependent variables - voting intention, vote value 
index, and efficacy - to determine if the effects of regulatory fit versus nonfit vary based on 
the perceived strength of the GOTV message.   
Table 6.7 examines this relationship using the dummy variable indicating whether 
participants were in a condition activating regulatory fit or nonfit. While persuasion is 
associated with more positive attitudes and a higher intention to vote, the interactions are 
not significant; persuasiveness of the GOTV message does not affect the relationship 
between regulatory fit and attitudes. 
 
Efficacy Vote Value Vote Intent
Regulatory Fit .10 (.10) .04 (.09) -.11 (.11)
Persuasiveness .17 (.06)** .42 (.05)*** .88 (.06)***
Regulatory Focus x 
Persuasiveness
-.01 (.08) .01 (.07) -.12 (.09)
Constant 2.83 (.07)*** 5.62 (.06)*** 4.85 (.07)***
F 6.90*** 48.11 136.30***
N 607 607 610 
R2 .03 .19 .40
Table 6.7. OLS Coefficients (SE) for Regulatory Fit by 
Persuasiveness Interaction Model
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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Table 6.8 repeats the analyses but looks at the interactions between each condition 
and message persuasiveness. Overall, as the GOTV message persuasiveness increases, 
people report perceiving voting as more valuable and more likely to do so. The relationship 
between persuasion and efficacy is also positive for all conditions but, this relationship is 
only marginally significant for the Promotion Fit condition).  
 
 As Table 6.8 shows, there is little evidence that the relationship between perceived 
persuasiveness and voting attitudes differs across the four conditions. None of the 
interactions are significant for the efficacy models – all groups show a similar, positive 
relationship between GOTV message persuasiveness and efficacy.  
There is somewhat more evidence, based on the interactions, that persuasiveness 
impacts the relationship with regulatory fit and seeing value in voting. While all conditions 
show a positive relationship between persuasion and reports on the value of voting, this 
relationship somewhat differs based on condition. Figure 6.3 shows the patter of the 
interaction between persuasiveness and condition on the value of voting. The relationship 
Main Effects Efficacy Vote Index Intent
Promotion Fit .05 (.14) .24 (.13)^ .001 (.15)
Prevention Fit .02 (.14) .07 (.13) -.06 (.15)
Prevention Nonfit -.14 (.14) .23 (.13)^ .20 (.15)
Persuasion .20 (.08)* .54 (.07)*** .94 (.09)***
Persuasion Interactions
Promotion Fit -.06 (.12) -.20 (.11)^ -.15 (.12)
Prevention Fit -.01 (.10) -.06 (.10) -.20 (.11)^
Prevention Nonfit -.04 (.11) -.24 (.10)* -.13 (.12)
Constant 2.91 (.10)*** 5.56 (.09)*** 4.86 (.10)***
F 3.19** 22.93*** 58.96***
N 608 608 610
R2 .036 .211 .406
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Table 6.8. OLS Coefficients (SE) for Persuasion by Condition 
Interactions (Promotion Nonfit is the comparison condition)
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between persuasiveness and vote value is more positive for people in the Promotion Nonfit 
condition compared to the Promotion Fit and Prevention Nonfit groups. Also, the 
Prevention Fit group has a more positive relationship compared to the Prevention Nonfit 
participants. People in the prevention condition meet the expectation that increased 
persuasiveness is associated with a more positive attitude, people in the promotion condition 
do not show the relationship.  
 
 The last set of models in Table 6.8 concerns the intention to vote. Participants in all 
conditions report a higher intention to vote as perceived persuasiveness increases. There is 
little evidence within the interactions that this relationship differs based on condition. 
Promotion Nonfit participants report slightly higher intentions to vote as persuasiveness 
increases compared to participants in the Prevention Fit condition. Overall, the expectation 
Figure 6.3. Interaction Between Persuasion and Condition for the Vote Value Index 
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was not found, perceived persuasiveness of the GOTV message does not increase voting 
intentions for people in a state of regulatory fit. 
6.6 Discussion 
 Regulatory fit was expected to increase positive attitudes and motivation towards 
political participation through misattribution by making participation “feel right”. Chapter 5 
looked at regulatory fit as a process-based fit between a participant’s dominant regulatory 
focus and how the person participates and makes decisions within the political world. I used 
an outcome-based approach in this chapter to look at the effect of regulatory fit by inducing 
a regulatory focus state and, subsequently, altering the framing of the political context 
through a GOTV message. In both cases, there is little evidence in the existence of a 
relationship between regulatory fit and political attitudes and behavior; the few significant 
findings are more complicated than a simple, direct effect of fit increasing attitudes. 
 The findings for this chapter show that participants induced into a promotion focus 
reported a marginally higher intention to vote and more positive perceptions of the value to 
vote compared to participants induced into a prevention focus. There were no effects seen 
between participants who received the eager or vigilant GOTV message. In regard to the 
main hypotheses, regulatory fit did not increase the perceived persuasiveness of the GOTV 
message, external efficacy, perceived value of voting, or the intention to vote.  
 Using the four individual conditions rather than the dichotomous fit versus nonfit 
measure did expose some differences. Main effects highlight the previous findings regarding 
more positive attitudes under a promotion focus versus prevention focus. Participants in the 
Promotion Fit (marginally) and Nonfit (significantly) reported higher mean attitudes 
concerning voting as a valuable form of participation compared to those in the Prevention 
Fit and Nonfit conditions. As for the interaction terms, looking at the individual conditions 
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did not substantiate the hypotheses. Promotion focus induced participants have higher 
evaluations of voting. 
 Since a direct effect of regulatory fit was absent in the main analyses, I examined the 
impact motivational strength and persuasiveness of the GOTV message on the relationship 
between regulatory fit and voting behavior and attitudes. Contrary to the expectation, 
regulatory strength had little affect on the relationship between regulatory fit and the 
dependent variables. Second, in all cases, increases in persuasiveness also led to an increase 
in positive attitudes and intention to vote. However, the people in the Prevention Fit 
condition had a stronger relationship between persuasiveness and voting value perceptions 
than the Prevention Nonfit participants.  
The previous chapter discussed how research should examine ways the political 
atmosphere may increase positivity towards participation for those who do not hold a high 
level of promotion focus. The results, here, show exposure to a strong GOTV message that 
has a vigilant underlining increases perceptions of voting as a valuable form of participation 
for those in a prevention state. This may be a first signal in being able to determine how to 
increase positive perceptions of working within the political system for those with a 
prevention focus. Promotion focused individuals are already more likely to participate and 
have positive attitudes regarding political participation, so the exposure to a persuasive pro-
participation message may not be needed to increase positive attitudes or participation. 
However, strong, vigilant or prevention framed pro-participatory messages may be more 
effective for those who do not have a predisposition towards these attitudes and behaviors. 
6.6.1 GOTV Messages and Persuasion 
 The argument above suggested that GOTV message research is missing out on 
effects based on the notion that a majority of the current scripts utilize language associated 
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with prevention focus. The findings, overall, do not show that an eager framed message, 
geared towards promotion focus individuals would lead to differences in findings. 
Participants in the Promotion Fit condition did have marginally higher perceptions of voting 
as valuable compared to participants in the Prevention Fit and Notfit conditions but this 
pattern is not consistent across all of the voting attitude variables. It appears that promotion 
oriented people are more likely to have more positive attitudes regardless of the type of 
persuasive technique used. 
 There are many instances in which persuasion techniques work better at changing 
attitudes. One argument, the matching hypothesis, states that a message consistent with a 
person’s psychological traits is more persuasive (Lavine & Snyder 1996; Petty, et al. 2000; 
DeBono & Snyder 1989). Based on this principle, I hypothesized that a message matching 
the regulatory focus of a participant would be more persuasive. However, the findings do 
not show an increase in the persuasiveness of the GOTV between the regulatory fit and 
nonfit conditions.  
 However, the positive relationship between how message persuasiveness and the 
value in voting was stronger for those in the Prevention Fit and Promotion Nonfit 
conditions. Emotional reactions trigger an attitude change for promotion focused people 
while cognitive elaboration is used within prevention focus (Lee & Aaker 2004). The 
emotional based attitude change occurring within the promotion fit condition is weaker (e.g. 
Petty & Cacioppo 1986), leading to lower impacts on voting attitudes. This would indicate 
that people in the Prevention Fit and the Promotion Nonfit conditions relied more on 
cognitive deliberation. This would explain the increase in vote value for both groups – 
cognitive deliberations lead to stronger attitude changes that are more likely to linked to each 
other. Further research should explore the mechanism in which the change is occurring and 
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consequences of regulatory fit regarding messages; persuasion through regulatory fit may 
lead to more attitude change for prevention but not promotion. 
6.7 Conclusion 
 Using an experimental design, I manipulated regulatory focus and a GOTV message, 
independently, to test the effect of regulatory fit on message persuasiveness, external 
efficacy, the value of voting as a form of participation, and the intention to vote. My findings 
demonstrate no clear evidence that regulatory fit increases these attitudes and behaviors 
versus a state of nonfit. However, differences in the relationships among attitudes towards 
voting emerge based on being in a state of promotion or prevention fit and nonfit. 
 The evidence suggests that in some cases, there is a stronger relationship between 
voting attitudes within a prevention fit condition. This is important in that these 
relationships are ultimately tied to a person’s decision to turnout on Election Day. In 
addition, the findings offer an initial glimpse into how the political atmosphere may 
encourage participation amongst those with a higher prevention and lower promotion focus, 
which was brought up in the previous chapter. 
 Further research should continue exploring how to increase the motivation to and 
positive attitudes about political participation for prevention focused citizens. In addition, 
different types of messages should be explored in the examination of regulatory fit and 
voting attitudes and behavior. The political world is filled with all kinds of persuasive 
messages, ranging from GOTV campaigns, to candidate appeals, to policy arguments. 
Regulatory fit may impact any or all of these attempts to change the minds of citizens. 
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CHAPTER 7 Conclusion: The Motivation Behind Political Attitudes 
and Behavior 
 
Why should political scientists care about regulatory focus? The short answer is 
because it affects behavior. The field is familiar with the trait approach to personality, such 
as the Big 5 (i.e. Mondak 2010). However, RFT approaches personality as a process of 
motivated cognition; personality is about how people perceive goals and go about reaching 
them (Higgins 2008; Higgins & Scholer 2008; Scholer & Higgins 2010). This has powerful 
implications on people’s behavior, including how they act within the political world. 
Political acts, whether taking a position on an issue or voting, begin with a goal. 
When and how that goal is met depends on a person’s motivational system, in this case, 
whether the person is promotion or prevention oriented. Promotion focus is associated with 
using eager strategies to meet goals. On the other hand, prevention oriented people use 
vigilant strategies (Higgins 1997). Implications of this range from information processing to 
emotional outcomes of either goal attainment or failure (Forster & Werth 2009; Higgins 
1997; Molden et al. 2008).  
As I have previously discussed, there is no strict barrier separating the political from 
the social world. Many scholars, media personnel, and lay people like to believe that when it 
comes to the political world, people are rational. However, time and time again, attitudes and 
behavior are influenced by the same biases, irrationality, and error displayed in everyday life 
(Alford, et al. 2005; Inbar et al. 2009, 2012; Lodge & Taber 2005, 2013; Marcus, et al. 2000; 
Mondak 2010; Oxley et al. 2008). As I have shown, regulatory focus also affects how people 
relate and work within the political world. 
 
 
! ! 215 
7.1 Regulatory Focus as the Intersection of General and 
Political Life 
 
 By far my most comprehensive finding throughout the project is the congruence 
between everyday and political behavior based on RFT tenants in Chapter 3. People who use 
eager strategies to meet goals within their everyday life also use these tactics in the political 
world. In addition, people who use vigilant strategies across general life activities met 
political goals in the same way. Going back to Jackie from the introduction, if she roots for 
Rogers to throw a touchdown pass to Jordy Nelson, she is likely to put a pro-candidate 
bumper sticker on her car; if she roots for the defense to sack the Vikings quarterback, she is 
likely to put an anti-candidate bumper sticker on her car.  
 What is new about the current project is that it really looks into people’s motivations 
behind their vote choice rather than looking at why people vote a certain way versus 
another. Prevention orientation is associated with a higher desire to vote against a candidate, 
which is not how the U.S. system is set up (Dolinski & Drogosz 2011). However, I showed 
that some people are informally voting against candidates rather than picking the most 
preferred candidate. While people who use eager strategies in everyday life do decide who 
their favorite is and vote for him/her, people who use vigilant strategies base their vote on 
who they dislike the most and then vote for the other candidate. 
While strategies were clearly connected across social domains, the role of a person’s 
chronic regulatory focus was not so clear. Promotion focus was associated with using eager 
strategies to meet a range of general life goals as well as political ones. However, I did not 
find the expected connection between prevention focus and vigilant strategies. The question 
remains why was I able to find a strong promotion and eager strategy connection but not 
one between prevention and vigilant strategies. 
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One answer is that not only does RFT explain the motivation orientation of a 
person, but also the environment (Higgins 1997). As I previously expressed, the political 
environment, especially elections, can best be described as promotion orientated. More 
research should look into the connection between promotion and prevention within the 
realm of primary elections. Primary elections may be able to distinguish the strategies 
between regulatory foci. General elections are always going to have people that will vote for 
their party’s candidate without much thinking. On the other hand, primary elections have 
people choosing intra-party and motivation systems are likely to play a larger part in 
understanding why a person chose a certain candidate. 
In addition, research should look into the current social and political environment. 
Different societies have distinct balances of regulatory foci and economic circumstances can 
alter the balance (Higgins 2008; Lee, et al. 2000; Welzel 2007; Welzel & Inglehart 2010). The 
election between President Trump and Hillary Clinton may prove to be an interesting 
avenue to examine regulatory focus and political attitudes. As previously stated, the number 
of vigilant aspects of the campaign, both within the formal campaigns and the citizenry, was 
much stronger than previous elections. For example, the number of people choosing to vote 
one way or another because of their dislike for the opposition was much larger than in 
previous years. In addition, the number of people choosing to abstain because of dislike for 
both candidates was much larger than in previous years (Lopez & Flores 2017; Pew Research 
Center 2016). Whereas the political environment traditionally fits more with a promotion-
eager orientation, political unrest and alienation may invite a more prevention-vigilant 
orientation. 
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7.2 Regulatory Focus and Political Attitudes 
 After looking at broad behavior across life domains, I turned to political attitudes. 
Many of the same differences found between conservatives and liberals align with 
differences between promotion and prevention focused people. For example, liberalism and 
promotion focus is associated with being more cognitively flexible and attuned to positive 
information, while conservatism and prevention focus show connections with using negative 
information and being more rigid (Amodio, et al. 2004; Carraro, et al. 2011; Dodd, et al. 
2012; Fazio, et al. 2004; Forster, et al. 2001; Friedman & Forster 2000; Hetherington & 
Suhay 2011; Hibbing et al. 2014; Lockwood et al. 2002; Rock & Janoff-Bulman 2010; Shook 
& Fazio 2009). In addition, researchers have argued and shown liberalism and promotion 
orientation is connected while conservatives are more likely to be prevention focused (Jost, 
et al. 2003). My findings dispel the notion that there is a direct connection between 
ideological attitudes and regulatory focus. 
 The link between regulatory focus and ideology may be more complicated. As just 
mentioned, both ideological predispositions and regulatory orientations, align with the 
propensity to direct attention, learn, and act based on the valence of information and the 
environment. Future research should focus on this aspect. Rather than looking at a direct 
connection, emphasis should be placed on the mediating effect of the sensitivity towards 
negative stimuli driving the relationship between policy and ideological attitudes with 
regulatory focus.  
 In contrast to the ideological direction, Lucas and Molden (2011) argued regulatory 
focus and policy attitudes connect based on issue content – growth policies correlate with 
promotion and security ones with prevention. I did not find any solid evidence of this with 
the issues I examined. Interactions between focus and self-reported ideology did not help in 
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providing a solid connection between attitudes and motivational orientation. If this agenda is 
going to continue it must take into account how people perceive the policy. Some people 
may support gay rights because it secures civil rights. Others may oppose gay rights because 
they want to secure traditional values. In this case prevention scores could correlate with 
both sides of the policy issue. 
 In the final examination of issue attitudes, I took a different look at the connection 
with regulatory focus by emphasizing the policy environment. People who are promotion or 
prevention oriented move towards goals differently based on the status quo. A state of 
promotion is concerned with moving past the status quo to a more positive end state – 
going from 0 to +1. On the other hand, a state of prevention leads to a more concern that 
the outcome is not worse than the status quo or getting back to a certain point – moving 
from -1 to 0 (Scholer et al. 2008, 2010). By providing some guidance of the current policy 
issue I was able to show a strong connection between attitude strength and promotion in 
three of the four issues. People with a stronger promotion system were more likely to prefer 
policies that move the issue beyond the current state. 
 RFT is based not only on a person’s motivational orientation, but also on how the 
environment creates a goal and motivation structure. Because of this, research should focus 
on the interaction of the environment and regulatory focus. Researchers should attempt to 
understand how people perceive the policy environment and connect these perceptions with 
regulatory focus and policy attitudes.  
Beyond research, policy activists and government officials should understand the 
effect of how regulatory focus creates policy environments. Framing is not a new thing in 
politics and has strong effects on people’s attitudes (Chong & Druckman 2007; Entman 
2004; Iyengar 1991; Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley 1997). Regulatory focus should be 
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considered an important variable in these studies. If you want to convince people that a 
policy does not go far enough, the message should be based on promotion and eager 
strategies to get there; this emphasizes from going beyond the status quo. On the other 
hand, if an activist wants to emphasize how a policy oversteps, a frame encompassing 
prevention and vigilant strategies should be used – basing the argument that the policy will 
drop below the preferred reference point. Again, the person by environment interaction 
should be emphasized when looking at political issue attitudes and regulatory focus. 
7.3 Regulatory Fit and Political Attitudes and Behavior 
 The final two chapters emphasize just the issue I was discussing – the combined 
impact of regulatory focus and the environment – by looking at regulatory fit effects. 
Regulatory fit occurs when the environment matches a person’s regulatory state or when a 
person uses the strategies to meet a goal that correspond with their regulatory state (Aaker & 
Lee 2006; Higgins 2000). Regulatory fit can have large effects on people’s feeling towards 
their attempts to meet a goal and their success or failure at doing so. In addition, regulatory 
fit increases the value of a target object and confidence in the decisions (Cesario et al. 2004; 
Frietas & Higgins 2002; Higgins 2000; Hong & Lee 2008; Idson et al. 2000).  
 I first looked at the role of regulatory fit on external efficacy – people’s behavior 
impacts government officials and others’ actions (Campbell, et al. 1954; Lane 1959; Madsen 
1987; Craig, et al. 1990) – by examining how people use strategies that either correspond or 
contradict their chronic regulatory focus. Does Jackie, from the introduction, think she has a 
larger impact if she experiences regulatory fit within the political world?  
 My findings showed that if Jackie is more likely to use eager strategies and has any 
strong sense of motivational orientation she will also have an increase in external efficacy 
attitudes. While this may seem counterintuitive, I argue that eager strategies match the 
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political environment more so than vigilant ones. Therefore, even if someone is prevention 
oriented, the environment and eager strategy create regulatory fit, increases the value in 
pursuing political goals.  
Using vigilant strategies was associated with an increase in efficacy for people with 
low levels of prevention and promotion. This may be due to the minimal nature of vigilant 
strategies. People that are apathetic in the general, social world may also be politically 
apathetic. Then, regulatory fit may occur when they act against the parts of the political 
world that they do not like – or maybe they dislike all to some extent. As I discussed with 
the case of Donald Trump’s election, vigilant tactics may be rewarding for people with very 
negative attitudes already – they feel as though they need to get from the current state to a 
neutral point or a previous status quo. 
However, I also expected goal success and failure to impact the relationship between 
fit and efficacy. One hallmark of regulatory fit is that winning can feel really good for people 
in a promotion state but losing feels really bad for those with a prevention focus (Cesario, et 
al. 2004; Frietas & Higgins 2000; Higgins et al. 2003; Idson, et al. 2004). Goal success or 
failure, in terms of voting for a winning or losing candidate, affects efficacious attitudes 
(Finkel 1985; Iyengar 1980; Valentino, et al. 2009; Weissberg 1975). Regulatory fit can 
exacerbate the feelings associated with how a citizen’s does in the election. 
My findings show that people with a strong promotion orientation who use eager 
strategies have increased efficacy when their candidate wins. However, if these same people 
use vigilant tactics and fail to vote for the winning candidate, efficacious attitudes increase as 
well. This exemplifies the effect between regulatory focus and the political environment – 
regulatory fit can increase the positive value of winning and regulatory nonfit can inhibit the 
negative effect of losing. 
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This finding offers a great avenue to examine the more affective attitudes towards 
the political world. Little research has examined psychological underpinnings of external 
efficacy, but it likely has an affective component based on research looking at emotions and 
election outcomes (Britt 2003; Pierce, et al. 2015; Stanton et al. 2009, 2010). In order to 
really understand how regulatory fit and unfit connect to being electorally successful or not 
should examine the strength of emotional reactions towards winning and losing. Promotion 
focus people should experience elation under success and dejection under failure; on the 
other side, prevention focused people should feel agitated after failure and calm after success 
(Higgins et al. 1986, 1997; Idosn et al. 2000; Liberman et al. 2005). These emotional 
outcomes change how people feel about their political participation. 
These findings may be helpful to lawmakers and others interested in maintaining an 
active citizenry following an election. If you can boost people’s emotional reactions 
following electoral success, they may be more inclined to continue to participate. On the 
other hand, sending messages that emphasize regulatory unfit to citizens who just 
experienced goal failure may increase the motivation to participate again by increasing 
people’s perception of effectiveness. For example, Democrats should send out messages to 
supporters that reflect a combination of promotion and vigilant facets of the 2016 election, 
but Republicans should send ones that create regulatory fit, in order to boost efficacy 
attitudes and hopefully maintain or increase participation levels. 
Prior to an election, messages that create regulatory fit can energize people to vote. 
In the final study, I examined how GOTV messages, differing in emphasizing promotion-
eager related prevention-vigilant related words, increase efficacy and motivation to vote for 
people that are in a promotion versus prevention state, respectively. Most GOTV messages 
use a more prevention-vigilant tone – strategies include peer pressure, civic duty messages, 
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or instrumental benefits emphasizing minimizing losses (Green & Gerber 2008). While these 
may motivate prevention oriented people or, as in my previous findings, those less inclined 
to have a strong regulatory system, these messages may dampen the vote motivation for 
people with a strong promotion focus. 
When looking at regulatory fit through GOTV messages, I examined the traditional 
efficacy scale as well as a new scale focusing on how valuable people perceive voting as a 
form of participation. I was unable to find evidence that the GOTV messages affected either 
of these attitudes based on their regulatory fit state. I did find evidence that matches my 
previous findings. People induced into a promotion state were more likely to report that 
voting as more valuable and a higher intention to vote. In addition, I looked at the 
relationship between regulatory fit and motivation strength and message persuasiveness with 
efficacy, vote value, and vote intention. These interaction terms did little to understand the 
relationship between regulatory fit and GOTV message. 
Efficacy is an important component of democracy and should continue to be studied 
by researchers. Because promotion and the use of eager strategies has a larger connection 
with participation and coincides with the general goal of an election, these types of messages 
should be pursued further. While the “d” term represents civic duty as a motivator for 
political behavior (Downs 1957; Riker & Ordeshook 1973), it is not the only reason people 
may be inclined to vote. Messages heralding the pro-social aspect of voting and how voting 
grows a sense of American identity may entice promotion focused people more than the 
civic duty and peer pressure messages. 
On the other hand, I have repeatedly found low participation levels and attitudes for 
people with a high prevention focus or no strong regulatory system. Messages need to also 
look to boost attitudes and participation among these types of people. People with little 
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motivation may never be persuaded to participate, but my previous findings show that they 
are more inclined to use vigilant strategies. Perhaps a very strong message utilizing a vigilant 
tone could persuade even the most apathetic. 
  Last, messages using regulator fit do not have to only involve campaigns. As I 
mentioned before, framing is common in the political world. Given the ability of using 
regulatory fit has to persuade people (Lee & Aaker 2004; Cesario et al. 2004; Evans & Petty 
2003; Pham & Avnet 2004), policy arguments could benefit from taking RFT into account. 
Messages utilizing the concepts from regulatory fit could make policy arguments stronger. 
This could be done by priming both a regulatory focus and related strategy within the same 
argument. For example, a message could introduce an issue using promotion or prevention 
language and then using strategic eager or vigilant language terms to describe how the policy 
meets the specific policy goal. Regulatory fit within the message would increase persuasion 
and motivation to act on the issue. Not only do people create regulatory fit by meeting goals 
in accordance with their regulatory state, but the environment can create regulatory fit. 
7.4 Limitations 
 No research project is perfect and mine is no different in having several 
shortcomings. First, across all studies, I recruited participants using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (AMT). One problem is that this means the surveys and experiment were all done 
online without knowing how distracted people were while working on the survey and 
experiment. I attempted to mitigate this problem by using attention items and programming 
the experiment so that participants had to spend a certain amount of time on the GOTV 
message before being able to move on to the experiment. I also limited who could 
participate – requiring the AMT worker to have a U.S. IP address and had completed 1,000 
projects with at least a 95 percent success rate. In addition, my sample was skewed to the 
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liberal side, which has been previously reported (Paolacci et al. 2010). While not a random 
sample, AMT workers have been shown to pay more attention and act comparably to off-
line samples (Antoun, Zhang, Conrad, & Schober 2016; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling 
2011; Paolacci et al. 2010). While the lack of random sampling is a limitation on the validity 
of my projects, the research on AMT shows that it is an adequate way to obtain a sample. 
 The second limitation has to do with the surveys. In the quest to examine how 
behavior crosses life domains, I created a unique instrument – the Regulatory Focus, 
General, and Political Life survey. Items asked about a large range of behaviors people may 
encounter in everyday life and a number of political activities. People were asked how they 
acted when performing the behavior and how they felt about their impact. Even if people 
had not previously performed the behavior, I still had them answer all the questions as if 
they would complete the action. Removing responses from people that had not performed 
the actions would have drastically cut my Ns or the number of items used in the scales – 
only 13 percent reported previously voting for a reality competition contestant and only 11 
percent reported putting a political bumper sticker on their car. People may err in reporting 
how they would behave or they would feel about their actions. This may have caused some 
problems in looking at behavior in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.  
 The second issue with the survey concerns the low level of vigilant strategy reports 
in the Regulatory Focus, General, and Political Life survey. The strategy items were created 
with the common themes associated with promotion and prevention. The vigilant items 
reflect aspects associated with viewing goals as minimal, avoidance of going beyond the 
minimum qualifications, and a pronounced negativity bias based on the literature 
surrounding regulatory focus. These may produce social desirability effects, which are 
common in survey research (Berinsky 1999, 2002; Streb et al. 2008; Tourangeau & Yan 
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2007). The lower reported levels of using vigilant strategies, especially in the political 
domain, is likely due to the unwillingness to report minimal performances and enjoying the 
negative side of politics. In addition, promotion focus is associated with using a broader 
categorization scheme (Crowe & Higgins 1997; Liberman et al. 2001; Molden & Higgins 
2004, 2008). Participants with a stronger promotion focus may perceive that they would or 
had used a wider range of behaviors compared to people with a prevention focus leading to 
the divergent levels between eager and vigilant strategies.  
Even with these two shortcomings with the main survey, I filled a large void in the 
literature on political behavior. To my knowledge, there is no research comparing concrete 
behaviors between general and political life. Future iterations should use a larger number of 
activities and attempt to obtain a sample with more experience seeking the specific goals. 
 The final shortcoming has to do with the experiment in Chapter 6 looking at 
regulatory fit and GOTV messages. I independently manipulated both regulatory focus and 
the message to create a 2 x 2 design. This may have created problems, especially for people 
that have a strong prevention system who have been shown to be less affected by primes 
(Haws et al. 2012; Lisjack, Moldent, & Lee 2012). However, I manipulated focus in order to 
ensure a balance between conditions of regulatory fit and unfit groups. In addition, I wanted 
to ensure that participants had either regulatory system activated at the time in order to make 
a causal argument. Due to the lack of findings, the experiment should be repeated but by 
using a measure of chronic focus and only manipulating the GOTV message. 
7.5 Final Thoughts 
 There are two main conclusions that I have repeated throughout the project. First, 
political behavior is not special. This is not to say that the field of political science should be 
abandoned, it is distinct in the topics it covers. However, nor should it ignore what governs 
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behavior in people’s everyday life. Goals matter; behavior requires goals (Austin and 
Vancouver 1996). Regulatory focus, as a motivational theory, offers a singular source of 
information concerning the origins of political behavior from both the person and the 
environment. 
 Regulatory focus posits personality is based on a person’s motivational systems and 
how they bias people’s view of the social world and the strategies used to approach goals 
within it (Higgins 1997, 2008; Higgins & Scholer 2008; Scholer & Higgins 2010). Promotion 
focus sees goals as ideals and their pursuit reflects an eager strategy – approaching possible 
opportunities to reach a desired end state. Prevention focus perceives goals as obligations 
and are met through vigilance – avoiding obstacles to reaching the preferred outcome 
(Crowe & Higgins 1997; Higgins 1996, 1997; Higgins et al. 1994; Molden et al. 2008). These 
systems matter for political behavior. People that reach goals in everyday life using eager or 
vigilant strategies do the same in pursuit of political aims. 
 The second thought is the importance of examining the interaction of the 
environment and person through a regulatory focus lens. I explicitly looked at this 
interaction in the final two chapters looking at regulatory fit and political attitudes and 
behavior. When a person’s goal pursuit matches their motivational state a “feeling of right” 
occurs and this is passed on to attitudes about their behavior and the outcomes of it 
(Cesario, et al. 2004; Cesario & Higgins 2008; Freitas & Higgins 2002; Higgins 2000, 2005; 
Idson, et al. 2004).  
 Environment-person interactions are also important because the political world 
imposes regulatory focus onto the environment. For example, elections require people to 
choose their most preferred candidate, which frames the system as promotion oriented. On 
the other hand, campaigns are framed using negative references such as how the candidate is 
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going to take back Washington. How the political environment is structured can impact how 
people interact – or their choice to not participate – based on the regulatory structure 
imposed. 
 In closing, I have taken a broad stroke in examining how regulatory focus is 
associated with political behavior and attitudes. Motivational systems matter in how people 
relate to politicians, issues, and their own political behavior. Future research should continue 
to examine the impact of regulatory focus on these issues. 
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CHAPTER 8 Appendix A: Survey and Experiment Items 
 
A.1 Regulatory Focus, General and Political Life Survey 
 
Participation, efficacy and promotion/prevention strategy in life and 
politics questions 
 
NOTE: For each set of questions, the first asks if the person participates in the area the 
behavior is involved. The next question, labeled “a”, asks about efficacy when the behavior 
is performed. The second set of questions, labeled “b”, ask about the regulatory strategy 
used. The questions are phrased differently based on whether someone is involved in the 
behavior or not. The responses listed for the first question are the same for all. 
 
1 (Sports Team). Are you a fan of any professional sports teams? 
1! Yes 
2! No 
1a. (If yes) Thinking about your favorite team, how likely is the organization to take your 
views, as a fan, into account when making decisions? 
1! Very Unlikely 
2! Unlikely 
3! Somewhat unlikely 
4! Undecided 
5! Somewhat likely 
6! Likely 
7! Very Likely 
 (If yes) Thinking about a time when you performed a ritual to help your team win, how 
likely is it that the ritual actually helped? 
1! Very Unlikely 
2! Unlikely 
3! Somewhat unlikely 
4! Undecided 
5! Somewhat likely 
6! Likely 
7! Very Likely 
 (If no) If you were a fan of a team, how likely would the organization be to take your views, 
as a fan, into account when making decisions? 
1! Very Unlikely 
2! Unlikely 
3! Somewhat unlikely 
4! Undecided 
5! Somewhat likely 
6! Likely 
7! Very Likely 
(If no) If you were a fan of a sports team, how likely would a ritual performed to help your 
team win actually help? 
1! Very Unlikely 
! ! 229 
2! Unlikely 
3! Somewhat unlikely 
4! Somewhat likely 
5! Undecided 
6! Likely 
7! Very Likely 
1b. (If yes) When watching your favorite sports team, how likely are you to cheer for the 
team’s offense more than the defense? 
1! Very Unlikely 
2! Unlikely 
3! Somewhat Unlikely 
4! Undecided 
5! Somewhat Likely 
6! Likely 
7! Very Likely 
 (If yes)  When watching your favorite sports team, how likely are you to cheer for the team’s 
defense more than the offense? 
1! Very Unlikely 
2! Unlikely 
3! Somewhat Unlikely 
4! Undecided 
5! Somewhat Likely 
6! Likely 
7! Very Likely 
 (If no) If you were to watch a team in a sports competition, how likely would you be to 
cheer for the offense more than the defense? 
1! Very Unlikely 
2! Unlikely 
3! Somewhat Unlikely 
4! Undecided 
5! Somewhat Likely 
6! Likely 
7! Very Likely 
(If no) If you were to watch a team in a sports competition, how likely would you be to 
cheer for the defense more than the offense? 
1! Very Unlikely 
2! Unlikely 
3! Somewhat Unlikely 
4! Undecided 
5! Somewhat Likely 
6! Likely 
7! Very Likely 
2. (PRAY) Do you pray or talk to a higher power? 
 
2a. (If yes) Thinking about a time when you prayed or spoke with a higher power, how likely 
did the higher power you talk with see what you have to say as important? 
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(If no) If you were to talk with a higher power, how likely would it see that what you have to 
say as important? 
 
2b. (If yes) When you pray or talk with a higher power, how likely are you to request that 
something good happen? 
 
(If yes) When you pray or talk with a higher power, how likely are you to request that 
something bad does not happen? 
 
(If no) If you were to pray or talk with a higher power, how likely would you be to request 
that something good happen? 
 
(If no) If you were to pray or talk with a higher power, how likely would you be to request 
that something bad does not happen? 
 
3. (SKILL) Do you have a skill, hobby, or talent that your friends and/or family know 
about? 
 
3a. (If yes) Thinking about a time when someone asked your advice concerning a skill, hobby 
or talent you have, how likely is it that the person used the information you give them? 
 
(If no) If you did have a skill, hobby, or talent and someone asked your advice concerning it, 
how likely would the person be to use the information you gave them? 
 
3b. (If yes) If you are engaged in that task regarding a particular skill, hobby or talent that 
you have, how likely are you to try and repeat what you have done before that was 
successful? 
 
(If yes) If you are engaged in that task regarding a particular skill, hobby or talent that you 
have, how likely are you to try and avoid what you have done in before that led to failure? 
 
(If no) If you were to do a task regarding a particular skill, hobby or talent, how likely would 
you be to try and repeat what you have done before that was successful? 
 
(If no) If you were to do a task regarding a particular skill, hobby or talent, how likely would 
you be to try and avoid what you have done in before that led to failure? 
 
4. (COMMENT) Do you ever leave comments about places of business, such as 
restaurants or stores, either online or at the business? 
 
4a. (If yes) Thinking about a comment you have made as a customer, how likely were your 
views taken into account by the management and/or owners of the business? 
 
(If no) If you were to make a comment as a customer, how likely would your views be taken 
into account by the management and/or owners of the business? 
 
4b. (If yes) When leaving a comment about a place of business such as a restaurant, how 
likely are you to tell them how to make your next visit more enjoyable? 
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4b. (If yes) When leaving a comment about a place of business such as a restaurant, how 
likely are you tell them why you are never coming back? 
 
(If no) If you were to leave a comment about a place of business such as a restaurant, how 
likely would you be to tell them how to make your next visit more enjoyable? 
 
(If no) If you were to leave a comment about a place of business such as a restaurant, how 
likely would you be to tell them why you are never coming back? 
 
5. (JOB) Do you have a job? 
 
5a. (If yes) Thinking about your job, how likely is your boss to think your comments about 
the job or company are important? 
 
(If no) If you had a job, how likely would your boss think that your comments about the job 
or company are important? 
 
5b. (If yes) When working, how likely is your job performance based on getting strong 
evaluations? 
 
5b. (If yes) When working, how likely is your job performance based on avoiding getting in 
trouble? 
 
(If no) If you were working, how likely would you base your job performance on getting 
strong evaluations? 
 
(If no) If you were working, how likely would your job performance be on avoiding getting 
into trouble? 
 
6. (REALITY) Do you vote in any reality competition shows on television where the 
audience decides who goes on in the competition, such as American Idol, So You Think 
You Can Dance, X factor, etc? 
 
6a. (If yes) Thinking about a time when you voted for a contestant, how likely did your 
vote(s) matters in determining who stayed in the competition and who left? 
 
(If no) If you were to vote for a contestant in a reality competition show, how likely would 
your vote(s) matters in determining who stayed in the competition and who left? 
 
6b. (If yes) When you vote for a reality contestant, how likely are you to pick out your 
favorite contestant and vote for him/her? 
 
(If yes) When you vote for a reality contestant, how likely are you to pick out your least 
favorite contestant and vote for someone else? 
 
6b. (If no) If you were to vote for a reality contestant, how likely would you be to pick out 
your favorite contestant and vote for him/her? 
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(If no) If you were to vote for a reality contestant, how likely would you be to pick out your 
least favorite contestant and vote for someone else? 
 
7. (REVIEW) After purchasing an item, do you ever leave a review of it online? 
 
7a. (If yes) Thinking about an online review you have made, how likely were other people to 
take your review into account when deciding whether or not to purchase the product? 
 
(If no) If you were to leave a comment online, how likely would other people take your 
review into account when deciding whether or not to purchase the product? 
 
7b. (If yes) When you leave a review of a product online, how likely are you to review a 
product because you are happy about the choice to buy it? 
 
(If yes) When you leave a review of a product online, how likely are you to review a product 
because you are angry about the choice to buy it? 
 
 (If no) If you purchased a product, how likely would you be to leave a review of it online 
because you were happy about the choice to buy the product? 
 
(If no) If you purchased a product, how likely would you be to leave a review of it online 
because you were angry about the choice to buy it? 
 
8. (EVALS) Have you ever filled out detailed evaluations of a course at the university? 
 
8a. (If yes) When thinking about previous evaluations you have filled out, how likely does 
the professor use your evaluations of the class to improve it the next time (s)he teaches it? 
 
(If no) If you were to fill out class evaluations, how likely would the professor use your 
evaluations of the class to improve it the next time (s)he teaches it? 
 
8b. (If yes) When filling out a class evaluation, how likely are you to write a lot in the 
sections asking about what you liked about the course? 
 
(If yes) When filling out a class evaluation, how likely are you to write a lot in the sections 
asking about what you did not like about the class? 
 
(If no) If you were to fill out a class evaluation, how likely would you be to write a lot in the 
sections asking about what you liked about the course? 
 
(If no) If you were to fill out a class evaluation, how likely would you be to write a lot in the 
sections asking about what you did not like about the class? 
 
9. (GAMES) Do you play video games? 
 
9a. (If yes) Thinking about a time when you talked about a video game, how likely did the 
other person think that your opinion on the game matter? 
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(If no) If you were to play a video game, how likely would another person think that your 
opinion on the game matter? 
 
9b. (If yes) When playing a video game, how likely are you to attempt to get as many points 
as possible in each level? 
 
(If yes) When playing a video game, how likely are you to just try to finish the level without 
dying? 
 
(If no) If you were to play a video game, how likely would you be to attempt to get as many 
points as possible in each level? 
 
(If no) If you were to play a video game, how likely would you be to just try to finish the 
level without dying? 
 
10. (GRP PROJ) Have you had to do any group projects for a class or work? 
 
10a. (If yes) Thinking about a group project you have participated in, how likely was it that 
your peers respected your views on the assignment and try to integrate them into the 
project? 
 
(If no) Thinking about what would happen if you participated in a group project, how likely 
would your peers respect your views on the assignment and try to integrate them into the 
project? 
 
10b. (If yes) When you participate in a group project, how likely are you to do as much work 
as possible to make sure that the outcome is viewed as good? 
 
 (If yes) When you participate in a group project, how likely are you to only do enough work 
so that the outcome is not viewed as poor? 
 
(If no) If you were to participate in a group project, how likely would you be to do as much 
work as possible to make sure that the outcome is viewed as good? 
 
 (If no) If you were to participate in a group project, how likely would you be to only do 
enough work so that the outcome is not viewed as bad? 
 
11. (RECIPE) Have you ever tried a new recipe you found online and left a review of it? 
 
11a. (If yes) Thinking about a recipe you have tried, how likely would you be reviews you 
have left online, how often do other people searching for a recipe, use your comments to 
help them decide whether or not to try the recipe? 
 
(If no) If you were to leave a review of a recipe online, how often would other people 
searching for a recipe use your review to decide whether or not to try the recipe? 
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11b. (If yes) When using a new recipe, how likely are you to use the recipe as a guide and 
add/remove ingredients in order to make it taste better? 
 
(If yes) When using a new recipe, how likely are you to be careful to stick closely, or as 
closely as you can, to the recipe? 
 
(If no) If you were to use a new recipe, how likely would you use the recipe as a guide and 
add/remove ingredients in order to make it taste better? 
 
(If no) If you were to use a new recipe, how likely would you be careful to stick closely, or as 
closely as you can, to the recipe? 
 
12. (GROUP) Are you a member of any organized groups or clubs? 
 
12a. (If yes) Thinking about a club or group you are involved in, how likely do other 
members consider your opinion about the club’s activities when making decisions? 
 
(If no)  If you were to be a member of a club or group, how likely would other members 
consider your opinion about the club’s activities when making decisions? 
 
12b. (If yes) As a member of your club or group, how likely are you to participate in as many 
ways as you can? 
 
(If yes) As a member of your club or group, how likely are you to only participate as much as 
required? 
 
(If no) If you were to be a member of a club or group, how likely would you participate in as 
many ways as you can? 
 
(If no) If you were to be a member of a club or group, how likely would you to only 
participate as much as required? 
 
13. (PARTY) Do you consider yourself a member of a political party? 
 
13a. (If yes) As a member of the political party, how likely are party officials to listen and 
consider your policy ideas important?   
 
(If no) If you were a member of a political party, how likely would party officials listen to 
and consider your policy ideas as important?   
 
3b. (If yes) When discussing politics, how likely are you to talk about how your political party 
has the right ideas? 
 
(If yes) When discussing politics, how likely are you to talk about how the opposing party 
has the wrong ideas? 
 
(If no) If you were to discuss politics, how likely would you talk about how your political 
party has the right ideas? 
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(If no) If you were to discuss politics, how likely would you talk about how the opposing 
party has the wrong ideas? 
 
14. (PRIMARY) Have you ever voted in a primary election? 
 
14a. (If yes) Thinking about when you have voted in a primary election, how likely did your 
vote matter? 
 
(If no) If you were to vote in a primary election, how likely would your vote matter? 
 
14b. (If yes) When you vote in a primary, how likely are you to vote for the candidate you 
like the most even if he might lose the general election? 
 
 (If yes) When you vote in a primary, how likely are you to vote for the candidate you think 
can win the general election even if (s)he is not your favorite? 
 
(If no) If you were to vote in a primary, how likely would you vote for the candidate you like 
the most even if he might lose the general election? 
 
 (If no) If you were to vote in a primary, how likely would you vote for the candidate you 
think can win the general election even if (s)he is not your favorite? 
 
15. (GENERAL) Have you voted in a general elections? 
 
15a. (If yes) Thinking about when you have voted in general elections, how likely was your 
vote in determining who wins the election? 
 
(If no) If you were to vote in a general election, how likely would your vote determine who 
wins the election? 
 
15b. (If yes) When voting in a general election, how likely are you to vote for a party because 
you believe in its platform? 
 
(If yes) When voting in a general election, how likely are you to vote for a party because you 
oppose the other party’s platform? 
 
(If no) If you were to vote in a general election, how likely would you vote for a party 
because you believe in its platform? 
 
(If no) If you were to vote in a general election, how likely would you vote for a party 
because you oppose the other party’s platform? 
 
16. (BUMP STICK) Have you ever placed a political bumper sticker on your car? 
 
16a. (If yes) Thinking about when you have displayed a political bumper sticker on your car, 
how likely did it influence other people’s opinions? 
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(If no) If you were to display a political bumper sticker on your car, how likely would it 
influence other people’s opinions? 
 
16b. (If yes) When you put a political bumper sticker on your car, how likely are you to place 
a bumper sticker that shows your support for a candidate you like? 
 
(If yes) When you put a political bumper sticker on your car, how likely are you to place a 
bumper sticker that shows that you do not support a candidate you dislike? 
 
(If no) If you were to put a political bumper sticker on your car, how likely would you be to 
place a bumper sticker that shows your support for a candidate you like? 
 
(If no) If you were to put a political bumper sticker on your car, how likely would you be to 
place a bumper sticker that shows that you do not support a candidate you dislike? 
 
17. (VOLUNTEER) Have you ever volunteered for a political campaign? 
 
17a. (If yes) Thinking about a time you volunteered for a campaign, how likely did your work 
impact the outcome of the election? 
 
(If no) If you were to volunteer for a campaign, how likely would your work impact the 
outcome of the election? 
 
17b. (If yes) When deciding to volunteer for a campaign, how likely are you to volunteer 
because you want to see the candidate win? 
 
 (If yes) When deciding to volunteer for a campaign, how likely are you to volunteer because 
you want to see the opposing candidate lose? 
 
(If no) If you were to volunteer for a campaign, how likely would you be to volunteer 
because you want to see the candidate win? 
 
 (If no) If you were to volunteer for a campaign, how likely would you be to volunteer 
because you want to see the opposing candidate lose? 
 
18. (MONEY) Have you ever given money to a political campaign? 
 
18a. (If yes) Thinking about when you have given money to a political campaign, how likely 
was your contribution influential to the candidate? 
 
(If no) If you were to give money to a political campaign, how likely would your 
contribution be influential to the candidate? 
 
18b. (If yes) When you decide to give money to a campaign, how likely are you to give 
money because the candidate makes you happy? 
 
(If yes) When you decide to give money to a campaign, how likely are you to give money 
because the opposing candidate makes you angry? 
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(If no) If you were to give money to a campaign, how likely would you be to give money 
because the candidate makes you happy? 
 
(If no) If you were to give money to a campaign, how likely would you be to give money 
because the opposing candidate makes you angry? 
 
19. (RALLY) Have you ever attended a political rally or event? 
 
19a. (If yes) Thinking about when you attended a political rally or event, how likely was your 
presence seen as important for the politician(s) at the event? 
 
(If no) If you were to attend a political rally or event, how likely would your presence be 
seen as important for the politician(s) at the event? 
 
19b. (If yes) When deciding to attend a political rally or event, how likely are you to attend to 
provide support for the politician or issue? 
 
 (If yes) When deciding to attend a political rally or event, how likely are you to attend to 
oppose the politician or issue? 
 
(If no) If you were to attend a political rally or event, how likely would you attend to provide 
support for the politician or issue? 
 
 (If no) If you were to attend a political rally or event, how likely you attend to oppose the 
politician or issue? 
 
20. (CONTACT) Have you ever contacted a representative in government at the local, state 
or, national level? 
 
20a. (If yes) Thinking about when you contacted a representative in government, how likely 
did they use what you said to make policy decisions? 
 
(If no) If you were to contact a representative in government, how likely would they use 
what you say to make policy decisions? 
 
 
20b. (If yes) When you contact a representative in government, how likely are you to tell the 
representative about bills you support? 
 
 (If yes) When you contact a representative in government, how likely are you to tell the 
representative about bills you oppose? 
 
(If no) If you were to contact a representative in government, how likely would you tell the 
representative about bills you support? 
 
 (If no) If you were to contact a representative in government, how likely would you tell the 
representative about bills you oppose? 
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21. (ADVERTISE) When you support a politician, do you follow his campaign in the 
media, including political advertisements? 
 
21b. (If yes) When you see a campaign advertisement in the media, how likely are you to get 
worked up when you see a positive advertisement about a politician you support? 
 
(If yes) When you see a campaign advertisement in the media, how likely are you to get 
worked up when you see a negative advertisement about a politician you oppose? 
 
(If no) If you were to see a campaign advertisement in the media, how likely would you be to 
get worked up when you see a positive advertisement about a politician you support? 
 
(If no) If you were to see a campaign advertisement in the media, how likely would you be to 
get worked up when you see a negative advertisement about a politician you oppose? 
 
22. (INFO) Do you use the internet to look up political information and discuss it with 
others? 
 
22a. (If yes) Thinking about when you have had a political discussion, how likely are others 
to be persuaded by what you say? 
 
(If no) If you were to have had a political discussion, how likely are others to be persuaded 
by what you say? 
 
22b. (If yes) When you use the media to look for political information, how likely are you to 
look for positive information about a politician or policy you support? 
 
(If yes) When you use the media to look for political information, how likely are you to look 
for negative information about a politician or policy you don’t support? 
 
(If no) If you were to use the internet to look for political information, how likely would you 
be to look for positive information about a politician and policy you support? 
 
(If no) If you were to use the internet to look for political information, how likely would you 
be to look for negative information about a politician and policy you don’t support? 
 
Political Attitudes 
 
In general, do you consider yourself liberal, conservative, or something in between? 
1! Strongly liberal 
2! Liberal 
3! Leaning liberal 
4! Moderate 
5! Leaning conservative 
6! Conservative 
7! Strongly conservative 
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In general, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent? 
1! Strong Democrat 
2! Democrat 
3! Lean Democrat 
4! Independent 
5! Lean Republican 
6! Republican 
7! Strong Republican 
8! Other 
 
How interested are you in politics and public affairs? 
 1 Not at all interested 
 2 Not very interested 
 3 Somewhat interested 
 4 Interested  
 5 Very interested 
 
2012 Election Participation Questions 
 
Are you currently registered to vote? 
 1  Yes 
 2 No 
 3 Not applicable 
 
Did you vote in the presidential election of 2012? 
 1 Yes  
 2 No 
 3 Not applicable/Don’t know 
If you weren’t eligible to vote in the last presidential election, would you have voted if you 
could have?  
1! Yes 
2! No 
Who did you vote for, President Barack Obama, Mitt Romney, or somebody else? 
1! Barack Obama 
2! The Republican nominee 
3! Other (specify_______________) 
(If Obama is selected)  Using the following scale, which of the following better describes 
your reasoning to vote for President Obama, because you like President Obama and his 
policies or because you dislike Mitt Romney and his policies? 
1! Like President Obama and his policies 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 Dislike Mitt Romney and his policies 
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(If Romney is selected)  Using the following scale, which of the following better describes 
your reasoning to vote for Mitt Romney, because you like Mitt Romney and his policies or 
because you dislike President Obama and his policies? 
1! Like Mitt Romney and his policies 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 Dislike President Obama and his policies 
 
(If Other is selected)  Using the following scale, which of the following better describes your 
reasoning to vote for a third party candidate, because you like the party’s candidate and his 
policies or because you dislike Mitt Romeny and President Obama and their policies? 
1! Like the Selected Party’s candidate 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7           Dislike Mitt Romney and President Obama 
 
Political efficacy questions 
 
Using the following scale, with 1 being strongly agree and 5 being strongly disagree, please 
indicate how much you agree/disagree with the following statements.  (1=Strongly Agree; 
2=Agree; 3=Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4=Disagree; 5=Strongly Disagree) 
 
1.  Generally speaking those we elect to Congress in Washington lose touch with the people 
pretty quickly. 
2.  People like me don’t have any say in what government does. 
3.  I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think. 
4.  I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics. 
5.  I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our 
country. 
6.  I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people. 
7.  I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people. 
8.  I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics. 
9.  Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t 
really understand what’s going on. 
10. Parties are only interested in people’s votes but not in their opinions. 
 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al. 2001) 
Instructions:  This set of questions asks you HOW FREQUENTLY specific events actually 
occur of have occurred in you life.  Please indicate your answer to each question by clicking 
on the bubble next to it. 
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Response options for each question are: (1) never or seldom; (2) rarely; (3) sometimes; (4) 
often; (5) very often 
 
1. Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life. 
2.  Growing up, would you ever “cross the line” by doing things that your parents would not 
tolerate? 
3.  How often have you accomplished things that got you “psyched” to work even harder? 
4.  Did you get on your parents’ nerves often when you were growing up? 
5.  How often did you obey rules and regulations that were established by your parents? 
6.  Growing up, did you ever act in ways that your parents thought were objectionable? 
7.  Do you often do well at different things that you try? 
8.  Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times. 
9.  When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don’t perform 
as well as I ideally would like to do. 
10.  I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life. 
11. I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or motivate 
me to put effort into them. 
 
Demographic Questions 
 
Are you male or female [Male, Female] 
In what year where you born? 
Are you, yourself, of Hispanic origin or descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or 
other Spanish background? 
 1  Yes 
 2 No 
What race or races do you consider yourself? 
 1  American Indian/Native American 
 2  Asian 
 3  African American or Black 
 4 Hispanic/Latino/Latina/Chicano/Chicana 
 5 White/Caucasian 
 6 Other (specify ____________________________) 
What is the highest level of school you have completed? 
 1 Less than high school 
 2 Some high school 
 3  High school graduate 
 4 Technical school graduate 
 5 Some college 
 6 College graduate 
 7 Some graduate school 
 8 Master’s degree 
 9 Professional degree (J.D., M.D., Ph.D., etc.) 
Please indicate in which category your family annual income currently falls. 
 1 Below $20,000 
 2 $20,000 to $40,000 
 3 $40,001 to $60,000 
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 4 $60,001 to $80,000 
 5 $80,001 to $100,000 
 6 Over $100,000 
 
A.2 Regulatory Focus and Ideology Survey 
 
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al. 2001) 
[See individual items are above.] 
 
Political Attitudes 
 
In general, do you consider yourself liberal, conservative, or something in between? 
 [See items above for response options.] 
 
In general, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican, or an Independent? 
 [See items above for response options.] 
 
How interested are you in politics and public affairs? 
 [See items above for response options.] 
 
Here is a list of policy positions.  Please indicate how much you favor or oppose each one.  
Indicate your answer by clicking on the bubble next to your response. 
[Response options are: (1) oppose a great deal; (2) oppose; (3) oppose a little; (4) neither 
favor nor oppose; (5) favor a little; (6) favor; (7) favor a great deal] 
 1.  The War on Terror 
 2.  Citizenship for illegal immigrants 
 3.  Increasing spending to stop crime 
 4.  Increasing the security of our borders 
 5.  The death penalty 
 6.  Regulation of businesses 
 7.  Gun Control 
 8.  Strengthening the military 
 9.  Protecting the environment 
 10.  Abstinence only education 
 11.  Universal healthcare 
 12.  Prescription drug coverage for seniors 
 13.  Increasing spending on social security 
 14.  Increasing spending on the poor 
 15.  Increasing spending on foreign aid 
 16.  Same-sex marriage 
 17.  Increasing spending on building and repairing roads and highways 
 18.  Increasing spending on research 
 19.  Abortion rights 
 20.  Increasing funding for public schools 
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Status Quo v. Government Action Policy Preferences 
 
1a. “Current regulations on gun ownership are considered very relaxed.  There are some 
people that are trying to restrict gun rights by expanding background checks, banning certain 
weapons, and limiting the amount of ammunition a clip can hold.  Do you prefer to more 
restrictions on gun rights, extending the rights of gun owners, or maintaining the laws in 
place now?”   
 a.  Restricting the rights of gun owners 
 b. Extending rights of gun owners 
 c.  Maintaining the status quo 
 
1b. How strongly do you prefer or oppose laws restricting gun rights [extending gun 
rights/doing nothing]?  
Response options: [1 (strongly prefer); 2 (prefer); 3 (neither prefer nor oppose); 4 (oppose); 5 
(strongly oppose)] 
 
1c. When you were making your decision on what to do on gun policy, were you being 
enthusiastic and thinking about maximizing America’s future? 
When you were making your decision on what to do on gun policy, were you being careful 
or thinking about what was necessary to ensure America’s future? 
Response options: [1(not at all); 5(very)] 
 
2a. Current border security is low.  However, many people are trying to increase border 
security by building a fence between the US and Mexico, increasing the number of border 
patrol agents, and using unmanned aircraft for surveillance.  Do you prefer laws that increase 
spending border security, laws that decrease spending on border security, or maintaining the 
current level of spending for border security? 
 a.  Increasing spending on border control 
 b.  Decreasing spending on border control 
 c.  Maintaining the current level of spending on border security 
 
2b. How strongly do you prefer or oppose increasing spending for border control [decrease 
spending/maintaining the current level]?  
Response options: [1 (strongly prefer); 2 (prefer); 3 (neither prefer nor oppose); 4 (oppose); 5 
(strongly oppose)] 
 
2c. When you were making your decision on border security, were you being enthusiastic 
and thinking about maximizing America’s future? 
When you were making your decision on border security, were you being careful or thinking 
about what was necessary to ensure America’s future? 
Response options: [1(not at all); 5(very)] 
 
3a. Current laws on abortion are considered more so of a pro-choice stance.  However, 
many people are trying to restrict abortion rights by requiring wait time, ultrasounds, and 
increased regulations of who can perform abortions and where.  Do you prefer laws that are 
making the current laws more pro-choice, making the laws more pro-life, or maintaining the 
status quo? 
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 a.  Making laws more pro-choice 
 b.  Making laws more pro-life 
 c.  Maintaining the status quo 
 
3b. How strongly do you prefer or oppose making abortion laws more pro-choice [more 
pro-life/maintaining the status quo]?  
Response options: [1 (strongly prefer); 2 (prefer); 3 (neither prefer nor oppose); 4 (oppose); 5 
(strongly oppose)] 
 
3c. When you were making your decision on abortion policy, were you being enthusiastic 
and thinking about maximizing America’s future? 
When you were making your decision on abortion policy, were you being careful or thinking 
about what was necessary to ensure America’s future? 
Response options: [1(not at all); 5(very)] 
 
 
4a. Deregulation has occurred in the airline, telecommunications, the financial, and energy 
industry.  However, there has been a recent push for increasing regulations to protect 
consumers, employees, and communities.  Do you prefer laws increasing the deregulation of 
businesses, laws creating strong business regulations, or maintain the status quo? 
 a.  Increasing deregulation of businesess 
 b.  Creating strong business regulation 
 c.   Maintaining the status quo  
 
4b. How strongly do you prefer or oppose increasing the deregulation of businesses [strong 
business regulations/maintaining the status quo]?  
Response options: [1 (strongly prefer); 2 (prefer); 3 (neither prefer nor oppose); 4 (oppose); 5 
(strongly oppose)] 
 
4c. When you were making your decision about business regulation, were you being 
enthusiastic and thinking about maximizing America’s future? 
When you were making your decision about business regulation, were you being careful or 
thinking about what was necessary to ensure America’s future? 
Response options: [1(not at all); 5(very)] 
 
Demographic Questions 
[See above for individual items.] 
 
A.3 Regulatory Fit and GOTV Experiment 
 
Regulatory Focus Induction (Freitas & Higgins 2002) 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to the promotion or prevention condition. Each subject 
typed three goals. 
 
Promotion: 
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Please think about something you ideally would like to do.  In other words, think about three 
hopes or aspirations that you currently have. Please list the hopes or aspirations below. 
 
Prevention: 
Please think about something you think you ought to do. In other words, think about three 
duties or obligations that you currently have. Please list the duties or obligations below. 
Following listing each goal, subjects answered the following for each one listed. 
 
You wrote [goal] as your first [second/third] goal. How motivated are you to meet the first 
[second/third] goal you wrote down? 
 
1 Not at all Motivated (1) 
2 (2) 
3 (3) 
4 (4) 
5 (5) 
6 (6) 
7 (7) 
8 (8) 
9 (9) 
10 Extremely motivated (10) 
 
GOTV Manipulation 
 
Instructions: For the second task please read the following get-out-the-vote message that is 
being tested to determine if it should be used for the upcoming 2014 Midterm election.  You 
can move on to the next page after 30 seconds has passed. 
 
Promotion: 
 Hi, this is XXXX from Vote 2014,Vote 2014 is a nonpartisan effort working to encourage 
citizens to vote. We just wanted to remind you that elections are being held this Tuesday. We 
want to encourage everyone to help advance democracy and remember this is an 
opportunity to grow as a citizen.  Democracy is only advanced when aspiring citizens go out 
and vote.  We hope you’ll come out and vote this Tuesday. Can we count on you to vote 
next Tuesday? 
 
Prevention: 
 Hi, this is XXXX from Vote 2014,Vote 2014 is a nonpartisan effort working to ensure 
citizens vote.  We just wanted to remind you that elections are being held on Tuesday.  We 
want to ensure everyone does their civic duty and remembers it is their responsibility to 
vote.  Democracy requires that responsible citizens go out and vote. We want you to come 
out and vote on Tuesday. Can we count on you to vote next Tuesday? 
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Survey Items 
How likely are you to consider voting after receiving the message on the previous page?  
1! Very Unlikely  
2! Unlikely  
3! Somewhat Unlikely  
4! Undecided  
5! Somewhat Likely  
6! Likely  
7! Very Likely  
 
How favorable or unfavorable do think voting is as a form of political participation? 
1! Very Unfavorable  
2! Unfavorable 
3! Somewhat Unfavorable  
4! Neither Favorable nor Unfavorable  
5! Somewhat Favorable 
6! Favorable  
7! Very Favorable 
 
How positive or negative do you feel about voting as a form of political participation?  
1! Very Negative  
2! Negative 
3! Somewhat Negative 
4! Neither Positive nor Negative  
5! Somewhat Positive  
6! Positive  
7! Very Positive  
 
How good or bad is voting as a form of political participation?  
1! Very Bad  
2! Bad  
3! Poor  
4! Neither Good nor Bad  
5! Fair  
6! Good  
7! Very Good 
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How believable was the message?  
1! Very Unbelievable  
2! Unbelievable  
3! Somewhat Unbelievable 
4! Not Sure  
5! Somewhat Believable  
6! Believable  
7! Very Believable  
 
How persuasive was the message?  
1! Very Unpersuasive  
2! Unpersuasive  
3! Somewhat Unpersuasive  
4! Neither Persuasive nor Unpersuasive  
5! Somewhat Persuasive  
6! Persuasive  
7! Very Persuasive  
 
Demographic Questions 
[See above for individual items.] 
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CHAPTER 9 Appendix B: Structural Models for Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
Unstandardized 
(SE)
Standardized 
Coefficient
R2
Paths
Promotion ! Gen. Eager .32 (.05)*** .29 .22 - .42
! Gen. Vigilant -.13 (.06)* -.11 .93 - .20
Prevention ! Gen. Eager .11 (.04)** .12 -.25 - -.02
! Gen. Vigilant -.08 (.05)^ -.08 -.18 - .01
Gen. Eager ! Pol. Eager .75 (.05)*** .61 .65 - .85
! Pol. Vigilant .06 (.05) .05 -.04 - .17
Gen. Vigilant ! Pol. Eager .06 (.04) .06 -.01 - .14
! Pol. Vigilant .44 (.05)*** .38 .33 - .54
Pol. Eager ! Vote Motivation -.84 (.19) *** -.25 -1.21 - -.47
Pol. Vigilant ! Vote Motivation .78 (.15) *** .24 .48 - 1.08
Variances
Gen. Eager .44 (.03)*** .89 .37 - .51 .111
Gen. Vigilant .58 (.04)*** .98 .50 - .66 .022
Pol. Eager .44 (.04)*** .60 .36 - .53 .401
Pol. Vigilant .64 (.04)*** .84 .56 - .72 .164
Vote Motivation 7.62(.50)*** .92 6.64 - 8.61 .080
Promotion .41 (.03)*** 1.00 .35 - .47
Prevention .58 (.04)*** 1.00 .51 - .65
Covariance
geneager genvigilant .22 (.03)*** .43 .15 - .28
poleager polvigilant .14 (.03)*** .27 .08 - .21
promotion prevention .07 (.03)** .14 .02 - .12
Table B.1. Hypothesized Model Results Presented in Figure 3.7
Parameter
95% Confidence 
Intervals
Note. N= 440, Χ2 (8) = 19.64, p = .012, CFI = .978, RMSEA = .057, SRMR = .029
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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Unstandardized 
(SE)
Standardized 
Coefficient
R2
Paths
Promotion ! Gen. Eager .32 (.05)*** .29 .22 - .42
! Gen. Vigilant -.13 (.06)* -.11 -.25 - -.02
! Pol. Eager .13 (.06)* .09 .01 - .24
! Pol. Vigilant -.01 (.07) -.01 -.15 - .14
Prevention ! Gen. Eager .11 (.04)** .12 .03 - .19
! Gen. Vigilant -.08 (.05) -.08 -.18 - .01
! Pol. Eager -.14 (.04)** -.12 -.22 - -.04
! Pol. Vigilant -.04 (.05) -.04 -.14 - .06
Gen. Eager ! Pol. Eager .74 (.06)*** .60 .62 - .86
! Pol. Vigilant .08 (.06) .06 -.05 - .19
Gen. Vigilant ! Pol. Eager .07 (.04) .06 -.02 - .15
! Pol. Vigilant .43 (.06)*** .38 .31 - .54
Pol Eager ! Vote Motivation -.84 (.19) *** -.25 -1.21 - -.47
Pol. Vigilant ! Vote Motivation .78 (.16) *** .24 .46 - 1.08
Variances
Gen. Eager .44 (.04)*** .89 .38 - .52 .111
Gen. Vigilant .58 (.04)*** .98 .50 - .67 .022
Pol. Eager .43 (.04)*** .58 .36 - .52 .401
Pol. Vigilant .64 (.04)*** .83 .56 - .73 .164
Vote Motivation 7.62(.51)*** .92 6.64 - 8.61 .080
Promotion .41 (.03)*** 1.00 .36 - .48
Prevention .58 (.04)*** 1.00 .51 - .65
Covariance
geneager genvigilant .22 (.03)*** .43 .16 - .29
poleager polvigilant .14 (.03)*** .27 .09 - .21
promotion prevention .07 (.03)** .14 .02 - .12
95% Confidence 
Intervals
Parameter
Note. N = 440, Χ2 (4) = 4.04, p = .400, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .005, SRMR = .015
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Table B.2. Alternative Model 1 Results (Adds Direct Paths between RF and Political Strategies)
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Unstandardized 
(SE)
Standardized 
Coefficient R
2
Paths
Promotion ! Gen. Eager .32 (.05)*** .29 .22 - .42
! Gen. Vigilant -.13 (.06)* -.11 -.25 - -.02
Prevention ! Gen. Eager .11 (.04)** .12 .03 - .19
! Gen. Vigilant -.08 (.05)^ -.08 -.18 - .01
Gen. Eager ! Pol. Eager .74 (.06)*** .61 .65 - .85
! Pol. Vigilant .06 (.05) .05 -.04 - .17
! Vote Motivation .12 (.28) .03 -.44 .67
Gen. Vigilant ! Pol. Eager .07 (.04) .06 -.02 - .15
! Pol. Vigilant .43 (.06)*** .38 .31 - .54
! Vote Motivation .21 (.22) .06 -.21 .63
Pol. Eager ! Vote Motivation -.94 (.23)*** -.28 -.14 - -.47
Pol. Vigilant ! Vote Motivation .72 (.16)*** .22 .39 - 1.01
Variances
Gen. Eager .44 (.04)*** .89 .38 - .52 .111
Gen. Vigilant .58 (.04)*** .98 .50 - .67 .022
Pol. Eager .43 (.04)*** .58 .36 - .52 .401
Pol. Vigilant .64 (.04)*** .83 .56 - .73 .164
Vote Motivation 7.59 (.50)*** .92 6.72 - 8.59 .084
Promotion .41 (.03)*** 1.00 .36 - .48
Prevention .58 (.04)*** 1.00 .51 - .65
Covariance
geneager genvigilant .22 (.03)*** .43 .16 - .29
poleager polvigilant .14 (.03)*** .27 .09 - .21
promotion prevention .07 (.03)** .14 .02 - .12
Table B.3. Alternative Model 2 (Adds Direct Paths from General Life Strategies to Vote Motivation)
Parameter 95% Confidence 
Intervals
Note. N = 440, Χ 2 (4) = 4.04, p  = .400, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .005, SRMR = .015
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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General Life Political Life
Promotion Eager Eager -.22 (.07)** -.05 -.38 - -.10
Eager Vigilant .02 (.02) .00 -.01 - .06
Vigilant Vigilant .03 (.02)* .01 .01 - .08
Vigilant Eager -.01 (.01) .00 -.02 - .00
----- Eager -.11 (.06)* -.03 -.25 - -.02
------ Vigilant -.01 (.05) .00 -.11 - .11
Eager ----- .04 (.09) .01 -.14 - .23
Vigilant ----- .02 (.03) .01 -.02 - .10
-.24 (.10)* -.05 -.44 - -.04
Prevention Vigilant Vigilant -.02 (.02) -.01 -.06 - .00
Vigilant Eager .01 (.00) .00 .00 - .02
Eager Eager .09 (.05)^ .02 .02 - .23
Eager Vigilant -.01 (.01) .00 -.03 - .00
----- Vigilant -.03 (.04) -.01 -.12 - .04
----- Eager .13 (.06)* .03 .04 - .27
Vigilant ----- -.02 (.02) .00 -.09 - .01
Eager ----- -.02 (.05) .00 -.13 - .05
.13 (.08) .03 -.02 - .30
Gen. Eager Eager -.69 (.18)*** -.17 -1.06 - -.33
Vigilant .06 (.05) .01 -.03 - .15
-.63 (.18)*** -.15 -.96 - -.28
-.51 (.22)* -.12 -.92 - -.03
Gen. Vigilant Vigilant .31 (.08)*** .08 .17 - .49
Eager -.06 (.04) -.02 -.16 - .01
.24 (.08)** .07 .10 - .41
.45 (.21)* .12 .01 - .83
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Total Indirect Effect (Promotion)
Total Indirect Effect (Prevention)
Total Indirect Effect (Gen. Life Eager)
Total Effect (Gen. Life Vigilant)
Note. N = 440
Total Effect (Gen. Life Eager)
Total Indirect Effect (Gen. Life Vigilant)
Table B.4. Indirect Effects for Alternative Model 2 in Table B.3
Paths From Mediated by Unstandardized 
(SE)
Standardized 
Coefficient
95% Confidence 
Intervals
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Unstandardized 
(SE)
Standardized 
Coefficient
R2
Paths
Promotion ! Gen. Eager .32 (.05)*** .29 .23 - .43
! Gen. Vigilant -.13 (.06)* -.11 -.25 - -.02
! Vote Motivation .29 (.22) .06 -.11 .70
Prevention ! Gen. Eager .11 (.04)** .12 .03 - .20
! Gen. Vigilant -.08 (.05)^ -.08 -.17 - .01
! Vote Motivation -.07 (.17) -.02 -.40 .25
Gen. Eager ! Pol. Eager .74 (.05)*** .61 .65 - .84
! Pol. Vigilant .06 (.06) .05 -.05 - .16
Gen. Vigilant ! Pol. Eager .06 (.04) .06 -.01 - .15
! Pol. Vigilant .44 (.05)*** .38 .33 - .54
Pol. Eager ! Vote Motivation -.91 (.19)*** -.27 -.13 - -.53
Pol. Vigilant ! Vote Motivation .80 (.16)*** .24 .50 - 1.11
Variances
Gen. Eager .44 (.03)*** .89 .38 - .52 .111
Gen. Vigilant .58 (.04)*** .98 .50 - .67 .022
Pol. Eager .44 (.04)*** .60 .37 - .56 .401
Pol. Vigilant .64 (.04)*** .84 .57 - .73 .164
Vote Motivation 7.59 (.48)*** .91 6.74 - 8.57 .088
Promotion .41 (.03)*** 1.00 .36 - .48
Prevention .58 (.04)*** 1.00 .51 - .66
Covariance
geneager genvigilant .22 (.03)*** .43 .16 - .30
poleager polvigilant .14 (.03)*** .27 .09 - .22
promotion prevention .07 (.03)** .14 .02 - .12
Table B.5. Alternative Model 3 (Adds Direct Paths from Regulatory Focus to Vote Motivation)
Parameter
95% Confidence 
Intervals
Note. N= 440, Χ2 (6) = 15.79, p = .015, CFI = .977, RMSEA = .061, SRMR = .026
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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General Life Political Life
Promotion Eager Eager -.22 (.06)*** -.05 -.34 - -.10
Eager Vigilant .02 (.02) .00 -.01 - .05
Vigilant Vigilant -.05 (.02)* -.01 -.09 - .00
Vigilant Eager .01 (.01) .00 .00 - .02
-.24 (.06)*** -.05 -.35 - -.13
.05 (.21) .01 -.36 - .46
Prevention Vigilant Vigilant -.03 (.02) -.01 -.06 - .01
Vigilant Eager .00 (.00) .00 .00 - ,01
Eager Eager -.08 (.03)* -.02 -.14 - -.01
Eager Vigilant .01 (.01) .00 .00 - .02
-.10 (.03)*** -.03 -.15 - -.04
-.17 (.16) -.05 -.49 - .15
Gen. Eager Eager -.68 (.15)*** -.17 -.97 - -.39
Vigilant .05 (.05) .01 -.04 - .15
-.63 (.15)*** -.15 -.91 - -.34
Gen. Vigilant Vigilant .35 (.08)*** .09 .21 - .51
Eager -.06 (.04) -.02 -.13 - .01
.29 (.08)*** .08 .14 - .47
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Total Indirect Effect (Gen. Life Vigilant)
Note. N = 440.
Total Indirect Effect (Promotion)
Total Effect (Promotion)
Total Indirect Effect (Prevention)
Total Effect (Prevention)
Total Indirect Effect (Gen. Life Eager)
Table B.6. Indirect Effects for Alternative Model 3 in Table B.5.
Paths From
Mediated by Unstandardized 
(SE)
Standardized 
Coefficient
95% Confidence 
Intervals
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CHAPTER 10 Appendix C: Comparison Models for Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main Effects Intent Vote Index Efficacy Persuasion
Prevention Fit -.11 (.20) -.19 (.15) -.02 (.15) -.08 (.16)
Prevention Nonfit .18 (.21) -.04 (.16) -.17 (.16) -.03 (.16)
Promotion Nonfit .03 (.20) -.22 (.15) .01 (.15) .06 (.15)
Regulatory Focus Strength .16 (.10) .07 (.07) .02 (.07) .17 (.07)*
RF Strength Interactions
Prevention Fit -.06 (.12) .03 (.09) .02 (.09) -.05 (.09)
Prevention Nonfit .02 (.15) .05 (.11) -.01 (.11) .04 (.11)
Promotion Nonfit -.13 (.12) -.05 (.09) .05 (.09) -.12 (.09)
Constant 4.75 (.15)*** 5.74 (.11)*** 2.93 (.11)*** 4.89 (.11)***
F  1.97^ 2.19* .75 3.17**
N 609 606 606 609
R 2 .022 .025 .009 .036
Table C.1. OLS Coefficients (SE) for Regulatory Focus Strengthby Condition 
Interactions (Promotion Fit is the comparison condition)
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Main Effects Intent Vote Index Efficacy Persuasion
Promotion Fit -.18 (.21) .06 (.16) .20 (.16) .03 (.16)
Prevention Fit -.28 (.21) -.14 (.15) .16 (.15) -.05 (.16)
Promotion Nonfit -.15 (.20) -.17 (.15) .19 (.15) .08 (.16)
Regulatory Focus Strength .18 (.11)^ .12 (.08) .02 (.08) .21 (.08)**
RF Strength Interactions
Promotion Fit -.03 (.15) -.05 (.11) .001 (.11) -.04 (.11)
Prevention Fit -.08 (.13) -.02 (.10) .03 (.09) -.09 (.10)
Promotion Nonfit -.15 (.13) -.10 (.09) .05 (.09) -.16 (.10)^
Prevention Nonfit ----- ----- ----- -----
Constant 4.93 (.15)*** 5.69 (.11)*** 2.75 (.11)*** 4.86 (.12)***
F 1.98^ 2.19 .80 3.17**
N 616 613 613 616
R 2 .023 .025 .009 .036
Table C.2. OLS Coefficients (SE) for Regulatory Focus Strength by Condition 
Interactions (Prevention Nonfit is the comparison condition)
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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Main Effects Intent Vote Index Efficacy Persuasion
Promotion Fit .10 (.20) .20 (.15) .05 (.15) .09 (.16)
Promotion Nonfit .13 (.20) -.03 (.15) .05 (.14) .14 (.15)
Prevention Nonfit .28 (.21) .16 (.15) -.14 (.15) .06 (.16)
Regulatory Focus Strength .10 (.07) .10 (.05)* .04 (.05) .12 (.05)*
RF Strength Interactions
Promotion Fit .05 (.12) -.03 (.09) -.02 (.09) .04 (.09)
Promotion Nonfit -.07 (.09) -.08 (.07) .03 (.07) -.08 (.07)
Prevention Nonfit .08 (.13) .02 (.10) -.03 (.09) .09 (.10)
Constant 4.65 (.14)*** 5.54 (.11)*** 2.89 (.10)*** 4.81 (.11)***
F 1.96^ 2.22* .76 3.17**
N 609 606 606 609
R 2 .022 .025 .009 .036
Table C.3. OLS Coefficients (SE) for Regulatory Focus Strengthby Condition 
Interactions (Prevention Fit is the comparison condition)
^ p ≤ .10; * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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